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Freedom Fighters, Freedom Haters, Martyrs, and Evildoers: 
The Social Construction of Suicide Terrorism 
 
Cécile Valérie Van de Voorde 
 
ABSTRACT 
Suicide terrorism is characterized by the willingness of physically and psychologically 
war-trained individuals to die while destroying or attempting to annihilate enemy targets 
in furtherance of certain political or social objectives. Rooted in the historical, social, and 
psychological dimensions of international terrorism, suicide terrorism is neither a unique 
nor a new phenomenon. Its recent resurgence and the extensive media coverage it has 
received account for the misleading uniqueness of this violent, complex, and adaptive 
form of terrorism. This qualitative study examines the definitional and rhetorical 
processes by which suicide terrorism is socially constructed. Using a social 
constructionist theoretical framework coupled with a symbolic interactionist approach, 
this multi-case study effectively moves the analysis of suicide bombings beyond 
essentialist debates on asymmetrical warfare or terrorism and into a more nuanced 
appreciation of cultural meaning and human interaction. Hence this case study 
emphasizes how the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a 
biased representation of events and their alleged causes that is conditioned by deliberate 
attempts to stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and promote 
certain political interests. The primary research question is: How are socio-political 
processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures involved in the social 
 viii 
 
construction of suicide terrorism? Secondary research questions focus on determining 
how suicide terrorism is (a) a political weapon, (b) a communication tool, and (c) a 
politicized issue that fits into a moral panic framework. Methods used to conduct the 
analysis include in-depth interviews (phenomenological and elite interviewing) and 
document analysis (general document review and historical review). Findings highlight 
the interactions between suicide bombers (as contemporary folk devils), the news and 
entertainment media, the public, and agents of social control (politicians, lawmakers, law 
enforcement, and action groups), and their respective roles in the social construction of 
suicide terrorism. The limitations of the study, its significant theoretical and practical 
implications, as well as suggestions for future research are discussed.
 
 
 
 1
 
 
 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
Suicide terrorism is characterized by the willingness of physically and 
psychologically war-trained individuals to die in the course of destroying or attempting to 
annihilate enemy targets in furtherance of certain political or social objectives. Suicide 
terrorism is rooted in the historical, social, and psychological dimensions of international 
terrorism, as a result of centuries of opposition between various groups and their actual or 
perceived enemies. As such, it is neither a unique nor a new phenomenon. Rather, it is an 
integral feature of the historical development of oppositional terrorism worldwide and the 
product of an assortment of tactics, goals, and motives characteristic of more 
conventional terrorism.  
Over the past three years, more suicide terror attacks have been recorded 
worldwide than in the last twenty-five years. This resurgence of suicide terrorism in 
several countries and the extensive media coverage it has received account for the 
seeming, misleading uniqueness of the phenomenon. Until recently, it was witnessed in 
less than a dozen countries, primarily Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Israel. It has now spread 
across the world and even reached U.S. soil. Today, about twenty religious or secular 
terrorist groups have resorted to or are capable of using suicide terrorism against their 
own governments and foreign governments alike. Such an unprecedented propagation of 
suicide terror attacks against Western interests at the dawn of the twenty-first century has 
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made governments and the public glaringly aware of how vulnerable they are to this 
extremely violent, adaptive form of terrorism, and how imperative it is to devise effective 
and efficient measures to combat and prevent suicide terrorism.  
Nonetheless, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, its etiology, outcomes, and 
implications are still misconstrued today by policymakers and scholars alike. There has 
been an outpouring of literature on terrorism since September 2001 and, in particular, 
articles and book chapters about suicide terrorism have multiplied in a variety of 
academic journals and more mainstream books. The majority of these pieces focus on the 
contemporary development of suicide bombings as the ultimate terrorist act and the 
legitimization of such a violent practice as a tool of war. They also typically focus on 
Islamic fundamentalism as the root cause of suicide terrorism, despite the fact that non-
Muslim religious groups and even secular groups have resorted to suicide terrorism, and 
highlight the psychological or psychopathological features of typical suicide bombers.  
This distinctive study shall advance our understanding of the complex and 
adaptive phenomenon that is suicide terrorism. The latter, much like terrorism in general, 
is a socio-political concept that is understood differently from one society to another and 
from one historical or political era to the next. As such, suicide terrorism is essentially the 
product of the interaction of social and political mechanisms, bureaucratic demands, and 
mass media organizations. The popular imagery and stereotypes manufactured by these 
processes, and perpetuated by government officials as well as many academics, do not 
provide us with an accurate representation of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Even 
the mere definition of suicide terrorism requires a very subjective, complex approach that 
is laden with political undertones and contradictions.  
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Suicide terrorism is not only a complex, adaptive phenomenon and a long-
standing tool of asymmetric warfare, but also a concept that varies depending on the 
socio-political context involved. Certain events (objective actions) will be labeled as 
suicide terrorism in a specific context or segment of society, whereas similar events 
would not be construed as such in a different context or another segment of society. 
Hence, the interpretation (subjective meaning) of the concept suicide terrorism calls for 
further study in order to fully understand the mechanisms and dynamics involved and, 
ultimately, the growing threat it poses worldwide.   
The interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is subjective and contingent 
upon rhetorical mechanisms by which diverse interest groups and bureaucratic agencies 
impose their particular opinion on suicide terrorism as the set of beliefs that must be 
recognized as right (i.e., the new and only acceptable norm). This study proposes to 
examine the subjective definitional and rhetorical processes by which suicide terrorism is 
socially constructed.  
Using a constructionist and interactionist approach, the purpose of this multi-case 
study is to demonstrate that suicide terrorism is essentially a socially constructed 
problem, and how collective definitions, interpretations, and understandings of suicide 
bombings depend upon the interaction of the media, the public, and agents of social 
control (politicians, law enforcement, lawmakers, and interest groups). Such an approach 
shall effectively move the analysis of suicide terrorism beyond essentialist debates and 
into more nuanced understandings of cultural and ideological meaning, socio-political 
context, and human action. Hence, this study is designed to determine how the 
interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a biased representation 
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of events (and their alleged causes) in official and media accounts that is conditioned by 
deliberate attempts to stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and 
promote certain political interests. Thus, the main research question on which this study 
focuses is: How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media 
structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism? A subset of three 
research questions can be derived from this. (a) How is suicide terrorism a political 
weapon? (b) How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool? (c) How is suicide 
terrorism a politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework? 
This chapter has presented the introduction, statement of the problem, 
significance of the present multi-case study, and research questions. Chapter 2 presents a 
conceptual framework, or theoretical perspective, with a review of the extant literature on 
suicide terrorism, social constructionism, and symbolic interactionism, as pertains to the 
issue under investigation. The methodology and procedures for data collection are 
described in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the study. Finally, Chapter 5 
comprises a summary of the multi-case study, a comprehensive discussion of the 
theoretical and practical outcomes of the analysis, as well as an examination of the 
limitations of the latter and suggestions for future research. 
 5
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
The extant literature on terrorism is sizable and diverse. Prior to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 on U.S. soil, terrorism was already a topic of interest 
across many academic disciplines, mainly political science, sociology, and psychology. 
Since September 2001, thousands of articles and books on terrorism have been published 
in an attempt to understand the dynamics of this peculiar form of violence. The field, 
however, is dominated by historical surveys and literature integrators (less than 5% of 
published scholarly pieces rely on interviews, for instance). Most authors rely solely upon 
open-source documents, which accounts for the overall lack of meaningful primary data 
and substantive new knowledge. Thus “[t]errorism research exists on a diet of fast-food 
research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious” (Silke, 2004:68). 
Unlike terrorism in general, the particular phenomenon of suicide terrorism 
remains largely understudied and fundamentally misconstrued. Impartial efforts (by 
scholars, governments or the media) to fully and methodically comprehend suicide 
bombings have been minor compared to efforts to prevent or control them. Without a 
clear, thorough understanding of suicide bombings within their specific context, any 
efforts to combat them with anti-terrorism (operational) or counter-terrorism (preventive) 
measures will remain futile. This analysis aims distinctively at determining whether 
suicide bombings are a product of specific socio-political processes and ideological 
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constructions, i.e., how they can be interpreted and politicized as terrorism or not based 
on a subjective construal of certain events and their alleged causes. Inasmuch as there 
have been more suicide terror attacks worldwide over the past four years than in the last 
two decades, it appears crucial to provide a sound understanding of the socio-political 
and ideological constructions of this significant contemporary phenomenon. The 
sociology of terrorism has been mostly neglected in the scholarly literature and the study 
of suicide terrorism, as noted below, has typically been limited to the overall use of 
suicide bombings as a political weapon without much attention being paid to the socio-
political dynamics, institutional processes, and complex biases inherent in the 
phenomenon, its interpretation, and our understanding of it.  
The following examination of the current literature on suicide terrorism, social 
constructionism, and symbolic interactionism shall provide an overview of the conceptual 
and theoretical foundation of this multi-case study of suicide bombings.  
Suicide Terrorism 
Defining Terrorism 
Although scholars in various disciplines have focused on the phenomenon, and 
even though a plethora of articles are available on the topic, there is still no agreed upon, 
all-encompassing definition of terrorism (Archick & Gallis, 2003; Caracci, 2002; 
Crenshaw, 1992; Hewitt, 2000; Hoffman, 2003; Hudson, 2000; International Policy 
Insitute for Counter-Terrorism, 2002; Jenkins, 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2000; Laqueur, 
2003; Nyatepe-Coo & Zeisler-Vralsted, 2004; Poland, 2004; Simonsen & Spindlove, 
2003; van Leeuwen, 2003c; White, 2003; Whittaker, 2001, 2002). The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force against persons or 
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property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives (Poland, 2004; Simonsen & 
Spindlove, 2003; White, 2003).  
As Schweitzer (2001) points out, “[d]efining a terror attack as a suicide bombing 
depends primarily on whether the perpetrator is killed.” If the bomber dies, as intended, 
while completing his or her mission, the terror attack will qualify as a suicide bombing. A 
contrario, the bombing cannot possibly be a suicide bombing if the perpetrator does not 
die in the course of the attack. Hence, a suicide terror attack can be construed as 
a violent, politically motivated attack, carried out in a deliberate state of 
awareness by a person who blows himself up together with his chosen 
target. The pre-meditated certain death of the perpetrator is the pre-
condition for the success of the attack. (Ibid.) 
 
Phenomenology and Etiology  
Virtually all the articles and books published on suicide terrorism focus on 
phenomenology, etiology, and promising prevention measures. Most articles on the 
“genesis of suicide terrorism” (Atran, 2003) underscore not only the processes by which 
suicide terrorism has developed from its early manifestations to contemporary times, but 
also the general characteristics of the phenomenon as observed around the world today 
(Beyler, 2003a; Council on Foreign Relations, 2004; Dale, 1988; Gunaratna, 2000, 2001; 
Hoffman, 2003; Hoffman & McCormick, 2004; International Policy Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism, 2000; Kondaki, 2001; Pipes, 1986; Schweitzer, 2001; Sprinzak, 
2000a, 2000b). In particular, Pape (2003) studied 188 suicide terrorist attacks perpetrated 
worldwide between 1980 and 2001. His study evidences that suicide terrorism follows a 
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“strategic logic” distinctively intended to obtain considerable territorial concessions by 
coercing contemporary liberal democracies.   
Psychological explanations of suicide terrorism. Several authors have focused on 
the psychological issues inherent in the “making of” a suicide bomber, most notably the 
absence of major psychopathological traits or psychiatric features (Atran, 2003, 2004; 
Glausiusz, 2003; Mansdorf, 2003; Perina, 2002; Sprinzak, 2000; Van Biema, 2001). In an 
attempt to provide an understanding of “what makes suicide bombers tick,” Shuman 
(2001) examines Palestinian bombers and highlights their strict religious education with 
promises of paradise in reward for martyrdom, the support they receive from their parents 
for their convictions, as well as the brainwashing process and the encouragement 
received “from a Palestinian society with no other means of fighting back against 
oppression and humiliation.”  
Socio-economic explanations of suicide terrorism. Yet others highlight the socio-
economic and political processes involved in the development and perpetuation of suicide 
terrorism recruitment campaigns and missions. Strenski (2003) emphasizes the “social 
logic” of Muslim “human bombers.” Atran (2003, 2004) firmly rebukes the position 
adopted by many government officials and political observers who deem contemporary 
suicide terrorists (especially in the Middle East) as “crazed cowards bent on senseless 
destruction who thrive on poverty and ignorance.” Kushner (2002) focuses on the socio-
political aspects of suicide terrorism, whereas Griset and Mahan (2003) put the 
phenomenon in perspective within a more general study of terrorism. The latter approach 
is in fact the preferred one in most terrorism books available today.  
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Religious and moral explanations of suicide terrorism. The religious and moral 
roots of suicide terrorism are also at the center of several articles, book chapters, and 
books. The “moral infrastructure” of suicide bombers is emphasized to offer an 
understanding of the phenomenon from a moral judgment perspective (Berko, 2004). The 
significance of suicide terrorism as religious violence, religious propaganda tool, and 
ultimate jihad is at the center of numerous articles and books published over the past few 
years (see, for instance, Ali, 2002; Bond, 2004; International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism, 2001; Israeli, 2003; Laqueur, 2003; Selegut, 2003; Victor, 2003). The 
substantial role of religious fundamentalism and martyrdom in Islamic terrorism is 
typically favored (see, for instance, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 
2001; Israeli, 2002, 2003). The endorsement of suicide terrorism by top Muslim clerics 
(Fighel, 2002) garners as much attention from scholars and analysts as does the 
interdiction of the trend by senior officials and religious leaders (Paz, 2001; Pope, 2003). 
Isolating issues and cases. Some articles or books provide more or less developed 
accounts (rather than analyses) of cases involving female suicide bombers (Beyler, 
2003b; Eshel, 2001; Victor, 2003). Others concentrate on specific groups using suicide 
terrorism or countries affected by it. For instance, Abuza (2002) reports on Al-Qaeda’s 
activities and allies in Southeast Asia, with an emphasis on suicide bombings perpetrated 
by Jemaah Islamyah and security concerns in the Philippines and Indonesia. Van de 
Voorde (2005) examines Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers, describing the LTTE’s Black Tiger 
suicide unit as the masters of suicide bombing. Palestinian suicide terrorism is the focal 
point of many articles and books available today (see, for instance, Kimhi & Even, 2003; 
Luft, 2002; Moghadam, 2003; Simon & Stevenson, 2003; Stork, 2002; Telhami, 2002). 
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Moghadam (2003) analyzes suicide bombers of the al-Aqsa Intifada (from September 
2000 to June 2002 only) in order to highlight the motivational and organizational 
elements involved in the process. Simon and Stevenson (2003) focus specifically on 
Hamas, its ideology, operations, and influence on the peace process between Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority.  
Anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism issues. Ways to “outsmart” suicide terrorists 
(Sprinzak, 2000b) or “defeat suicide terrorism” (Wolfson, 2003) are sporadically 
discussed in the extant literature. In 2001, the International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism (ICT) published a collection of chapters on countering suicide terrorism that 
provides both an overview of this worldwide phenomenon, brief case studies of specific 
countries or groups, as well as recommendations regarding realistic strategies and 
promising measures against suicide terrorism. Moghadam (2003) discusses counter-
terrorism strategies targeting Palestinian suicide terrorism and suggests that Israel 
identify ways of eliminating or at least reducing the incentives that encourage some 
Palestinians to volunteer for suicide missions. Simon and Stevenson (2003) suggest ways 
for Israel to deal with Hamas and survey the role of the United States in handling the 
ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Van de Voorde (2005) 
focuses on the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and offers policy 
recommendations to assess and effectively address the issue of ethnic separatism and 
violence in Sri Lanka.  
The sociology of suicide terrorism. What is still missing from the extant literature 
is a thorough analysis of “the dynamics through which terrorism becomes a social 
phenomenon” (Turk, 2004:271). Sociologists have, however, contributed to the study of 
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terrorism in general by adopting an interpretive approach in order to determine that 
terrorism is a social construction (Ben-Yehuda, 1993; Turk, 2002a, 2004; Van de Voorde 
& Mason, 2004). As Turk (2004) stresses, “[c]ontrary to the impression fostered by 
official incidence counts and media reports, terrorism is not a given in the real world but 
is instead an interpretation of events and their presumed causes” (2004:271). For 
instance, it appears that the United States itself  
has a long history of violence associated with political, labor, racial, 
religious, and other social and cultural conflicts. . . . Assassinations, 
bombings, massacres, and other secretive deadly attacks have caused 
many thousands of casualties. Yet, few incidents have been defined as 
terrorism or the perpetrators as terrorists. Instead, authorities have 
typically ignored or downplayed the political significance of such 
violence, opting to portray and treat the violence as apolitical criminal acts 
by deranged or evil individuals, outlaws or gangsters, or ‘imported’ 
agitators. . . . In official public usage, terrorism is far more likely to refer 
to incidents associated with agents and supporters of presumably foreign-
based terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda than with the violence of 
home-grown militants. (2004:272) 
 
Suicide Terrorism in Perspective 
Main Characteristics 
Suicide terrorism is a form of terrorism characterized by the willingness of 
physically and psychologically war-trained individuals to die in the course of destroying 
or attempting to annihilate enemy targets in furtherance of certain political or social 
objectives. A suicide terror operation is a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated 
by self-aware individuals who actively and purposely cause their own death through 
blowing themselves up along with their chosen target. The ensured death of the 
perpetrator is a precondition for the success of his or her mission.  
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Suicide operations are differentiated depending on whether they occur on or off 
the battlefield. Battlefield operations are those in which suicide bombers belong to the 
attacking groups. For instance, during World War II, scores of Japanese pilots known as 
Kamikaze (i.e., “the divine wind”) used their planes as missiles to crash into U.S. military 
targets. Japan first used suicide attacks during the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. 
In the fall of 1944, the Japanese Imperial Army organized massive suicide attacks, known 
as “Tokkotai.” In addition to destroying U.S. warships, the primary purpose of the 
Tokkotai was to launch a psychological warfare against Americans and discourage them 
from engaging in the conflict. The Kamikaze pilots believed that serving and honoring 
their Emperor by becoming human bombs would open the gates of heaven for them and 
guarantee their eternal happiness. Moreover, besides the promise of paradise and spiritual 
integrity, the majority of the Kamikaze were motivated by revenge and a desire to save 
their country from the invading, all-conquering Americans. The Kamikaze were therefore 
dying for a cause, serving both God and their country. Therefore, even though they target 
civilians instead of soldiers, Palestinian suicide bombers have been compared to 
Kamikaze terrorists since they typically also believe that they are fighting not only for 
their country but also against the enemies of God, that is, Israel and America. Operations 
taking place off the battlefield, on the other hand, usually involve single suicide bombers; 
however, multiple suicide bombers have also been used, as evidenced in attacks 
perpetrated by Hamas or the LTTE. The targets are generally varied: they can be either 
stationary or mobile, human beings or infrastructures; their nature can be civilian, 
military, political, economic, or cultural (International Policy Insitute for Counter-
Terrorism, 2002; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). 
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Historical Developments  
 History shows that suicide attacks are indubitably a long-standing modus 
operandi for terrorist groups. In ancient times, a couple of legendary sects, the Jewish 
Sicarii (Zealots) and the Islamic Hashishiyun (Assassins), were well known for 
committing suicide terror attacks (Schweitzer, 2002; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). 
From the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, various Muslim 
communities in Asia also opted for terrorist suicide attacks in their fight against European 
colonialism. Suicide operations were carried out against Western hegemonists on the 
Malabar Coast of Southwestern India, in Northern Sumatra in Atjeh, as well as in the 
Southern Philippines in both Mindanao and Sulu. The terrorists belonged to a minority 
subcultural group within the Muslim community; although they were established along 
the coast of the Indian Ocean, they terrorized Europeans both in the region and on the 
Old Continent. The suicide attacks would take place whenever hopeless militant Muslims 
would give up on resisting the Europeans. Their purpose was not only to protect the 
honor of the Islamic community, but also to terrify Europeans or local Christians. The 
terrorists considered their actions as a private jihad: they were driven by their intense 
religious commitment and their aspiration to personal merit. Characteristic of the suicidal 
jihads was the heroic literature they spawned (e.g., songs, poems, legal and theological 
treatises, epic narratives); it glorified both martyrdom and the rituals performed prior to 
carrying out the attacks. Epics specifically celebrated the sacrifice made by the suicide 
terrorists and encouraged other Muslims in the community to emulate the martyrs. Since 
the suicide attacks typically happened when military opposition to colonialism had been 
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unsuccessful, they were suspended once innovative political prospects flourished in the 
area (sometimes as late as the 1920s) (Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). 
As Dale (1988) explains in his study of anti-colonial terrorism in Islamic Asia, 
although the attacks did not involve bombings, they were “a premodern form of 
terrorism, and by studying them it is possible to appreciate why many Muslims regard the 
recent terrorist attacks in the Middle East as only a more politicized variant of a type of 
anticolonial resistance that long antedates the twentieth century” (1988:39). The 
contemporary trend of suicide terrorism in the Middle East is a result of the use and 
misuse of Islam as a political tool by Islamist, fundamentalist movements. Political Islam, 
even its most vicious and extremist manifestations, appeared early on in Islamic history 
owing to radical puritans such as the Kharijites, who would attack Muslims they did not 
deem devout or virtuous enough. Modern forms of politicized Islam are derived from the 
Wahhabi reforms initiated in Arabia in the late eighteenth century. Today, the extremist 
ideology developed by the Wahhabis is still promoted by their spiritual heirs in Saudi 
Arabia and the al-Qaeda network (Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).  
Hence, put in the historical perspective of the development of oppositional 
terrorism across the world, the contemporary trend of suicide terrorism appears much less 
exceptional or unique. Rather, it is an essential factor of the profound, underlying 
animosity between terrorist organizations and their governmental foes. Suicide terrorism 
merely mirrors the development of general terrorist tactics, as well as the ability of 
terrorist groups to refine their methods of operation in order to wage the most efficient 
and cost-effective psychological warfare of all, which also coincides with the 
advancement of technology and the evolution of the socio-economic forces inherent in 
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today’s society (International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2002; Van de 
Voorde & Mason, 2004).  
As emphasized by Boaz Ganor (2002a), the executive director of the International 
Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, at the 2000 International Conference on 
Countering Suicide Terrorism, 
Suicide terrorism constitutes a significant escalation in terrorist 
activity. In his ability to implement the attack at precisely the time and 
place where it will cause the maximum number of casualties and greatest 
damage, the suicide bomber is virtually guaranteed success. Even the least 
deadly of such attacks succeed in striking a devastating blow to public 
morale. (2002a:1) 
 
Suicide terrorism is all the more threatening because of the difficulties of combating it, 
the large number of casualties it creates, and the religious and ideological zeal it inspires. 
It is a phenomenon that often, though not always, goes hand in hand with religious 
extremism – distorting religion in the service of political aims. 
Contemporary Trends and Issues 
Terrorism today is very different from ancient methods of warfare; likewise, 
contemporary suicide terrorism has departed from the ancient strategies that spawned it. 
The primary purpose of suicide terrorism is to cause maximum physical damage and 
subsequently paralyze entire populations with overwhelming fear and angst. This 
guarantees the devastating, negative psychological effect of the impromptu operations not 
only on the direct attack victims, but also on entire populations. The high number of 
casualties in suicide attacks further warrants worldwide media coverage, which 
guarantees the exposure of suicide terrorist organizations on the international scene. 
Suicide terrorism has consequently become one of the most spectacular and dreadful 
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weapons available to terrorists, along with blowing up airplanes in mid air and using 
weapons of mass destruction (Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). 
The currently observed manifestations of suicide terrorism have typically 
involved terrorists carrying explosive charges concealed on their bodies or transported by 
various vehicles (generally cars, trucks, boats, or even bicycles and animals). Attacks 
usually involved one or two bombers. Terrorist bombings target enclosed spaces (e.g., 
buses, trains), semi-confined spaces (e.g., restaurants, cafés, hotels), and open spaces 
(e.g., open marketplace, bus stop, pedestrian areas) (Almogy, Belzberg, Mintz, Pikarsky, 
Zamir, & Rivkind, 2004). As Almogy et al. (2005) emphasize, “[t]he combination of 
military-grade explosive material, high-mass shrapnel, and precise control of the timing 
of detonation has transformed suicide bombing attacks into an ultimate tool in the hands 
of terrorists” (2005:390). The lethal effect of the bombs is often amplified by using 
explosives packed with metallic pellets, nails and bolts, or bombers who are carriers of 
viruses such as HIV or Hepatitis B and C (Almogy et al., 2005; Kluger et al., 2005; 
Siegel-Itzkovich, 2001).  
The mass casualty situation that can ensue from a terrorist bombing is a concern 
to the emergency management community. “Suicide bombing attacks seriously challenge 
the most experienced medical facilities” (Almogy, Belzberg, Mintz, Pikarsky, Zamir, & 
Rivkind, 2004:295) and require even large-volume trauma centers to update and modify 
their protocol regarding casualty management, triage, and treatment. Furthermore, the 
likelihood of severe injury and multiple contamination resulting from blast exposure 
presents new challenges to the civilian medical corps in advanced and developing 
countries alike (Almogy, Belzberg, Mintz, Pikarsky, Zamir, & Rivkind, 2004; Mrena, 
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Paakkonen, Back, Pirvola, & Ylikoski, 2004; Siegel-Itzkovich, 2001; Zafar, Rehmani, 
Chawla, Umer, & Mohsin-e-Azam, 2005).   
Using passenger airliners to organize airborne suicide attacks, on the other hand, 
is a relatively innovative and highly effective method. As explained by Rohan Gunaratna 
(2001) after the September 2001 attacks on U.S. soil, “[t]he use of passenger airliners in a 
suicide role demonstrates an escalation in the threat aimed at causing mass casualties. As 
the threshold has been crossed, it is very likely that several other terrorist groups will 
attempt similar operations in the immediate or foreseeable future” (2001:8). 
The concept of hijacking and employing passenger airliners in a suicide mission 
can be traced back to the Middle East. The idea first developed in the mid-1980s as 
Middle Eastern terrorist groups attempted to develop an air capability, primarily to gain 
access from Lebanon into Israel, and therefore acquired light air vehicles and trained 
soon-to-be-kamikaze pilots with much sophistication throughout the 1990s. Until the fall 
of 2001, although “the Western security intelligence community has been aware of 
terrorist consideration of the airborne suicide option for nearly three decades” (Ibid.), 
there had been little to no assessment of what should be done in order to safeguard the 
individuals and infrastructures that could be targeted by airborne suicide activities. Prior 
to the September 2001 unprecedented attacks on symbolic landmarks on U.S. soil, there 
are only two examples of terrorist groups trying to use passenger airliners in order to 
carry out a suicide attack. First, in 1986, Hizballah followers hijacked a TWA 
commercial jetliner and were determined to crash it into buildings in downtown Tel Aviv. 
The second attempt dates back to December 24, 1994, when the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers in an effort to raise international concern 
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over the Algerian struggle and punish France for supporting the Algerian government. 
The aircraft, which had over 225 passengers and crew on board, left for France after 
several women and children were released and three men killed. The GIA cell, led by 25-
year-old Abdul Abdallah Yahia (a.k.a. Abou), intended to crash the fully fueled plane 
into the Eiffel Tower in Paris or, if their effort failed, to blow the plane up in mid-air over 
the French capital. Seemingly however, because of the strong likelihood of significant 
governmental retaliation, Islamic terrorist groups (whether Asian or Middle Eastern) have 
overall been reluctant to carry out mass-casualty attacks (Jacinto, 2002).  
The Global War on Terror: War of Ideas and War of Words 
Ideological warfare and the terrorist label. Terrorism is fundamentally a socially 
constructed problem (Ben-Yehuda, 1993; Turk, 2002a, 2004; Van de Voorde & Mason, 
2004). Hence the subjective interpretations involved in the construction process “are not 
unbiased attempts to depict truth but rather conscious efforts to manipulate perceptions to 
promote certain interests at the expense of others. When people and events come to be 
regularly described in public as terrorists and terrorism, some governmental or other 
entity is succeeding in a war of words in which the opponent is promoting alternative 
designations such as ‘martyr’ and ‘liberation struggle’” (Turk, 2004:271-272). Indeed, 
“parties in conflict are trying to stigmatize one another. The construction and selective 
application of definitions of terrorism are embedded in the dynamics of political 
conflicts, where ideological warfare to cast the enemy as an evildoer is a dimension of the 
struggle to win support for one’s own cause” (2004:273). “Terrorism” thus becomes a 
convenient label that is used in a “pervasive and indiscriminate” manner (Bassiouni, 
1981:2) to vilify one’s enemy. As Davidson (1986) explains,  
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Labeling one’s opponent a terrorist is one way to barbarize both his image 
and his cause. Many world leaders see terrorism as monolithic: that is, 
they trace all important terrorist actions – either directly or indirectly – to 
the same source. In the U.S. they are branded as degenerative acts of 
immoral enemies. . . . The terror of one’s foes is real terror, premeditated 
and pathological, while that of one’s friends is only a temporary 
aberration, a mistake, to be addressed, if at all, by quiet diplomacy. . . . 
One of the consequences of the bipolar struggle in which states like Israel 
and the U.S. believe themselves to be involved is that the space for 
objectivity becomes considerably narrowed . . . [and] it is hard to seek the 
causes of the individual acts of terrorism dispassionately. (1986:109) 
 
The FTO solution: Denomination or demonization? Terrorism is a dynamic and 
complex phenomenon. It is therefore difficult to determine exactly how many terrorist 
groups or organizations exist today. In the United States, the Office of Counterterrorism 
of the Department of State is responsible for identifying Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
(FTOs), the groups and organizations designated by the Secretary of State in accordance 
with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. Being 
labeled as a terrorist group has legal, political, and fiscal consequences. FTO designations 
play a critical role in the fight against terrorism and can be an effective means of 
curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism 
business. The 42 current FTOs (as of October 2005) are listed in Appendix A. 
On the other hand, “pronouncements by the U.S. State Department . . . reflect 
assessments not only of objective threat but also of the political, economic, and military 
implications of naming particular entities as terrorist” (Turk, 2004:272). Ultimately, the 
process of labeling people or entities as terrorists results in the demonization of that 
group, organization, individual, or sponsor based on criteria unilaterally determined and 
selectively applied by the U.S. administration. Categorizing terrorists as “evildoers” or 
“evil cowards” has indeed been the approach of choice in the past few years, especially in 
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reference to members and supporters of the Al-Qaeda network (Atran, 2004; Van de 
Voorde & Mason, 2004). President Bush has, in effect, repeatedly declared that it is the 
responsibility of the United States “to rid the world of Evil” (Van de Voorde & Mason, 
2004). He also named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea the three major components of the 
“Axis of Evil” that ought to be fought relentlessly in the war on terror, much like 
President Reagan had targeted the U.S.S.R. as the “Empire of Evil” two decades earlier.  
Such reductionist and moralistic rhetoric unfortunately contributes nothing 
positive or productive to the fight against suicide terrorism or international terrorism. 
Publicly pitting the moral world of Good, as defined by the United States, versus the 
amoral world of Evil of the terrorists only promotes a rhetorical style that actually feeds 
into the similarly dichotomous extremist Islamic worldview pitting the House of God 
(Dar al-Islam, or House of Submission) against the House of War (Dar al-Harb). This 
“simple dualism of violence . . . is . . . reminiscent of Edward Said’s notion of 
Orientalism . . . a discourse about the East which carries with it notions of the chaotic, the 
violent, the disorderly, the treacherous, and the irrational . . . [to create] an Other in a 
binary mode which, by contrast, serves to define the West, the Occident” (Young, 
2004:1). This dualism of violence is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Binary of Violence – The West vs. the Other 
The West The Other 
Us Them 
Good Evil 
Moral  Immoral / Amoral 
Rational Irrational 
Justified Hysterical 
Focused Wanton 
Response Provocation 
Defensive Offensive 
Generating Security Inspiring Terror 
Modernity Anti-Modernity 
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Although the tendency to adopt double standards is recurrent in foreign policy and 
the somewhat naive good vs. evil worldview is prevalent in American culture and 
politics, demonizing one’s foes is neither constructive nor commendable. The success of 
suicide terrorist campaigns depends on the ability of the bombers to dehumanize their 
enemy (Sprinzak, 1998; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). Applying the same kind of 
rhetoric and reasoning to suicide terrorism policy-making and prevention is rather 
senseless. Instead of imposing the American style of democracy onto others as the one 
and only sustainable mode of civilization across the globe, the United States and its allies 
must work towards bettering their understanding of the socio-cultural and religious 
values of the countries where suicide terrorism sponsors and supporters are found (Van 
de Voorde & Mason, 2004).  
Rationale for a Social Constructionist Approach to the Study of Suicide Terrorism 
Contrary to popular belief and what policymakers and the media have insinuated 
in the past few years, suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It originated in ancient 
times and has simply evolved over time, developing as other forms of terrorism have. 
Rather than a new weapon in the arsenal of terrorists groups, suicide terrorism is a long-
standing, highly adaptable and extremely violent tool of “propaganda by deed” that is 
constantly reshaped by technological advances and contemporary social events.  
Terrorist suicide attacks are characterized by the use of rather primitive means 
which, thanks to meticulous planning (including the recruitment, formation, and training 
of the bombers or attack teams), result in considerable psychological and physical harm. 
Terrorist suicide attacks happen without warning and are virtually always successful in 
wreaking utter chaos upon entire populations. They are prime weapons of psychological 
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warfare and, as such, constitute one of the most dangerous weapons available to terrorists 
today.  
Studies typically focus on the “who, when, and where” instead of the “why and 
how” of suicide bombing attacks. The scholarly literature on suicide bombings therefore 
fails to provide a thorough, objective analysis and a critical understanding of dynamics 
and patterns. It merely offers an erroneous interpretation of suicide terrorism as a 
homogenous phenomenon, thus ignoring that it is a fundamentally adaptive, resilient, 
complex phenomenon involving a wide array of actors and a variety of activities. The 
literature on suicide terrorism is further characterized by a lack of applied focus: it 
generally relies on an arbitrary extension of terrorism research findings to suicide 
terrorism without further analysis or inquiry into the distinctive features of the latter. 
In order to thwart and pre-empt suicide terrorism, the international intelligence 
community and governments around the world must concentrate their counterterrorism 
efforts on interrupting suicide terror attacks in their preparatory phase. To prevent suicide 
terrorism, it is crucial to fully comprehend the complex combination of factors that exhort 
people to join a terrorist group and unite them behind common ideologies and grievances. 
It is furthermore important to bear in mind that the sustainability and growing popularity 
of suicide terrorism are partially affected by the foreign policies of the Western nations 
leading the “global war on terrorism,” as well as their overall social, political, economic, 
and cultural agendas.  
 Social constructionism “is a well-developed model for studying the contested 
claims that are made – by victims, interest groups, social movements, professionals and 
politicians – in the construction of new social problem categories” (Cohen, 2002:xxii). It 
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has been used to study the moral signification of a variety of cases, from “drunken 
driving, hate crime, stalking, environmental problems” (2002:xxiii) or psychiatric 
disorders to, more recently, terrorism (Jenkins, 2003; Turk, 2004).  
Applying a social constructionist approach to the study of suicide terrorism in 
particular can help understand the recent emergence of terrorists as contemporary folk 
devils, as well as the moral campaign and panic that ensued. Social constructionism 
further makes it possible to highlight the negative (and usually unintended) effects of 
social control policy, including the increased cohesion of terrorist groups and their 
polarization against the rest of society and, specifically, agents of control as represented 
by the entities involved in the global war on terror. The role of the mass media in 
publicizing attacks, triggering a “contagion effect,” and encouraging the ideological and 
commercial exploitation of suicide terrorism is also worthy of a thorough social 
constructionist investigation. 
There can be no immediate or long-term solution to suicide terrorism if the 
significance of its historical and socio-cultural dimensions is persistently overlooked. 
Likewise, it is unsuitable to keep ignoring the dynamics of the moral signification of the 
phenomenon by agents of control, the media, and society at large. A social constructionist 
approach combined with a symbolic interactionist stance can help determine how the 
interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a biased representation 
of events (and their alleged causes) that is conditioned by deliberate attempts to 
stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and promote certain 
political interests. It shall do so by (a) focusing the analysis on mechanisms of moral 
sensitization and symbolization; (b) evidencing how socio-political processes, 
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bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures contribute to the social construction of 
suicide terrorism; (c) highlighting how agents of social control and the mass media 
contribute to the commercial and ideological exploitation of suicide terrorism, as well as 
its dramatization, politicization, and escalation; and (d) improving our understanding of 
group solidification and polarization processes so as to improve anti- and 
counterterrorism policies regarding suicide bombing campaigns.  
It is of utmost importance that we fully comprehend how all these social entities 
have interacted to exploit suicide terrorism as a pressing social problem, to dramatize it 
by magnifying its symbolic nature and ramifications, and to further polarize ideologically 
opposed entities. In effect, they have mobilized extremists and helped them structure 
more cohesive networks. Once this intricate process of moral signification, exploitation, 
amplification, and polarization is explained, we may address the incongruity of arbitrary 
social policy and indiscriminate social action to assess why moral campaigns, panics and 
crusades have not worked to prevent suicide terrorism. Hence, such a progressive 
approach shall shed light on ways to develop the efficient and effective prevention 
strategies that have yet to be soundly devised.  
Social Constructionism 
The phrase “social construction” has become a recurrent catchphrase in scholarly 
books and articles since Berger and Luckmann introduced it in the sociological literature 
in The Social Construction of Reality (1966). Social constructionism is a postmodernist 
school of thought that focuses on the processes involved in constructing, or creating, 
social phenomena and social reality. Social constructionism focuses on how social rules 
are shaped, altered, institutionalized, and passed on traditionally from generation to 
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generation (Adler & Adler, 2003; Blumer, 1969; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Hacking, 
1999). 
Defining Social Problems and Social Reality 
Social constructionists are interested more in institutional- or structural-level 
analyses of social problems than in etiological approaches. They claim that specific 
issues, or putative conditions, become social problems as a result of their collective 
definitions (Blumer, 1969; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Loseke & Best, 2003; Searle, 
1995). Indeed, “objective conditions become social problems only when they are defined 
as or felt to be problematic – disturbing in some way, undesirable, in need of solution or 
remedy” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:88). According to Kitsuse and Spector (1995), 
social problems are a “process by which members of groups or societies define a putative 
condition as a problem” (1995:296). More specifically, they can be defined as “the 
activities of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with 
respect to some putative conditions” (Spector & Kitsuse, 1977:75).  
The emergence of a social problem, then, is contingent on the organization 
of group activities with reference to defining some putative condition as a 
problem, and asserting the need for eradicating, ameliorating, or otherwise 
changing the condition. The central problem for a theory of social 
problems, so defined, is to account for the emergence and maintenance of 
claim-making and responding activities. (Kitsuse & Spector, 1995:296) 
 
Hence, “social problems do not exist ‘objectively’ . . . they are constructed by the 
human mind, called into being or constituted by the definitional process” (Goode & Ben-
Yehuda, 1994:88). “All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in 
scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generalizations, 
formulations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization” 
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(Schutz, as cited in Prus, 1996:xvii). Social constructs, therefore, shape what could be 
called “reality by consensus.” As further explained by Fuller and Myers (1941:320), 
“[s]ocial problems are what people think they are, and if conditions are not defined as 
social problems by the people involved in them, they are not problems to these people, 
although they may be problems to outsiders.” Social problems therefore exist where a 
group of people identify something as wrong, concerned, and attempt to correct it. They 
have to not only be considered a problem, but also a “remediable condition” (Goode & 
Ben-Yehuda, 1994:89). As Becker (2003) emphasizes, “social groups create deviance by 
making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to 
particular people and labeling them as outsiders” (2003:70).  
Constructionist perspectives on social problems “ask how and why particular 
social problems emerge and become the focus of demonstrations and protests, front-page 
news stories and television coverage, and new social politics” (Loseke & Best, 2003:ix). 
In addition, social constructionists “examine how public consciousness of social 
problems can change the world around us as well as our understanding of this world” 
(Ibid.). Ultimately, “it is the social construction or subjective interpretation of conditions 
that defines a social problem, not the nature of the condition itself” (Goode & Ben-
Yehuda, 1994:91). Social construction indeed describes subjective, rather than objective, 
reality. Subjectivity is the antithesis of the epistemic virtue of objectivity; it implies 
judging something based on one’s personal opinion, values or intuitions, not objective 
examination, analysis, and beliefs. As a philosophical principle, subjectivism holds 
subjective experiences paramount: it implies that the very existence of any object or 
condition depends only on people’s subjective awareness of it. 
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Socially constructed reality is a continuing, dynamic process; such reality is 
constantly perpetuated as a pervasive set of norms by individuals who rely on their 
subjective interpretation and knowledge of it. Social constructionists essentially seek “to 
understand exactly how, and by whom, social problems are ‘discovered’” (Ibid.). They 
focus on the significance of “interests, resources, and legitimacy” (1994:92) involved in 
the process of creating or “discovering” social problems. 
Members or representatives of organizations or groups that stand to profit 
from the discovery of a problem are likely to be motivated to do so; 
organizations or groups that can command resources – many members, 
access to the media or to influential political figures, financial resources, 
and so on – are likely to be more successful in defining a condition as a 
social problem; and spokespersons who are considered credible, reliable, 
and respectable, likewise, are more likely to be taken seriously as the 
definers of a new problem. (Ibid.)  
 
Strict vs. Contextual Constructionism 
Social constructionism is either strict (hard) or moderate (soft or contextual). 
Moderate constructionists take into consideration the “objective seriousness” (Goode & 
Ben-Yehuda, 1994:94) of conditions that may or may not be re-defined as social 
problems. Social reality is constructed by conditions and problems that are both 
epistemologically objective and ontologically subjective (Searle, 1995). According to 
Pinker (2002), an adherent of moderate or contextual constructionism, “some categories 
really are social constructions: they exist only because people tacitly agree to act as if 
they exist” (Pinker, 2002:202). On the other hand, according to strict constructionists, “it 
is impossible to determine the relationship between objective damage and subjective 
concern because there is no such thing as objectivity in the first place” (Goode & Ben-
Yehuda, 1994:94). Strict constructionists dismiss the efforts of contextual 
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constructionists “to privilege a scientific version of reality over a popular or public one . . 
. [as] a fallacy, a bias, an inappropriate mixing of levels of analysis, a case of ‘ontological 
gerrymandering’ . . . [and] an improper enterprise” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:95-96).  
Following a contextual constructionist approach, it appears that “definitions of 
and concern about conditions are far more sociologically relevant, while the objective 
threat that conditions present stems from a wide variety of sources” (Goode & Ben-
Yehuda, 1994:96). This implies that “the objective seriousness of a given condition” is 
not what solely “determines the public’s reaction to it” (Ibid.).  
Social movement activity, legislation, a prominent ranking on the public’s 
list of society’s most serious problems, and media attention, are all 
generated by a variety of factors. . . . Public concern and action about a 
certain issue rise and fall in part for political, ideological, and moral 
reasons. There is, in other words, a ‘politics of social problems.’ . . . [T]he 
public may be stirred up as a result of the efforts of a ‘moral entrepreneur’ 
or moral crusader – an individual who feels that ‘something ought to be 
done’ about a supposed wrongdoing, and takes steps to make sure that 
certain rules are enforced. (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:97)  
 
Social Problems and Audiences 
 The sociological “focus on deviance as subjectively problematic implies the 
importance of an audience, that is, those individuals who directly or indirectly witness, 
hear about, and evaluate the behavior or the individuals in question” (Goode & Ben-
Yehuda, 1994:71). In order to determine if a certain type of behavior is deviant or can be 
labeled a social problem, one must determine who constructs the behavior as deviant or 
problematic, what audience’s reaction matters, and whose assessment of the behavior is 
of importance. Essentially, the construction of social problems and deviance “is 
completely meaningless without reference to a specific, relevant audience” (Ibid.). 
Hence, a behavior that may be interpreted as immoral or evil by an audience may not be 
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viewed as such by another audience. Audiences therefore play a crucial role in the 
construction of meanings and, ultimately, social problems. 
Public Images of Social Problems 
Rhetoric and random violence. Best’s (1999) interdisciplinary approach to the 
study of social problems posits that some new crime problems emerge and rapidly wither 
out of the public’s attention, whereas others will proliferate and turn into long-term social 
problems. Best highlights the processes through which these crimes are purposely 
described as new, random, and epidemic in nature, even though they truly are not, in 
order to both sustain private fears and influence public policies. Best not only focuses on 
the cultural framework of “random violence” as pertains to contemporary crime trends, 
but also exposes the erroneous claim that violence is ever more increasing. He thus 
analyzes how it is now conventional to “declare a war” on social problems and 
institutionalize crime problems with the help of the mass media, activists, officials, and 
crime or policy experts. The description and interpretation of social problems are 
characterized by a type of rhetoric, or language, chosen specifically to shape policies and 
control outcomes, which in turn promotes widespread social distrust and may lead to 
moral panics.  
Mass media, symbolic violence, and representations of crime. As Barak (1994) 
points out, “[m]ass news representations in the ‘information age’ have become the most 
significant communication by which the average person comes to know the world outside 
his or her immediate experience” (1994:3). Our understanding of social concepts is 
influenced and determined by our moral assessments of these concepts, that is, how we 
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perceive them. These subjective perceptions of crime and justice therefore vary across 
human groups or societies. They are, in effect, 
influenced by the different ways in which the interplay between criminals, 
apprehenders, and victims are socially and ethically perceived by ordinary 
citizens, criminal justice policy makers, those responsible for carrying out 
legal norms, criminologists, and the press. The mass communication of 
these perceptions construct [sic] a cultural awareness of crime, of 
victim/offender encounters, and of the administration of justice. (1994:4) 
 
 The mass media are inherently “active and subject to changing norms and values” 
and “also have a dialectical relationship with their object matter” (1994:13). As a result, 
the interaction of the mass media and symbolic deviance is at the core of the “mainstream 
set of outlooks, assumptions and beliefs about behavior” (1994:12). It is therefore crucial 
to analyze the dialectic nature of the dynamic interface of mass media coverage of crime 
news, the social trends the media either follow or create, the political change they may 
instigate, as well as the rhetorical processes involved in the categorization or labeling of 
certain acts and their presumed causes.  
Social Problems and Moral Panics 
Overview of moral panics. Moral panic “is characterized by the feeling, held by a 
substantial number of the members of a given society, that evildoers pose a threat to the 
society and to the moral order as a consequence of their behavior and, therefore, 
‘something should be done’ about them and their behavior” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 
1994:31). Five criteria define the concept of moral panic: concern, hostility, consensus, 
disproportionality, and volatility.  
The first indicator implies the need for “a heightened level of concern over the 
behavior of a certain group and the consequences that that behavior presumably causes 
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for the rest of society” (1994:33). Such concern should be genuine and measurable 
(media attention, social movement organizations, new legislation, etc.). This is different 
from the concept of fear, which is an expectable but not required element of the response 
to a tangible threat.  
In addition, moral panic is characterized by “an increased level of hostility toward 
the group or category regarded as engaging in the behavior in question. Members of this 
category are collectively designated as the enemy, or an enemy, of respectable society; 
their behavior is seen as harmful or threatening to the values, the interests, possibly the 
very existence, of the society” (Ibid.). This entails identifying a group or segment of 
society as “responsible for the threat” (1994:34). As a result, “a division is made between 
‘us’ – good, decent, respectable folk – and ‘them’ – deviants, bad guys, outsiders, 
criminals, the underworld. . . . This dichotomization includes stereotyping: generating 
‘folk devils’ or villains and folk heroes in this morality play of evil versus good” (Ibid.). 
There must also be “substantial or widespread agreement or consensus . . . that 
the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group members and their 
behavior” (Ibid.). People of course react differently to threats. Thus, moral panic can be 
observed throughout society, but it can also be limited to sub-cultures, as well as local or 
regional levels. 
The fourth criterion is more implicit and focuses on the “sense on the part of 
many members of the society that a more sizable number of individuals are engaged in 
the behavior in question than actually are, and the threat, danger, or damage said to be 
caused by the behavior is far more substantial than, is incommensurate with and in fact is 
‘above and beyond that which a realistic appraisal could sustain’” (1994:36). In other 
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words, moral panic involves excessive public concern compared to the objective harm or 
threat. Clearly establishing the objective dimension at stake is difficult, if not impossible, 
but taking it into consideration helps understand the existence of various levels or degrees 
of disproportionality.  
Finally, moral panics are inherently volatile. Indeed, “they erupt fairly suddenly . . 
. and, nearly as suddenly, subside. Some moral panics may become routinized or 
institutionalized, that is, the moral concern about the target behavior results in, or remains 
in place in the form of, social movement organizations, legislation, enforcement 
practices, informal interpersonal norms or practices for punishing transgressors, after it 
has run its course” (1994:38-39). Still, it is also important not to neglect the “structural or 
historical antecedents” (1994:39) that moral panics may have.  
In sum, 
the concept, moral panic, does not define a concern over a given issue or 
putative threat about which a given cynical observer is unsympathetic, or 
feels is morally or ideologically inappropriate. . . . The moral panic is a 
phenomenon – given its broad and sprawling nature – that can be located 
and measured in a fairly unbiased fashion. It does not matter whether we 
sympathize with the concern or not. What is important is that the concern 
locates a ‘folk devil,’ is shared, is out of synch with the measurable 
seriousness of the condition that generates it, and varies in intensity over 
time. . . . [I]f that concern is focused exclusively on moral or symbolic 
issues as ends in themselves, it cannot be regarded as a moral panic. 
(1994:41) 
 
Deviance and morality. The concept of deviance entails behaviors that are in 
violation of standards of conduct within a group or society, or behaviors that are 
interpreted as violating such standards. Deviance is determined by societal reaction. It is 
inherently relative to cultural norms and its definition varies depending on the social 
context and processes at stake, as well as the actors and audiences involved. Morality, on 
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the other hand, is a system of ethical principles and codes of conduct that distinguishes 
right from wrong and may be either relative or absolute.  
The absolute or objectively given approach is the traditional, conventional 
perspective; it assumes that we all know – or should know – what good 
and bad, right and wrong, virtue and evil, are. The quality of evil or 
immorality resides in the very nature of an act itself; it is inherent, 
intrinsic, or immanent within certain forms of behavior. If an act is wrong, 
it is wrong now and for ever; it is evil in the abstract. . . . Behavior is 
wrong if it violates an absolute, eternal, final law. It need not be seen or 
judged by external human observers to be regarded as wrong; its 
immorality is a simple, objective fact, even if it takes place in a society or 
group that condones it. . . . Moreover, the objectively given approach 
assumes that “evil causes evil,” or “the doctrine of evil consequences,” 
that is, that consequences universally agreed to be negative and harmful 
inevitably flow from immoral practices. . . .    
[Conversely, considering] morality as relative or subjectively 
problematic . . . attempts to understand how and why behavior is regarded 
as evil or deviant. The focus is on the definition or understanding that 
members of a society hold with respect to the acts designated as 
undesirable. The existence of the evil in the indwelling, objectively given, 
or immanent sense is not so much negated as put aside for a focus on how 
morality is defined and acted out. What is regarded as evil in one place or 
situation, or at one time, may be acceptable or even rewarded at others. . . . 
[D]esignating certain behaviors and individuals as deviant is problematic, 
non commonsensical, and it is the members of the society who decide, not 
the external observer. . . . What is crucial is how behavior is defined, 
judged, and evaluated in a particular context. What counts is these varying 
definitions and evaluations; it is they and they alone that determine the 
status of an act with respect to morality and immorality. (1994:66-67)  
 
Morality may serve as a universal guide that rational individuals use to control the 
behavior of moral agents and hold them accountable should they fail to abide by the 
established moral codes. This notion of universal moral consciousness is similar to what 
such philosophers as Kant or Mill focused on when analyzing how individual behavior 
affects other people. As Gergen (1999) stresses, “[b]eliefs in individual knowledge and 
reason are closely related to . . . another cultural talisman: moral principles. In a sense, 
most of our actions are congenial with a moral order – standards of what is appropriate or 
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acceptable. And it is because we endow individuals with the capacity for knowledge and 
conscious reasoning that we hold them responsible for deviations from this order” 
(1999:15).  
Moral crusades and moral entrepreneurs. “Societies everywhere have at times 
been gripped by moral panics” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:51). When government 
officials, authorities, or segments of society redefine certain forms of behavior as major 
social problems, they are often influenced by “the intensity of the concern that was 
aroused” (1994:19) and focus on deviant behavior they equate with “immoral 
wrongdoing” (Ibid.) as the root cause of the problem. This illustrates the notion of moral 
crusade, which is different from a moral panic (though the two are not mutually 
exclusive). “The moral crusades concept implies that the activists who are working to 
bring about change are motivated by moral, and not rational or protectionist, interests” 
(1994:20). Examples of moral crusades include the Prohibition movement of the early 
twentieth century, the frenzied campaign for anti-marijuana laws of the mid-1930s, or the 
more recent Satanism scare (Adler & Adler, 2003; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994).  
Adler and Adler (2003) stress that “[t]he process of constructing and applying 
definitions of deviance can be understood as a moral enterprise. That is, it involves the 
constructions of moral meanings and the association of them with specific acts or 
conditions” (2003:133). The concept of the moral crusade necessarily entails that of 
crusaders or, as they are sometimes referred to, moral entrepreneurs (Adler & Adler, 
2003; Becker, 1994; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Hawkins & Tiedeman, 1975). These 
moral entrepreneurs launch their moral crusades to target new or past “folk devils,” 
which inevitably translates into a demonization process and feeds into a dichotomous 
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worldview pitting Good against Evil. “Once the public viewpoint has been swayed and a 
majority (or a vocal and powerful enough minority) of people have adopted a social 
definition, it may remain at the level of a norm or become elevated to the status of law 
through a legislative effort. In some cases both situations occur” (Adler & Adler, 
2003:135). 
The “deviance-making enterprise” (Adler & Adler, 2003:134) is twofold. On the 
one hand, it involves the creation of rules (rule-creating), otherwise there would be no 
deviant behavior; on the other hand, it entails the enforcement of these rules (rule-
enforcing), which requires the application of the rules to certain groups of people. As a 
result, there are two types of moral entrepreneurs: the rule creators and the rule enforcers 
(Adler & Adler, 2003; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). 
Rule creation and rule enforcement. Rules can be created either by individuals or 
by groups. The latter are more commonly involved in rule-creating, inasmuch as groups 
of moral entrepreneurs can more easily and efficiently “use their collective energy and 
resources to change social definitions and create norms and rules” (Adler & Adler, 
2003:134).  
These groups of moral entrepreneurs represent interest groups that can be 
galvanized and activated into pressure groups. Rule creators ensure that 
our society is supplied with a constant stock of deviance and deviants by 
defining the behavior of others as immoral. They do this because they 
perceive threats in and feel fearful, distrustful, and suspicious of the 
behavior of these others. In so doing, they seek to transform private 
troubles into public issues and their private morality into the normative 
order. (Ibid.) 
 
Moral rules and legal systems can therefore be viewed as the products of a 
conscious enterprise to create them and ensure they become institutionalized and 
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guarantee the evildoers will be punished accordingly (Adler & Adler, 2003; Goode & 
Ben-Yehuda, 1994). As Adler and Adler (2003) explain,  
Moral entrepreneurs manufacture public morality through a multi-stage 
process. Their first goal is to generate broad awareness of a problem. They 
do this through a process of claims-making where they assert "danger 
messages" about a given issue. Claims-makers use these messages to 
create a sense that certain conditions are problematic and pose a present or 
future potential danger to society. . . .  Because no rules exist to deal with 
the threatening condition, claims-makers construct the impression that 
these are necessary. In so doing, they draw on the testimonials of various 
“experts” in the field, such as scholars, doctors, eyewitnesses, ex-
participants, and others with specific knowledge of the situation. These 
testimonials are disseminated to society via the media as “facts.” 
(2003:134) 
 
The rhetorical processes involved in the making and dissemination of such “facts” 
include using statistics to “show the rise in incidence of a given behavior or its 
correlation with another social problem” (Ibid.). Furthermore, “dramatic case examples 
can paint a picture of horror in the public’s mind, inspiring fear and loathing” and various 
issues can be lumped together to purposely create “a behavioral pattern portrayed as 
dangerous” (Ibid.). Rhetoric further “requires that each side seek the (usually competing) 
‘moral high ground’ in their assertions and attacks on each other, disavowing special 
interests and pursuing only the purest public good” (Ibid.). 
Moral entrepreneurs additionally strive to beget a moral conversion by persuading 
others of the righteousness of their stance on the given issue or issues. “They have to 
convert neutral parties and previous opponents into supporting partisans. Their successful 
conversion of others further legitimates their own beliefs. To effect a moral conversion, 
rule creators must compete for space in the “public arena,” often a limited resource” 
(Ibid.).  
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Moral entrepreneurs must draw on elements of drama, novelty, politics, 
and deep mythic themes of the culture to gain the visibility they need. 
They must also enlist the support of sponsors (opinion leaders who need 
not have expert knowledge on any particular subject, but are liked and 
respected) to provide them with public endorsements. . . . At times the 
efforts of moral entrepreneurs are so successful that they create a “moral 
panic.” A threat to society is depicted, and concerned individuals 
promoting the problem, reacting legislators, and sensationalist news media 
whip the public into a “feeding frenzy.” Moral panics . . . tend to develop 
a life of their own, often moving in exaggerated propulsion beyond their 
original impetus. (2003:135) 
 
Once the rules are created, they need to be enforced. Rule enforcers typically 
follow a subjective, selective pattern when applying moral rules and social norms. 
Indeed, they take advantage of the fact that “[v]arious individuals or groups have greater 
or lesser power to resist the enforcement of rules against them due to their 
socioeconomic, racial, religious, gender, political, or other status” (Ibid.).  
Differential social power. Adler and Adler (2003) stress that “[s]pecific 
behavioral acts are not the only things that can be constructed as deviant; this definition 
can also be applied to a social status or lifestyle. When entire groups of people become 
relegated to a deviant status through their social condition (especially if it is ascribed 
through birth rather than voluntarily achieved), we see the force of inequality and 
differential social power in operation” (2003:136). As evidenced by the social 
construction perspective and conflict theory alike, it can be argued that “those who 
control the resources in society (politics, social status, gender, wealth, religious beliefs, 
mobilization of the masses) have the ability to dominate, both materially and 
ideologically, over the subordinate groups” (Ibid.). This implies that rules, laws, or 
norms, as well as their application and enforcement, are the result of “political action by 
moral entrepreneurial interest groups that are connected to society's power base” (Ibid.).  
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One way to do this is to pass and enforce norms and rules that define 
others’ behavior as deviant. Thus, the relative deviance of [certain 
putative] conditions . . . can be seen to reflect the application of 
differential social power in our society. Individuals in these groups may 
find themselves discriminated against or blocked from the mainstream of 
society by virtue of this basic feature of their existence, unrelated to any 
particular situation or act. This application of the deviant label 
emphatically illustrates the role of power in the deviance-defining 
enterprise, as those positioned closer to the center of society, holding the 
greater social, economic, political, and moral resources, can turn the force 
of the deviant stigma onto others less fortunately placed. In so doing they 
use the definition of deviance to reinforce their own favored position. This 
politicization of deviance and the power associated with its use serve to 
remind us that deviance is not a category inhabited only by those on the 
marginal outskirts of society: the exotics, erotics, and neurotics. Instead, 
any group can be pushed into this category by the exercise of another 
group’s greater power. (Ibid.) 
 
Critique of Social Constructionism 
Detractors of the social constructionist perspective posit that the contributions of 
the scientific inquiry are enough to discredit any claim made by the constructionists (or 
the postmodernists, for that matter). Many denounce what they call the “social 
construction of social constructionism,” while others criticize the paradigm because they 
view it as a form of solipsism or an illustration of dogmatic narrow-mindedness (Best, 
1995; Gergen, 1999). Yet others contend that “constructionists either make assumptions 
about objective conditions or worse, believe they know when objective conditions have 
changed or not. If so, they are unable to fulfill the constructionist imperative which 
requires information on the beliefs of the people involved in the social problem process 
rather than the beliefs of sociologists” (Best, 1995:341). This concern was in fact strong 
enough amongst constructionist scholars to prompt the abovementioned rift between 
“strict social constructionists, those who only study the claims-making process, and 
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contextual constructionists, who take into account what is known about objective 
conditions” (Ibid.).  
Objectivists further argue that the peculiar approach adopted by constructionists is 
intrinsically flawed, inasmuch as their “focus on claims-making ignores a far more 
important subject: the harmful social conditions which are the ‘real’ social problems” 
(1995:343). Both perspectives are radically different and, indeed, their relative value 
depends on exactly what one is trying to understand. To the objectivists’ criticism 
corresponds a dual social constructionist rejoinder: “(1) there is nothing wrong with 
studying social conditions, but decades of objective research on social conditions have 
failed to lay a foundation for general theories of social problems; and (2) it is important to 
remember that we only recognize social conditions as ‘really’ harmful because someone 
made persuasive claims to that effect” (Ibid.). 
Thus, a social constructionist approach to the study and prevention of suicide 
terrorism appears to be a more fertile one than what has been favored thus far by 
scholars, practitioners and policymakers alike. Indeed, it shall shed light on the 
mechanisms involved in the construction of meaning, the misinterpretation of socio-
cultural factors and fundamental belief systems, and the lack of understanding or 
knowledge concerning the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Furthermore, in order to 
explicitly focus on the interaction of the social entities involved in the interpretive 
process, it appears useful to borrow from a complementary perspective that specifically 
examines the social construction of subjective meanings: symbolic interactionism. 
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Symbolic Interactionism 
Overview and Underlying Assumptions 
Symbolic interactionism is a sociological perspective that borrows theoretically 
from both cultural studies and humanistic tradition. It focuses on how individuals and 
groups interact and, more specifically, how personal identity (the self) is created through 
interaction with others. Of particular interest is the relationship between individual action 
and group pressures. The symbolic interactionist perspective posits that subjective 
meanings are socially constructed and that these subjective meanings interrelate with 
objective actions (Charon, 2004; Farberman & Perinbanayagam, 1985; Plummer, 1991a, 
1991b; Prus, 1996; Stryker, 1980).  
Precursors of the sociological tradition of symbolic interaction include the 
Scottish moralists (common sense school of moral philosophy), especially Adam Smith, 
who “propounded the symbolic-interactionist assumptions that society is necessarily 
antecedent to the individual, self and mind develop through interaction with others, self-
control derives from social control, and people are actors as well as reactors” (Shott, 
1976:39). Heralds of the symbolic interaction perspective also include American 
Pragmatists, such as George Herbert Mead, William James, and John Dewey. It was fully 
developed by sociologists of the Chicago School, mainly Herbert Blumer, Robert E. 
Parke, and Everett C. Hughes (Blumer, 1969; Becker & McCall, 1990; Charon, 2004; 
Farberman & Perinbanayagam, 1985; Plummer, 1991a, 1991b; Prus, 1996; Stryker, 
1980). Blumer (1969) described symbolic interactionism as “a down-to-earth approach to 
the scientific study of human group life and human conduct” that “lodges its problems in 
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[the] natural world, conducts its studies in it, and derives its interpretations from such 
naturalistic studies” (1969:47).  
Symbols play a significant role for human actors. Indeed, “[h]umans name, 
remember, categorize, perceive, think, deliberate, problem solve, transcend space and 
time, transcend themselves, create abstractions, create new ideas, and direct themselves – 
all through the symbol” (Charon, 2004:63-64). Symbolic interactionism is founded upon 
three fundamental assertions: 
The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the 
meanings that the things have for them. . . . The second premise is that the 
meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social 
interaction that one has with one’s fellows. The third premise is that these 
meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process 
used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters. (Blumer, 
1969:2) 
 
Symbolic interactionism thus considers meaning not as a product of “the intrinsic makeup 
of the thing that has meaning,” but “as arising in the process of interaction between 
people” (1969:4). The use of meanings by social actors implies a necessary “process of 
interpretation” (1969:5) that is determined by self-interaction and the way meanings are 
handled by the actors. Interpretation is more than the mere use of previously integrated 
meanings. Instead, Blumer argues, interpretation is an active process of formulation, 
reconsideration, and revision. 
The Interpretive Tradition 
 Interpretivist social science has developed “concurrently with a critique of 
positivist social science” (Prus, 1996:3). Unlike the positivist (structuralist) approach, 
which studies human behavior in an objective fashion, the interpretive approach 
considers “human group life as actively constituted by people in interaction with others” 
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(1996:9). The interpretive tradition is therefore based upon an interactionist and 
hermeneutic analysis of human lived experience.  
Symbolic interaction and the study of human lived experience. The 
interactionist/interpretive perspective assumes, explicitly or not, that human group life is 
intersubjective, multi-perspectival, reflective, activity-based, negotiable, relational, and 
processual (Prus, 1996). Indeed, “interpretivists observe that the study of human behavior 
is the study of human lived experience and that human experience is rooted in people’s 
meanings, interpretations, activities, and interactions” (1996:9). Intersubjectivity and 
reflective interchange thus emerge as the core elements of human essence.  
As further explained below, the Chicago School (or Blumerian School) of 
symbolic interactionism puts strong emphasis on “the thoroughly intersubjective nature 
of community life,” while it “draws attention to the active dimensions (human struggles 
and enterprise) of the accomplishment of intersubjectivity” (1996:22).  
Hermeneutics and interpretivists. Hermeneutics is the study of the methodological 
principles of interpretation. The word initially described the interpretive study of Greek 
classics and religious texts. As such, hermeneutics “reflects an awareness that recorded 
statements are inevitably subject to interpretation” (Prus, 1996:34). The development of 
the interpretive tradition as it relates to social theory came about in the late 1800s with 
the works of German theorist Wilhelm Dilthey. Other major German scholars who have 
contributed to the growth of the interpretive framework include Georg Simmel, Max 
Weber, and Wilhelm Wundt. American Pragmatists, mainly Charles Horton Cooley and 
George Herbert Mead, further played a significant part in the emergence of the Chicago 
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School of symbolic interaction and strongly influenced the works of its founder, Herbert 
Blumer. 
 Wilhelm Dilthey, who many regard as “the founder of contemporary interpretive 
social science” (1996:35), approached human science from a purely hermeneutical 
viewpoint. Indeed, “it was Dilthey who most explicitly extended the hermeneutic or 
interpretive insight or Verstehen (interpretive understanding) beyond textual 
interpretations to all other instances of human behavior” (Ibid.). He laid strong emphasis 
on the intersubjectivity that is inherent in human behavior and interchange. He further 
understood human life or group life as “built on a sharedness of understandings” (Ibid.). 
According to Dilthey, interpretation “depends pivotally on making sense of the other by 
reference to the community context in which the actions of the other are embedded” 
(Ibid.).  
 Georg Simmel considered that society was essentially defined by the interaction 
that took place among and between individuals. Simmel, “best known for his pronounced 
emphasis on sociology as the study of the forms of human association” (1996:39), viewed 
human existence, or group life, as an ensemble of continuous social processes. Human 
interaction, thus, occurs through such ongoing processes as “conflict, cooperation, 
compromise, mediation, domination and subordination” (Ibid.).  
 Max Weber is often, though erroneously, credited for inventing the concept of 
Verstehen (interpretive understanding) and contributing to the advancement of 
ethnography. Weber’s synthetic social theory merely built upon Dilthey’s hermeneutical 
contributions on Verstehen, which were in effect more thorough and coherent than 
Weber’s. “Within Weber’s contextual analysis . . . verstehen tends to be largely implicit 
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and group-oriented, as opposed to denoting an attentiveness to the viewpoints of 
particular people and to the ways in which they go about accomplishing their activities on 
a ‘here and now’ basis” (1996:42). Weber was further influenced by other German social 
scientists like Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, whose works actually 
neglected the quintessential intersubjective nature of human interaction. “Weber 
generated an intellectual stance in which the hermeneutic thrust was largely dismissed 
from a more active consideration in social research” (1996:41). Weber ultimately 
attempted to bring together the interpretive and positivist paradigms, but his mostly 
empirically-driven efforts remained futile and his outlook on human group life, in the 
end, appears more obscure than enlightening. Indeed, 
Weber sought to develop “objective,” causal statements about group life 
while simultaneously claiming an intellectual primacy in the foundations 
of “subjective experience.” At the same time, Weber appears intent on 
using modes of historical-cultural-legalistic analysis to formulate more 
generic statements on the religious, political, and economic orderings of 
human societies. In particular, Weber seemed concerned with stipulating 
the historical and material conditions that fostered particular world views 
and the ways in which these collectively established beliefs or group 
mind-sets might find expression in the forms of association and practices 
characterizing particular societies. (Ibid.) 
 
 Wilhelm Wundt’s major contribution to the interpretive paradigm came in the 
form of Volkerpsychologie, or folk psychology (sometimes also referred to as psychical 
anthropology), which provided “a significant source of stimulation for a number of 
scholars working in the interpretive and (emergent) ethnographic traditions” (1996:45). 
The basic premise of folk psychology is that human behavior is conditioned by culture 
and language. Primitive culture is at the core of this approach, rather than western 
cultural concepts and ideals. Wundt thus focused his interpretive analyses of social 
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thought and interaction on primitive or elementary modes of human group life, 
specifically communal spirit and its relation to human interchange 
(Gemeinschaftpsychologie).  
 Pragmatists equally played a key part in the development of the interpretive and 
interactionist traditions (Farberman, 1985; Lewis, 1976; Prus, 1996). The works of 
Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George H. Mead were highly 
influential in the emergence of the philosophical movement that became known as 
American Pragmatism. The movement was started by Peirce and popularized by James 
(James and Mead were, incidentally, Wundt’s students). The basic premises of 
Pragmatism are that the meaning of concepts lies in their practical bearings, that the 
purpose of thought is to direct action, and that truth ought to be evaluated depending on 
the practical outcomes of belief. “The pragmatists’ emphases were somewhat diverse, but 
they generally opposed to ‘rationalist’ or ‘determinist’ (i.e., positivist) philosophy and 
wanted to develop conceptualizations of human behavior that attended to the actualities 
and practices of people” (Prus, 1996:46).  
George H. Mead’s contribution to the sociology of knowledge, in particular, is 
remarkable for it encompasses three fundamental areas of study: philosophy, history, and 
social psychology (Farberman, 1985; Fine & Kleinmann, 1968; Fisher & Strauss, 1979a, 
1979b; McKinney, 1991; Maines, Sugrue, & Katovich, 1983; Miller, 1973; Ropers, 
1973). “Mead’s approach to behavior may be characterized by such generally descriptive 
terms as pragmatic, empirical, bio-social behavioristic, naturalistic, voluntaristic, 
instrumental, and functional” (McKinney, 1991:112). Mead focused on social acts as “the 
unit of existence” (Miller, 1973:294), the source of “all socio-cultural behavior,” 
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analyzing “self-awareness, thinking, purposive behavior, and moral discrimination” in 
order to evidence “that mind and self are social emergents, and that language constituted 
the mechanism for that emergence” (McKinney, 1991:113). Hence, human action was 
“the key to the Meadian model of man and to the human construction of meaning and 
knowledge” (Franks, 1985:39). Ultimately, Mead’s “extraction of mind, self, thinking, 
and meaning from the context of the social act via the delineation of such mechanisms as 
role-taking, the generalized other, symbolization, and attitude systems, constitutes an 
expansion of the frame of reference of the sociology of knowledge” (McKinney, 
1991:118).  
The Chicago School of interactionism: Blumerian contributions to the interpretive 
tradition. Herbert Blumer has been presented by several scholars as “the single most 
important social theorist of the twentieth century” (Prus, 1996:75). His critical work on 
human lived experience and social interaction drew together the interpretive framework 
and the ethnographic tradition. Blumer, a student of George Herbert Mead, unequivocally 
and methodically expanded upon the works of Dilthey, Simmel, and the American 
Pragmatists (Becker, 1988; Prus, 1996; Shibutani, 1988). He acknowledged early on that 
human behavior was intrinsically complex, “reflective, interactive, emergent” (Prus, 
1996:68). Relying on Mead’s analysis of social behaviorism and drawing from Dilthey’s 
hermeneutical approach, Blumer “explicitly established the vital link of the interpretive 
tradition with ethnographic research” and harshly criticized the “core features of 
positivist social science” (1996:69). Blumer’s work on human interchange and 
intersubjectivity, similarly to Mead’s, also focused on human group life as the product of 
“the ongoing production of action” (1996:71) and, as such, further “synthesized and 
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developed the theoretical and methodological significance of Mead’s ideas for the social 
sciences” (1996:70). Blumer’s pivotal role in the development of social science and 
interpretivism is threefold: 
First, building on the works of George Herbert Mead, Blumer develops a 
clearer, more coherent and sociologically focused statement pertaining to 
the implications of the interpretive paradigm for the study of human lived 
experience than Dilthey, Cooley, or Mead had been able to generate. 
Furthermore, by emphasizing Cooley’s notion of sympathetic 
introspection, Blumer helps establish the relevance of the interpretive 
approach for the ongoing study of human group life. Second, Blumer 
challenges the prevailing positivist (quantitative) traditions that dominate 
the social sciences. . . . Blumer forcefully and clearly lays bare the central 
weaknesses of mainstream social science. . . . Third, Blumer provides a 
conceptual framework which not only theoretically undergirds 
ethnographic research . . . in the social sciences, but which also 
encourages the development of generic or transsituational social 
processes. (1996:74-75) 
 
Critique of Symbolic Interactionism 
Scholars within the symbolic interactionist paradigm have voiced their criticism 
of the theoretical and practical frameworks involved. Besides its potential for 
methodological problems and operationalization issues, symbolic interactionism is 
viewed as overemphasizing self-consciousness, having “an obsession with meaning” and 
promoting “a metaphysic of meaning” (Meltzer, Petras, Reynolds, 1975:84-85). As a 
result, some fear the “danger that a fetish will be made out of everyday life, especially if 
the perspective comes to give a totally relativistic account of human interaction” 
(1975:85). Moreover, some interactionists deplore the “unwarranted demotion of the 
psychological,” which may have “robbed human needs, motives, intentions, and 
aspirations of their empirical and analytical reality by treating them as mere derivations 
and/or expressions of socially defined categories” (1975:84). Overall, the major “in-
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house” criticism is aimed at the apparent inability of symbolic interactionism “to come to 
grips with either human emotions or the unconscious” (1975:85). 
Scholars outside the realm of symbolic interaction have also criticized the 
approach. Positivists have been the most vocal opponents thus far. As explained by Prus 
(1996), however, the positivist/structuralist critique of symbolic interactionism as “a 
subjective social science or a microlevel sociology” (1996:22) is the result of a 
misinformed interpretation of interactionist tenets. In fact, 
symbolic interaction is intersubjective to the core and envisions the 
development of language or ongoing symbolic interchanges as 
fundamental to the human essence (and the human struggle for existence). 
People are seen to develop (multiple) worldviews or definitions of reality 
as they interact with one another and attempt to incorporate particular 
objects of their awareness into their activities. Notions of community, self, 
action, reflectivity, symbolic realities, human interchange, and collective 
behavior are fundamental to interactionism, as are the processes of 
conflict, cooperation, and compromise. Likewise, while interactionism 
builds on situated definitions and interchanges, and insists on the pursuit 
of research g rounded rigorously in human lived experience and the 
ongoing production of action, it is quite able to deal with more molar 
matters such as fashion, the media, social problems, industrialization, 
economic development, law and policy formation, and other political 
processes. (Ibid.) 
 
As for concerns regarding the potential methodological shortcomings of a 
theoretical perspective relying heavily (if not exclusively) on a qualitative approach, 
some have counter-argued that ethnographic inquiry is as scientific as more quantitative 
and, in fact, likely more reliable than positivist methods to accurately and soundly 
examine human behavior and the interaction of individuals with their environment. 
Indeed,  
the methodology (open-ended inquiry, participant-observation, and 
observation) of ethnographic research may seem less rigorous or scientific 
than some other approaches in the social sciences, especially to those who 
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have been encouraged to envision positivist structuralism and 
quantification as synonymous with scientific progress. However, this 
inference is highly inaccurate. Ethnographic inquiry is a singularly 
powerful technique for studying the ways in which human behavior takes 
its shape. (Ibid.) 
 
Herbert Blumer (1956) wrote, “We can, and I think must, look upon human life as 
chiefly a vast interpretative process in which people, singly and collectively, guide 
themselves by defining the objects, events, and situations which they encounter. . . . Any 
scheme designed to analyze human group life in its general character has to fit this 
process of interpretation” (1956:686). True to the interpretivist theoretical tradition, the 
purpose of this inquiry is to apply the symbolic interactionist approach to the study of 
suicide terrorism in order to expose it as a socially constructed phenomenon. Thus, we 
may focus on mechanisms of moral signification, sensitization, and symbolization, and 
demonstrate their effects on extremist groups that favor suicide terrorism to fight their 
real or perceived enemies. Such mechanisms may in turn emphasize processes of group 
solidification and polarization, which are very important to account for and understand if 
we want to devise efficient and effective prevention measures addressing the fundamental 
socio-cultural aspects of suicide terrorism.  
“All reality, as meaningful reality, is socially constructed” (Crotty, 1998:54). 
Thus, suicide terrorism is a reality, a real issue indeed – no one shall deny that –, but it 
must be regarded essentially as a socially constructed one. This does not mean that 
suicide terrorism is a mere figment of the social scientist’s imagination or purely the 
byproduct of socio-political rhetoric. It is a genuine social problem, with tangible causes 
and dramatic real-life outcomes. Nonetheless, our interpretation of bombings as suicide 
terrorism is first and foremost a social construction. As Shadish (1995b) emphasizes, 
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social constructionism “refers to constructing knowledge about reality, not constructing 
reality itself” (1995b:67). It is therefore our knowledge, as well as the very cognitive 
mechanisms which influence our understanding of suicide terrorism that are at the core of 
this social constructionist inquiry into the phenomenon and related meaning-making 
processes. A theoretical framework allowing for the analysis of “how people in particular 
contexts . . . individually and collectively construct meaning and knowledge” (Patton, 
2001:78) therefore appears to be a sine qua non. 
Summary of Literature and Purpose of Study 
A long-standing modus operandi of asymmetric warfare, suicide bombings are an 
extremely violent and adaptive form of oppositional terrorism that has been increasingly 
witnessed around the world. The contemporary wave of suicide bombings, which started 
in the early 1980s in Lebanon and grew stronger mostly in Israel and Sri Lanka over the 
following two decades, has now reached Western Europe and the United States. Since the 
suicide attacks of September 2001 in the United States, a plethora of articles about 
suicide terrorism have appeared in a variety of academic journals and more mainstream 
books. The majority of these pieces focus on the contemporary development of suicide 
bombings as the ultimate terrorist act and the legitimization of such a violent practice as a 
tool of war. They also highlight Islamic fundamentalism as the root cause of suicide 
terrorism, despite the fact that non-Muslim religious groups and even secular groups have 
resorted to suicide terrorism, and emphasize the psychological or psychopathological 
features of typical suicide bombers.  
Thus the available literature typically focuses on the “who, when, and where” and 
the recent globalization of suicide terrorism, instead of the “why and how” of suicide 
 51
bombings. As a result, it fails to provide a thorough, methodical analysis and a critical 
understanding of the dynamics and patterns involved. It ignores that suicide terrorism is 
not a homogenous phenomenon but a fundamentally adaptive, resilient, and complex one. 
The literature on suicide terrorism is further characterized by a lack of applied focus: it 
generally relies on an arbitrary extension of terrorism research findings to suicide 
terrorism without further analysis or inquiry into the distinctive features of the latter. 
Finally, much like the terrorism literature in general, scholarly and mainstream articles or 
books on suicide terrorism rely almost entirely on secondary data analysis and literature 
integration. Without primary data and meticulous case studies, such literature contributes 
little to no original information to our understanding of the phenomenon.  
The popular imagery and stereotypes created and supported by government 
officials and the mass media, as well as many academics, do not provide an accurate 
representation of suicide terrorism. This distinctive study shall advance our 
comprehension of the phenomenon. The latter, much like terrorism in general, is a socio-
political concept that is understood differently from one society to another and from one 
historical or political era to the next. Suicide terrorism therefore appears to be the product 
of the interaction of social and political mechanisms, bureaucratic demands, and mass 
media organizations.  
“Qualitative research approaches have traditionally been favored when the main 
research objective is to improve our understanding of a phenomenon, especially when 
this phenomenon is complex and deeply embedded in its context” (Audet & d’Amboise, 
2001). Hence this study focuses on suicide terrorism from a qualitative angle, the most 
promising approach to analyzing how individuals construe their experience (i.e., human 
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lived experience) and how their understanding in turn affects or determines their way of 
life.  
From a theoretical standpoint, the present analysis is based on social 
constructionism and a complementary symbolic interactionist approach. Social 
constructionism “is a well-developed model for studying the contested claims that are 
made – by victims, interest groups, social movements, professionals and politicians – in 
the construction of new social problem categories” (Cohen, 2002:xxii). Applying a social 
constructionist approach to the study of suicide terrorism in particular can help 
understand the recent emergence of terrorists as contemporary folk devils, as well as the 
moral crusade and moral panic that ensued. Social constructionism further makes it 
possible to highlight the negative (and usually unintended) effects of social control 
policy, including the increased cohesion of terrorist groups and their polarization against 
the rest of society and, specifically, agents of control as represented by the entities 
involved in the global war on terror. The role of the mass media in publicizing attacks, 
triggering a “contagion effect,” and encouraging the ideological and commercial 
exploitation of suicide terrorism is also worthy of a thorough social constructionist 
investigation. Socially constructed reality is a continuing, dynamic process; such reality 
is constantly perpetuated as a pervasive set of norms by individuals who rely on their 
subjective interpretation and knowledge of it. Constructionist perspectives on social 
problems “ask how and why particular social problems emerge and become the focus of 
demonstrations and protests, front-page news stories and television coverage, and new 
social politics” (Loseke & Best, 2003:ix). Social problems are defined by the way certain 
acts or conditions situations are socially constructed or subjectively interpreted, not by 
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the very nature of these acts or conditions. The construction and application of definitions 
of deviance is a moral enterprise that entails the construction of moral meanings and their 
connection to certain acts or conditions. 
In a noteworthy study entitled Images of Terror: What We Can And Can’t Know 
About Terrorism, Philip Jenkins (2003) used a social constructionist approach to provide 
a critical analysis of mass media representations of terrorism. Jenkins argues that 
academics, journalists, and the general public naively trust the interpretations of terrorism 
provided by governments and official agencies. He further claims that our understanding 
of terrorism is the product of the interaction of bureaucratic agencies, private experts, 
scholars, and the mass media. Thus, he contends, “bureaucratic interests create and 
sustain the image presented in the mass media and popular culture” (2003:189) and the 
imagery and stereotypes we are exposed to do not reflect social reality. To conduct his 
research on mass media images of terrorism, Jenkins used open-source data drawn from 
the extant scholarly and mainstream literature on terrorism. He relied on a variety of 
documents such as articles, books, official statistics, news media reports, as well as 
entertainment media sources (domestic and foreign feature films) to gather the essence of 
“terrorism pop culture” and study how socio-political processes are involved in the social 
construction of terrorism, terrorist movements, groups, and actions. Although the overall 
analysis provides valuable insight into the role of the media and the interaction between 
all the social actors involved in the definition and interpretation processes, Jenkins relied 
exclusively on available data – sometimes prosaically and, in fact, occasionally 
inaccurately – and derived “frequent overgeneralizations” (Ross, 2004) that undermined 
the validity of an otherwise inspirational critique of terrorism research and policies.  
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This study provides a narrower, more methodical application of Jenkins’ 
paradigm to the social construction of suicide terrorism. Based on his approach, the main 
research question is: How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and 
media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism? A subset of 
three research questions was derived: (a) How is suicide terrorism a political weapon? (b) 
How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool? (c) How is suicide terrorism a 
politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework? 
In order to remedy the shortcomings of a study relying solely upon secondary data 
analysis, the research project was designed as a multi-case study in order to provide a 
comprehensive description and a holistic understanding of suicide terrorism. This multi-
site study was designed as an instrumental collective case study. It was collective as it 
consisted of the analysis of multiple cases (sites or groups) and instrumental inasmuch as 
it focused on a specific issue – suicide terrorism – instead of each individual case. 
Borrowing from Jenkins’ basic methodology – albeit with a much larger and more 
diverse sample –, the present study relies on the use of open-source documents for a 
review and content analysis of available data sources regarding suicide terrorism. 
However, in an effort to significantly improve on Jenkins’ design, over three dozen 
interviews conducted with key informants in various countries that have dealt with 
suicide bombings over the last two-and-a-half decades were also used. The goal of 
collecting and analyzing primary data was to contribute in-depth and innovative 
information to our empirical knowledge of the phenomenon.  
Furthermore, to complement Jenkins’ social constructionist stance, an 
interactionist/interpretive perspective was chosen insofar as it focuses specifically on how 
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individuals and groups interact. The symbolic interactionist perspective posits that 
subjective meanings are socially constructed and that these subjective meanings 
interrelate with objective actions. Hence meanings arise through interaction between 
people and the use of these meanings by social actors implies interpretation, i.e., an active 
process of formulation, reconsideration, and revision. The interactionist/interpretive 
perspective assumes that human group life is intersubjective and reflective: “the study of 
human behavior is the study of human lived experience and that human experience is 
rooted in people’s meanings, interpretations, activities, and interactions” (Prus, 1996:9).  
Qualitative inquiry, social constructionism, and symbolic interactionism allow for 
more fruitful approaches to study such a multifaceted social phenomenon as suicide 
terrorism, which not only comprises a substantial human element, but also encompasses 
political, social, historical, and psychological dimensions. Suicide terrorism cannot be 
combated or prevented if the significance of its historical and socio-cultural dimensions is 
persistently overlooked. Likewise, the dynamics of the moral signification of the 
phenomenon by agents of control, the media, and society at large cannot be ignored. A 
social constructionist approach combined with a symbolic interactionist stance within the 
qualitative framework of a multi-site study can help determine how the interpretive 
understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a biased representation of events 
(and their alleged causes) conditioned by deliberate attempts to stigmatize ideological 
enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and promote certain political interests. The 
present multi-case study shall do so by (a) focusing the analysis on mechanisms of moral 
sensitization and symbolization; (b) evidencing how socio-political processes, 
bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures contribute to the social construction of 
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suicide terrorism; (c) highlighting how agents of social control and the mass media 
contribute to the commercial and ideological exploitation of suicide terrorism, as well as 
its dramatization, politicization, and escalation; and (d) improving our understanding of 
group solidification and polarization processes so as to improve anti- and 
counterterrorism policies regarding suicide bombing campaigns.  
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
Multi-Case Study 
“Case study research holds a long, distinguished history across many disciplines” 
(Creswell, 1997:62). A case study provides an in-depth description and understanding of 
one or more events, settings, groups, or other bounded systems. Audet and d’Amboise 
(2001) describe the multi-site or multi-case study as an “adaptive and innovative” 
qualitative research approach “designed to gain an in-depth knowledge of an 
organizational phenomenon.” This further “combines several approaches to case study 
research, borrowing from the positivist tradition, the interpretative approach and the 
qualitative research corpus” and “involves the observation and analysis of several sites 
using . . . cross-case comparisons and explanation building techniques to analyze data.” 
By examining more than one case, researchers have the opportunity not to adulterate their 
global approach, but rather to compare cases and discern possible themes or patterns 
across cases, which in turn adds depth to the study and helps corroborate or solidify its 
findings and implications.  
The type of analysis of these data can be a holistic analysis of the entire 
case or an embedded analysis of a specific aspect of the case. . . . Through 
this data collection, a detailed description of the case emerges, as do an 
analysis of themes or issues and an interpretation or assertions about the 
case by the researcher. . . . This analysis is rich in the context of the case 
or setting in which the case presents itself. . . . When multiple cases are 
chosen, a typical format is to first provide a detailed description of each 
case and themes within the case, called a within-case analysis, followed 
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by a thematic analysis across the cases, called a cross-case analysis, as 
well as assertions or an interpretation of the meaning of the case. In the 
final interpretive phase, the researcher reports . . . the ‘lessons learned’ 
from the case. (Creswell, 1997:63) 
 
In keeping with such rationale for the use of multi-case studies in qualitative 
research, and given the purpose of this research, the study was designed as an 
instrumental collective case study. It is collective as it consists of the analysis of multiple 
cases (sites or groups). It is instrumental (as opposed to intrinsic) inasmuch as it focuses 
“on a specific issue rather than on the case itself . . . [and] the case becomes a vehicle to 
better understand the issue” (Stake, 1995).  
In case studies, the unit of analysis “is typically a system of action rather than an 
individual or group of individuals” (Tellis, 1997). As such, “[c]ase studies tend to be 
selective, focusing on one or two issues that are fundamental to understanding the system 
being examined” (Ibid.). In this particular study, suicide terrorism is the issue at stake, 
not specific suicide terror attacks or groups using suicide bombings. What the analysis 
focuses on is the tactic and strategy of suicide bombings, not terrorism as an ideology. 
The purpose of such analysis is to shed light on the one-sided interpretations and social 
construction of suicide bombings. Socio-political biases and ideological constructions are 
in fact the common theme highlighted in all the cases studied, a pattern which emerged 
early on during the data collection and analysis phases. In order to bring such theme to 
light, a cross-case analysis was necessary, whereby “themes across cases” were 
examined “to discern themes that are common to all cases” (Ibid.).  Finally, the context of 
each case was broadly conceptualized in order for each setting to include wide-ranging 
social, political, historical, and psychological issues (see Creswell, 1997). 
 59
The information gathered for the present study may be summarized in a matrix 
highlighting the research questions, the sites selection process, the data sources, and the 
themes inherent in the analysis of the social construction of suicide terrorism (Figure 1).  
Main Research Question 
 How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic 
imperatives, and media structures involved in the 
social construction of suicide terrorism? 
   
Secondary Research Questions 
 (a) How is suicide terrorism a political weapon? (b) 
How is suicide terrorism used as a communication 
tool? (c) How is suicide terrorism a politicized issue 
that fits into the moral panic framework? 
   
Cases Selected 
 • Afghanistan 
• France 
• Iraq 
• Israel 
• Kashmir 
• Lebanon 
• Russia 
• Sri Lanka 
• Turkey 
• United Kingdom 
• United States 
   
Sources of Evidence  • Primary Data: Interviews 
  • Secondary Data: Open-Source Documents 
   
Themes and Concepts 
 • Occurrence / Episodic Threats 
• Signification / Media Coverage 
• Galvanization of Public Interest and 
Policymakers’ Attention 
• Claims-Making  
• Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation, 
Demonization (Folk Devils), 
Radical/Moralizing Rhetoric  
• Construction of Collective Insecurity 
• Moral Panics and Moral Crusades 
• Social Control Mechanisms / Rule Creation 
and Enforcement 
• Construction of Social Problem (Suicide 
Terrorism) and Exacerbation of Issue 
 
Figure 1: Social Construction of Suicide Terrorism: Multi-Case Study Data Matrix  
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Overview of Research Design 
Herbert Blumer recommended approaches to the study of human behavior and 
lived experience that have now “become highly valued and widely used qualitative 
methods” (Patton, 2001:112). He viewed “qualitative inquiry as the only real way of 
understanding how people perceive, understand, and interpret the world. Only through 
close contact and direct interaction with people in open-minded, naturalistic inquiry and 
inductive analysis could the symbolic interactionist come to understand the symbolic 
world of the people being studied” (Ibid.). Qualitative research focuses on how 
individuals construe their experience (i.e., human lived experience) and how their 
understanding in turn affects or determines their way of life. As emphasized by Audet 
and d’Amboise (2001), “qualitative research approaches have traditionally been favored 
when the main research objective is to improve our understanding of a phenomenon, 
especially when this phenomenon is complex and deeply embedded in its context. . . . 
Qualitative research has now grown into a wide domain, having evolved much beyond its 
original scope of qualitative data collection.” Furthermore, 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) claim that qualitative methods can be used to 
better understand any phenomenon about which little is yet known. They 
can also be used to gain new perspectives on things about which much is 
already known, or to gain more in-depth information that may be difficult 
to convey quantitatively. Thus, qualitative methods are appropriate in 
situations where one needs to first identify the variables that might later be 
tested quantitatively, or where the researcher has determined that 
quantitative measures cannot adequately describe or interpret a situation. 
(Hoepfl, 1997) 
 
This multi-case study of suicide bombings draws upon methods used consistently 
in previous examinations of the social construction of crime (secondary data analysis). It 
also broadens the field of suicide terrorism analysis by combining document analysis, 
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literature integration, and series of interviews within an innovative case study framework. 
The main research question at the core of this multi-case study is: How are socio-political 
processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures involved in the social 
construction of suicide terrorism? Hence a subset of three research questions can be 
derived: (a) How is suicide terrorism a political weapon? (b) How is suicide terrorism 
used as a communication tool? (c) How is suicide terrorism a politicized issue that fits 
into the moral panic framework? 
Qualitative inquiry, social constructionism, and symbolic interactionism allow for 
more fruitful approaches to study such a complex and adaptive phenomenon as suicide 
terrorism, which not only comprises a substantial human element, but also encompasses 
political, social, historical, and psychological dimensions. Constructionism has been 
established as “an influential methodological paradigm” (Patton, 2001:99) that enables 
researchers to use a qualitative approach to study human behavior and lived experience, 
group life, and social phenomena in general.  
Philip Jenkins has relied on social constructionism to enlighten us about a variety 
of social problems. In one study, Jenkins (1994a) offers a social constructionist 
interpretation of the “ice” (smokeable crystal methamphetamine) epidemic and analyzes 
the overall structure of drug scares via an examination of Congress reports and hearings, 
media accounts in dailies and weeklies, and the overall context in which policies are 
developed and national problems created out of local issues. In order to contribute to our 
understanding of the serial murder mythology, Jenkins (1994b) focuses on rhetoric and 
the process of social construction, the context of news making, changing media patterns, 
as well as the role of the media, popular culture, federal law enforcement and the Justice 
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Department in the making of the myth and the relentless exploitation of fear. Jenkins 
(2000) also used the social constructionist approach to further study the serial killer panic 
of recent years via an analysis of media publications related to serial murderers, including 
a search of the New York Times archive since 1960. In another notable study, Jenkins 
(2003) focused on “images of terror” and provides a critical analysis of mass media 
representations of terrorism. As noted in the previous chapter, Jenkins’ work on the social 
construction of terrorism which had much bearing on the design and implementation of 
this multi-case study. Other researchers have also employed a social constructionist 
approach to the study of social problems. For instance, Jacobs & Potter (1998) explain 
the social construction of the hate crime epidemic by analyzing hate crime legislation and 
news media coverage to demonstrate that political ambitions, powerful advocacy groups 
and lobbies, and diehard legislation were the source of extreme social reaction 
concerning hate- and bias-motivated crimes. Jacobs and Henry (2000) additionally argue 
that the “hate crime epidemic” is a myth, although it has been decried by politicians, 
academics, and journalists alike, as well as spokespersons for various minority advocacy 
or lobbying groups. Despite what has been reported since the mid-1980s, there has been 
no “explosion” of hate crimes and statistics have not “skyrocketed” in the United States. 
Jacobs and Henry focus on the inadequacy of data gathering methods at the local, state, 
and federal levels, review existing legislation throughout the United States, highlight the 
slanted interpretation of dubious statistics, and analyze media coverage of hate or bias 
incidents. They emphasize the propensity of the news media to eagerly “embrace the 
most negative interpretation of intergroup relations” (2000:51). They conclude that 
identity politics played a significant part in the creation of symbolic and subjective laws 
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that are based on vague definitions of the concept of hate crime and enforced 
inconsistently, thus undermining generic criminal law and intensifying social divisions 
and conflict. Likewise, a study of the social construction of child abduction (Kappeler, 
Blumberg & Potter, 2000) assessing the sensationalism of news media representations of 
child-related kidnapping cases systematically highlights the use of distorted official 
definitions, misleading statistics, and media accounts to demonstrate a pattern in the 
presentation of a crime issue and the subsequent creation of images and crime myths. The 
authors essentially focus on how politicians and the media exploit the imagery of missing 
children, as well as the legal reforms that spring from emotional societal reaction and in 
effect create a new type of crime and a new class of criminals without offering a 
productive solution or an actual prevention option against criminality.   
As for the symbolic interactionist approach, it is highly adaptive and flexible. 
Hence it has been applied to a variety of contemporary issues to help understand the 
interaction of agents and institutions, and the use of symbolic resources (such as 
governments and global media networks) to create meanings persuasively. The 
interpretation of media representations and ideological claimsmaking related to a given 
issue involves a creative and selective process that can be efficiently analyzed with a 
sound symbolic interactionist approach. For example, two studies on cybersex (Patton, 
2001; Waskul, 2003) used in-depth interviews to analyze the symbolic interaction 
between cybersex chat-room users and applied the interaction framework to explain the 
social processes and structures that can emerge in the virtual community. Waskul (2002) 
focuses specifically on televideo cybersex (as opposed to text-based cybersex) and, 
through a series of in-depth interviews, studies the relationships between individuality 
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(selfhood) and the body, as well as the context in which they are both located. The 
context for interaction is thus singled out as an important aspect to consider in order to 
fully comprehend the relationships between the involved agents and their social situation.  
More recently, Arena and Arrigo (2005) published a study relying upon a 
structural symbolic interactionist analysis of the terrorist identity. They used five major 
organizing concepts (symbols, definition of situation, roles, socialization and role-taking, 
and the self) in order to develop a conceptual framework focusing on “the importance of 
culture, self, and society when investigating one’s membership in and identity through 
militant extremist organizations” (2005:485). The article resorts to structural symbolic 
interactionism to improve our “understanding of how terrorist identities are created, 
embraced, and maintained, as well as how they influence the behavior of members in 
militant extremist subculture” (Ibid.).  
Patton (2001:113) notes that  
the importance of symbolic interactionism to qualitative inquiry is its 
distinct emphasis on the importance of symbols and the interpretive 
processes that undergrid interactions as fundamental to understanding 
human behavior. . . . [T]he study of the original meaning and influence of 
symbols and shared meaning can shed light on what is most important to 
people, what will be most resistant to change, and what will be most 
necessary to change if the . . . organization is to move in new directions. 
The subject matter and methods of symbolic interactionism also 
emphasize the importance of paying attention to how particular 
interactions give rise to symbolic understandings when one is engaged in 
changing symbols as part of . . . [an] organizational development process.  
 
Case Identification and Selection Criteria 
Purposeful sampling was used in order to select unique research sites and key 
participants for this qualitative multi-case study. Unlike probability sampling, which 
derives its logic and strength from its very objective of generalization, purposeful 
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sampling consists in selecting, as Blumer himself suggested, information-rich cases for 
an in-depth study aimed at providing a better understanding of a complex social 
phenomenon. “Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal 
about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research, hence the term 
purposeful sampling” (Patton, 2001:46). Contrary to quantitative studies using 
probabilistic sampling, the need for generalization in qualitative research is secondary – 
or even nonexistent – compared to the significance of the in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon of interest. Types of purposeful sampling include site selection, 
comprehensive sampling, maximum variation sampling, network sampling, and sampling 
by case type.  
“In choosing what case to study, an array of possibilities for purposeful sampling is 
available . . . [from selecting] cases that show different perspectives on the problem, 
process or event . . . [to selecting] ordinary cases, accessible cases, or unusual cases” 
(Creswell, 1997:62). A combination of purposeful sampling strategies was used to select 
cases for this large-scale study. These favored strategies included: 
1. Site selection: specific sites were selected because the phenomenon of interest 
(i.e., suicide bombings or suicide terrorism) has occurred or is considered likely to 
occur there; likelihood of occurrence was determined based on the socio-political 
context of a given site, recent increases in overall terrorist activities and 
recruitment practices, and documented presence (e.g., training camps) of groups 
linked to the phenomenon of interest; 
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2. Typical-case sampling: sites/groups were selected for analysis if they presented 
the typical characteristics of sites/groups using or likely to experience/use suicide 
bombings; 
3. Critical-case sampling: sites/groups were selected for analysis if they represented 
dramatic examples of the phenomenon of interest; 
4. Concept-based sampling: information-rich (key) participants were sampled due to 
their scholarly knowledge of, professional experience with, or personal exposure 
to the phenomenon of interest. 
As a result of this sampling strategy, eleven countries were selected for 
interviewing and document analysis purposes. They are listed below, as well as the 
rationale for their inclusion. Cases where suicide terrorism has occurred or is likely to 
occur, but for which little to no data or informants were available were omitted. Sampling 
strategies are summarized in Table 2. 
1. Afghanistan: the network known as al-Qaeda, or “the Base,” was established in 
Afghanistan; suicide bombings have occurred regularly in various parts of the 
war-torn country; 
2. France: representatives of the Ministry of Interior and the Anti-Terrorism 
Coordination Unit (U.C.L.A.T., or Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-
Terroriste) were interviewed to discuss attempts by the Algerian GIA (Groupe 
Islamique Armé) to perpetrate a suicide attack in Paris in the mid-1990s, as well 
as current efforts to prevent suicide terrorism across the European Union and at 
the international level; INTERPOL representatives of the Fusion Task Force were 
also interviewed for the same purposes; 
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Table 2 
Sampling Strategies and Case Selection 
Site selection Typical-case sampling Critical-case sampling 
Concept-based 
sampling 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Al-Qaeda France 
France Israel Russia Israel 
Iraq Kashmir Lebanon Turkey 
Israel Iraq Sri Lanka United Kingdom 
Kashmir  Turkey United States 
Lebanon  United Kingdom  
Russia  United States  
Sri Lanka    
Turkey    
United Kingdom    
United States    
 
3. Iraq: the Iraqi insurgency has been resorting to suicide bombings on a regular 
basis since the U.S.-led invasion of the country in 2003; 
4. Israel: researchers from the International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism 
(ICT; Herzliya, Israel) were contacted due to their scholarly knowledge of, and 
professional or personal experience with suicide terrorism; 
5. Kashmir: since the late 1990s, a separatist movement of Kashmiri terrorists has 
perpetrated over a dozen suicide bombings aimed at India’s Hindu government; 
6. Lebanon: Hizballah, the Party of God, pioneered the contemporary use of suicide 
terrorism in the early 1980s; 
7. Russia: Chechen rebels opposing the Russian occupation of Chechnya have been 
increasingly resorting to suicide bombings since 2000; 
8. Sri Lanka: the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) began their suicide bombing campaign in 
1987 and they are still the most prolific users of suicide bombings in the world; 
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9. Turkey: the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party; today’s KONGRA-GEL or KGK) 
perpetrated several suicide attacks in the mid-1990s; Turkish government and 
intelligence officials were interviewed;  
10. United Kingdom: researchers at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and 
Political Violence were selected due to their scholarly, professional, and personal 
experiences with suicide terrorism; in addition, a series of four suicide bombings 
occurred in central London in July 2005;  
11. United States: the September 2001 attacks against the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon were the first suicide terror attacks on American soil; the United States 
had also suffered losses from suicide attacks overseas before (e.g., Kenya and 
Tanzania U.S. embassy bombings in 1998, USS Cole attack in 2000).  
The Role of the Researcher 
My interest in suicide terrorism grew steadily over a decade ago, soon turning into 
a downright fascination with this complex, captivating social phenomenon. Growing up 
in France, where I was exposed to daily news coverage of suicide terror attacks occurring 
mainly in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Israel, I became particularly sensitive to and intrigued 
by the phenomenology and etiology of this peculiar form of terrorism. Long before the 
September 2001 suicide attacks on American landmarks by members of the Afghanistan-
based Al-Qaeda terror network, which essentially introduced both the U.S. government 
and the general public to the reality of suicide terrorism and its dramatic practical 
consequences, I decided to focus my research efforts on this extremely violent and 
adaptive form of terrorism.  
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Soon after (and ever since) the September 2001 terrorist attacks, a plethora of 
articles, books and other reports flourished in scholarly journals, news reports, think 
tanks, and bookstores across the U.S. and most of the world. Many authors, 
unfortunately, have been self-proclaimed experts on terrorism whose knowledge and 
understanding of the phenomenon have been as flawed and inconsistent as the 
reductionist interpretations and reactionary policies that have been adopted as a result of 
an obvious misconception of suicide terrorism and its outcomes. 
What is featured in political and media discourse on terrorism today? Cases that 
emphasize the simplistic “Good vs. Evil” or “Us vs. Them” binaries promoted by the 
current administration. Such an approach illustrates the construction of deviant identities 
via the stigmatization, marginalization, and demonization of entire groups of people 
officially labeled as “evildoers” or “evil cowards.” Publicly setting the civilized and 
moral world of Good, as defined by the United States, against the barbaric amoral world 
of Evil of the terrorists only promotes a reductionist rhetorical style that actually feeds 
into the similarly dichotomous extremist Islamic worldview pitting the House of God 
(Dar al-Islam) against the House of War (Dar al-Harb). 
The mechanisms involved in the construction of suicide terrorism as a social 
problem have come to intrigue and fascinate me the most. Hence, the focus of my 
dissertation shifted from a phenomenological and etiological analysis of the issue to an 
approach centered specifically on the social construction of suicide terrorism, the 
commission of objective acts vs. the subjective meanings ascribed to such actions, the 
symbolic interaction involved in the interpretive process, and the detrimental effects of 
the ideological and commercial exploitation of the phenomenon. Years of research on the 
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topic have given me insight into the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism as a 
subjective process that is contingent upon various rhetorical mechanisms that are worth 
studying more closely. Interest groups and bureaucratic agencies are deeply involved in 
the interpretation phase and it is essential to explore, uncover, and understand the 
subjective definitional and rhetorical processes by which suicide terrorism is socially 
constructed. Failing to do so will only result in developing more inadequate strategies and 
arbitrary policies that ignore the inherently socio-cultural dimension of the problem and 
the fact that it is first and foremost an institutional-level issue. Suicide terrorism is a 
dynamic phenomenon that involves a substantial human dimension and deals with the 
complexity of social interaction. Studying human behavior and human experience, as 
well as the interaction between individuals and their environment therefore calls for a 
pragmatic and interpretive approach effectively factoring the lived experiences of people 
into the analysis. This is what a qualitative study allows, which explains why I selected 
such a paradigm. 
Prior to directing a qualitative study, a researcher must: (a) “adopt the stance 
suggested by the characteristics of the naturalist paradigm”; (b) “develop the level of skill 
appropriate for a human instrument, or the vehicle through which data will be collected 
and interpreted”; and (c) “prepare a research design that utilizes accepted strategies for 
naturalistic inquiry” (Hoepfl, 1997; also see Lincoln & Guba, 1985). One’s competence 
and skills to conduct qualitative research depend largely upon one’s “theoretical 
sensitivity” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Hoepfl, 1997; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
Theoretical sensitivity refers to a personal quality of the researcher. It 
indicates an awareness of the subtleties of meaning of data. . . . [It] refers 
to the attribute of having insight, the ability to give meaning to data, the 
 71
capacity to understand, and capability to separate the pertinent from that 
which isn’t. (Strauss & Corbin, as cited in Hoepfl, 1997) 
 
Theoretical sensitivity is the product of various sources, including personal and 
professional experience, as well as knowledge of the extant scholarly literature. As a 
result, “[t]he credibility of a qualitative research report relies heavily on the confidence 
readers have in the researcher’s ability to be sensitive to the data and to make appropriate 
decisions in the field” (Hoepfl, 1997; also see Patton, 2001). 
If humans are the “instrument of choice” when it comes to qualitative or 
naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), it is mainly because 
 Humans are responsive to environmental cues, and able to interact with 
the situation; they have the ability to collect information at multiple levels 
simultaneously; they are able to perceive situations holistically; they are 
able to process data as soon as they become available; they can provide 
immediate feedback and request verification of data; and they can explore 
atypical or unexpected responses. (Hoepfl, 1997) 
 
LeCompte (1993) further posits that “positivistic science imposes a false distance 
between researchers and the researched by mandating that the researcher maintain an 
artificially impersonal stance toward the people studied” and that such detachment results 
“in data that present a partial and therefore false, and an elitist and therefore biased, 
reality” (1993:11-12). Authenticity is thus possible only where it is genuinely reflected in 
the relationship between the researcher and the participant(s), i.e., beyond the simple 
narrative. LeCompte even argues that the researcher acts as a mediator to help 
participants voice their thoughts on and understanding of events and circumstances 
within the broader context of their own lived experience.  
Researchers conducting structured interviews are typically physically involved 
but emotionally removed observers who play “a neutral role,” at the same time “casual 
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and friendly” and “directive and impersonal” (Fontana & Frey, 1994:367). Semi-
structured interviews, on the other hand, allow for a more open, casual questioning – a 
format that favors more flexibility and authenticity.  
The interview protocol selected for this study was semi-structured, which made it 
possible for me to effectively interact and develop a trust rapport with the research 
participants while gathering insightful data on the problem of interest. My involvement in 
the in-depth interview process was both intensive and extensive. Indeed, conducting the 
interviews required me to make several overseas trips to meet with the key participants 
selected for the research in Turkey, Scotland, France, and the United States. The length of 
each stay ranged from two to ten days, depending on the destination and how many 
participants had to be interviewed. Only one participant was interviewed per day (in some 
cases, the interview even spanned two days) in order to ensure that I could spend enough 
time with each of them and give them enough time for additional questions, formal or 
informal feedback, etc. 
Active listening played a significant part in conducting the interviews; responses 
were taped so intensive note-taking would not distract me or the interviewees. Study 
participants were therefore naturally encouraged to become more engaged in the 
interview process and to openly discuss not only their experience but also their thoughts 
on suicide terrorism, the meaning-making mechanisms inherent in our understanding of 
the phenomenon, and various related socio-political issues. The interview process, at 
times, resembled more an informal conversation than an interview (albeit a semi-
structured one), which never interfered with the progression of the discussion. 
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Reciprocity issues were also anticipated and addressed wherever necessary. Since 
interviewing is an obtrusive method that requires me to intrude on participants, even 
though they have formally agreed to participate in the study, it is important for me to 
reciprocate when needed. Key informants have shared information with me that I would 
have otherwise had no access to via document analysis. Hence, I was clearly indebted to 
them for their input and insight, and if an interviewee felt the need to ask additional 
questions or inquire about my credentials and background, or the progress of the study, 
the information was provided overtly and candidly. Meanwhile, I bore in mind that too 
much self-disclosure (or, worse, unsolicited self-disclosure) could have a negative effect 
on the participant and therefore hamper the interview process. As emphasized by 
Reinharz (1992), it is crucial that I, as a qualitative researcher, learn how to “pace my 
interactions and look for cues from the participant as to readiness to know more about 
me” (1992:33). Thus, aware of the necessity to both time and measure any type of self-
disclosure, I made sure participants received the right amount of information about me 
when they needed it, in a reasonable and balanced fashion.  
Data Collection Methods 
Creswell (1997) emphasizes that, “[i]n qualitative research, the convergence of 
sources of information, views of investigators, different theories, and different 
methodologies represents the triangulation of ideas . . . to help support the development 
of themes” (1997:251). With case studies, “[t]he data collection is extensive, drawing on 
multiple sources of information, such as observations, interviews, documents, and audio-
visual materials” (1997:62-63). Such a diversity of information sources and collected data 
guarantees a more “complete picture” (Patton, 2001:307) of the phenomenon being 
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studied. Such a research strategy based upon triangulation enables researchers to base 
their case study on multiple sources of information and therefore evidence (Stake, 1995; 
Yin, 1994). For this multi-case study, data were obtained and triangulated using two 
complementary information sources: in-depth interviews and document analysis. Table 3 
describes the sources from which data were collected and analyzed for the purpose of this 
multi-case study. They are further detailed below. 
Table 3 
Sources of Data, Type of Evidence Collected, and Sample Size 
Data Sources Type of Data Sample Size 
Interviews Phenomenological Interviews 22 
 Elite Interviews 17 
 Total 39 
Documents News Articles 1450 
 Television News Clips 112 
 Scholarly Articles 25 
 Books 9 
 Archival Records 19 
 Administrative Documents 24 
 Government Reports & Memos 43 
 Private Organization Reports 13 
 Unclassified Military Reports 16 
 Feature Films 5 
 Documentary Films 4 
 Recruitment Videos 11 
 Short Films & Animations 5 
 Militant Websites 18 
 Speeches & Letters 21 
 Total 1775 
 
Interviews 
Thirty-nine on-site interviews were conducted in France, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, as part of a two-year grant project on suicide terrorism 
funded by the U.S. Office of Naval Research via the Global Center for Disaster 
Management and Humanitarian Action (G-CDMHA) at the University of South Florida 
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(USF). While the interviews focused more on the phenomenology and etiology of suicide 
terrorism, risk assessments and prevention, the respondents provided answers that 
continually reflected the significance of social contexts, socio-political forces, and 
ideology, thus echoing issues inherent in social constructionism. Such patterns in the 
initial data collection phase prompted me to later focus my attention – and my subsequent 
dissertation work – on the constructions and interpretations of suicide bombings around 
the world. 
The interviews were semi-structured in nature since specific interview questions 
had to be used within a research protocol approved by the USF Institutional Review 
Board. The interviews typically lasted from 60 to 120 minutes, depending on how many 
additional comments the interviewees had. Each interviewee signed an informed consent 
form for minimal-risk research and was asked about 20 questions, which centered on the 
issues listed below. Table 4 summarizes relevant interviewee demographics. Due to 
confidentiality requirements, the exact identity and related professional or personal 
details about each interviewee cannot be revealed. The actual interview questions, 
although they relate more directly to the G-CDMHA project than to this current study, 
are listed in Appendix B.  
In-depth one-on-one interviews with information-rich participants were selected 
as a data collection method following the Blumerian tradition of using key informants as 
interviewees. Blumer indeed “considered a carefully selected group of naturally acute 
observers and well-informed people to be a real ‘panel of experts’ about a setting or 
situation, experts who would take the researcher inside the phenomenon of interest” 
(Patton, 2001:112). “In-depth interviews with multiple informants at each site” also made 
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it possible “to triangulate findings across sources and test issues of reliability and 
validity” (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:60). Potential informants were selected due to their 
current or past involvement with suicide terrorism policy, prevention or research and 
contacted to participate in the study. Some declinedfor security or ideological reasons, 
including a representative of the Arab European League who, in January 2004, wrote:  
Dear Madam, I do not wish to collaborate on your project, but i can give 
yuou a tip though. you want to stop people from blowing themselves up? 
Give them weapons that are equal to those of their opressors or stop 
opression. Give the palestinians appachi helecoptors and F 16, that would 
be a good idea to stop people from using their bodies as a weopon to detter 
the oppressor. (sic) 
 
Table 4 
Interviewee Demographics for On-Site One-On-One Phenomenological and Elite 
Interviewing Process, By Country 
Country Total of Interviews Affiliation Gender Status 
France 9 Ministry of Interior; UCLAT; Interpol 
Male: 8 
Female: 1 
Civilian: 9 
Military: 0 
Turkey 15 
Turkish National 
Police; TADOC; 
UNODC; Ministry 
of Interior; Ministry 
of Defense; Turkish 
Intelligence Agency; 
University 
Male: 15 
Female: 0 
Civilian: 12 
Military: 3 
United 
Kingdom 6 
CSTPV; University; 
London Police 
Male: 6 
Female: 0 
Civilian: 6 
Military: 0 
United 
States 9 
University; Army; 
Air Force; Navy 
Male: 9 
Female: 0 
Civilian: 4 
Military: 5 
 
Two forms of in-depth interviewing were used and, ultimately, merged into the 
interview process: phenomenological interviewing and elite interviewing. 
Phenomenological interviewing is rooted in phenomenology, “the study of lived 
experiences and the ways we understand those experiences to develop a worldview,” and 
its goal is to thoroughly “describe the meaning of a concept or phenomenon that several 
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individuals share” (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:112). Phenomenological interviewing is a 
useful tool inasmuch as “it permits an explicit focus on the researcher’s personal 
experience combined with those of the interviewees” (1998:113). However, a strict 
introspective exercise – called epoche – is necessary for researchers to become fully 
aware of their own biases and ensure that their own experiences and worldviews do not 
interfere with those of the interviewees. In the present study, respondents selected for 
phenomenological interviews were the ones who could provide an academic 
understanding of the phenomenon (i.e., scholars in Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States), as well as law enforcement and military personnel having had exposure to 
suicide terrorism or related training (in all four countries visited). Out of the thirty-nine 
interviewees, twenty-two were involved in the phenomenological interviewing process. 
Elite interviewing, on the other hand, focuses specifically on interviewees who are 
“considered to be influential, prominent, and/or well-informed people in an organization 
or a community . . . on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research” 
(Ibid.). Invaluable data can be gathered by interviewing these knowledge-rich people. In 
addition, elites can “report on an organization’s policies, past histories, and future plans 
from a particular perspective” (Ibid.), which can yield very useful information that would 
not be easily obtained elsewhere. The major limitations of elite interviewing are typically 
gaining access to the elites and their lack of flexibility when dealing with a relatively or 
fully structured interview format. In this study, these obstacles were circumvented thanks 
to federal sponsorship for the grant the interviews were conducted through, as well as a 
network of contacts in the various agencies or governmental offices included in the 
project. The quality of the information thus gathered was invaluable. Seventeen of the 
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thirty-nine interviewees were considered elite respondents due to their top positions and 
responsibilities within specific national or international agencies (i.e., government, law 
enforcement, and military senior officials). 
Document Analysis 
Document analysis was the second data collection method adopted for this study 
to not only supplement and triangulate the interview data, but also ensure more flexibility 
in the data collection and data analysis phases. This is a commonly used method that 
allows researchers to verify other observations or complement interview data. Documents 
used in this study included either primary sources (i.e., original work) or secondary 
sources (i.e., secondhand analyses of original work). Focusing on oral narratives 
(interviews), textual narratives (broadsheet media coverage, scholarly journals, official 
policy statements, formal and informal governmental memoranda, speeches and reports, 
archival records), and visual narratives (videotaped news coverage, feature films, 
documentaries, recruitment videos) made it possible to fully explore all available 
materials concerning suicide terrorism.  
Articles published worldwide in newspapers and news magazines between 
December 1980 and December 2005 were accessed through the LexisNexis Academic 
database and compared to results from the Associated Press (AP) news archive. 
Keywords used for the search included: suicide terrorism, suicide bombing, martyrdom 
operation, suicide bomber, suicide attack, suicide terror attack, suicidal bombing, and 
homicide bombing. The number of articles thus found is presented in Table 5.  
The search was then narrowed down using the LexisNexis database option to use 
only “major news” reports published in English-language major newspapers and news 
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magazines for the 1980-2005 period. Articles were randomly sampled from the results. 
This process yielded a total of 1450 relevant articles.   
Table 5 
Number of Articles Published in Major Newspapers and News Magazines, By Keyword, 
1980-2005 
 LexisNexis Academic Associated Press Archive 
Suicide Terrorism 6470 5389 
Suicide Bombing 7870 10313 
Martyrdom Operation 126 0 
Suicide Bomber 9790 7256 
Suicide Attack 13200 14541 
Suicide Terror Attack 2920 938 
Suicidal Bombing 41 79 
Homicide Bombing 36 73 
 
A total of 1775 documents were collected and systematically analyzed. Besides 
news articles (n=1450), other open-source documents on suicide bombings that were used 
in the present study include television news clips (n=112), scholarly articles (n=25), 
books (n=9), archival records (n=19), administrative documents (n=24), government 
reports and memoranda (n=43), private organization reports (n=13), unclassified military 
reports (n=16), feature films (n=5), documentary films (n=4), recruitment videos (n=11), 
short films and animations (n=5), militant websites (n=18), as well as speeches and letters 
(n=21). Most documents were obtained via Internet-based archives; the rest was acquired 
from the interviewees involved in the phenomenological and elite interviewing process 
described above.  
The data gathering phase of this study was twofold and required a general review 
of documents, as well as a systematic historical analysis of documents. A general review 
of documents, an unobtrusive interpretive method that allows for the use of content 
analysis for the examination of various materials on suicide bombings, as well as a 
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systematic historical analysis of documents occurred prior to conducting in-depth 
interviews (inasmuch as it provided me with a thorough knowledge of suicide terrorism, 
its emergence many centuries ago, its contemporary developments and current trends, as 
well as the groups that have used / use / could resort to this method). Both were also used 
during the content analysis phase of the study in order to provide more insight into the 
subjective interpretation of suicide bombing events over time and across countries.  
Content analysis made it possible to examine and categorize the contents of the 
sources used. As “a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text 
into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” (Stemler, 2001), content 
analysis may be broadly defined as “any technique for making inferences by objectively 
and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages” (Holsti, 1969:14). 
Hence, the method is not limited to textual analysis. It has in fact been used in other 
areas, such as coding drawings (Wheelock, Haney, & Bebell, 2000) and coding actions 
observed in videotaped studies (Stigler, Gonzales, Kawanaka, Knoll, & Serrano, 1999). 
The advantage of content analysis is that it “enables researchers to sift through large 
volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion” (Stemler, 2001). As Weber 
(1990) points out, content analysis is a valuable method for observing and depicting “the 
focus of individual, group, institutional, or social attention.” Furthermore, researchers can 
use content analysis to make inferences that may be corroborated by additional, 
complementary data collection techniques. As Krippendorff (1980) mentions, “[m]uch 
content analysis research is motivated by the search for techniques to infer from symbolic 
data what would be either too costly, no longer possible, or too obtrusive by the use of 
other techniques” (1980:51). Here, content analysis began with a word-frequency count 
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and also entailed devising codes to divide the data into sensible concept-based groups. A 
specific coding scheme was thus applied to the data and the latter were classified so that 
the frequency of specific concepts could be recorded and computed more easily. The 
frequency breakdown of the codes for each concept is explained and tabulated later on. 
Concept mapping was then used in order to methodically analyze emerging 
patterns and themes in the data. Miller and Riechert (1994) provide a thorough discussion 
of concept mapping, a scaling technique that enables researchers to observe and depict 
themes or categories of content within larger amounts of text. Their analysis highlights 
three major benefits of concept mapping over a more traditional take on content analysis: 
(a) concept mapping is a fast and convenient tool to draw attention to significant themes 
in large textual bodies; (b) such themes, rather than being subjectively designed and 
imposed by the researcher, emerge from the data themselves; and (c) concept mapping 
emphasizes the significance of and associations between themes. The concept map for 
this study is provided later on in this chapter, under the “Data Interpretation” section. 
For instance, the collection of data on suicide bombings in Turkey was a twofold 
process. On the one hand, in-depth one-on-one interviews were conducted in Ankara, 
Turkey, between April 13 and April 21, 2004. The main focus of these interviews were 
the fifteen suicide bombings perpetrated by the PKK (today’s KONGRA-GEL) between 
June 30, 1995, and July 15, 1999, as well as known aborted missions. Interviewees 
included senior officials from and researchers affiliated with the Turkish Academy 
against Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC); top officials from the Information 
Ministry; top officials from the Bomb Squad and Anti-Terrorism Unit of the Turkish 
National Police Academy; top officials at the Anti-Terrorism Ministry and 
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representatives of the Security Department; senior officials from the Interior Security 
Department; top officials at the headquarters of Turkey’s Intelligence Services; and 
senior  members of the Organized Crime Unit at the Ministry of Interior. On the other 
hand, documents were obtained from the abovementioned interviewees and a variety of 
other authoritative sources, such as governmental Websites and official publications, 
published state and research reports, available press archives (Associated Press coverage 
and Lexis-Nexis-Academic drawn data), as well as the official Website currently 
maintained by KONGRA-GEL and associated Kurdish and PKK-related Websites and 
publications. The contents of the documents and other sources were systematically 
analyzed by following a twofold approach. First, a conceptual analysis was carried out to 
highlight the presence and frequency of certain key words or concepts related to suicide 
terrorism (e.g., suicide, bombing, martyrdom, martyr, sacrifice, jihad, infidels, mission, 
Kurdistan, Kurdish, PKK, nationalism, ethnic conflict, separatism). Second, a relational 
analysis of the documents and sources made it possible to lay emphasis on the 
relationships between these words or concepts, in order to infer their meaning within the 
text and deduce specific characteristics of their authors and intended audience. As a result 
of the association of certain words or concepts, various patterns and subjective meanings 
emerged.  
Methodological Concerns 
Smith (1998) contends that “a critical pragmatist stance . . . rejects the dominant 
empiricist goal of research as generating knowledge or adding to scientific theorising, 
and instead proposes a moral base of reasoning.” Indeed, the purpose of qualitative 
research “is not to produce knowledge of the social world as an entity but to engage in 
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knowledge making as a human activity. This is fundamentally a normative undertaking. It 
requires that we come to terms with a sense of moral purpose and responsibility in human 
inquiry . . . to persuade one another of the value or goodness of a way of thinking” 
(Schwandt, 1993:19-20). As Smith (1992) posits, interpretive inquiry is consequently 
both a practical and a moral activity: “the pursuit of knowledge must be understood in 
practical and moral terms” (1992:102). Thus, owing to the moral element involved, one 
cannot differentiate belief and opinion using epistemology (see Smith, 1992; Schwandt, 
1993).  
Conducting research consists in offering “a publicly scrutinizable analysis of a 
phenomenon with the intent of clarification” (Reinharz, 1992:9). The purpose of this 
study, as stated before, is to expand our theoretical and practical understanding of suicide 
terrorism by providing some much needed insight into the social construction of suicide 
terrorism. While gathering and analyzing data to conduct this study, several issues or 
concerns arose that had to be methodically addressed.  
First, it appeared primordial to ascertain the “truth value” (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985:290) of the study, as well as “its applicability, consistency, and neutrality” 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1998:192). Researchers, in their efforts to determine the best 
possible estimate of the veracity of their studies, are mostly concerned with what is 
commonly referred to as validity. Campbell and Stanley (1966), amongst others, have 
highlighted two types of validity: internal and external. Internal validity can be described 
as the level of authority with which we infer that the relationship between two variables 
is causal. On the other hand, external validity refers to the level of certainty with which 
we can infer that the alleged causal relationship can be generalized to and across various 
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measures of the cause-and-effect link, and across different settings, times, or groups of 
people.  
The strength of a qualitative study that aims to explore a problem or 
describe a setting, a process, a social group, or a pattern of interaction will 
rest with its validity. An in-depth description showing the complexities of 
processes and interactions will be so embedded with data derived from the 
setting that it cannot help but be valid. Within the parameters of that 
setting, population, and theoretical framework, the research will be valid. 
A qualitative researcher should therefore adequately state those 
parameters, thereby placing boundaries around the study (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1998:192-193).  
 
Much like reliability and objectivity, internal validity and external validity both 
relate to a more “conventional positivist paradigm” (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:192) and 
therefore do not seem to adequately fit the inherently naturalistic qualitative research 
framework. Although the issue of validity is mostly relevant to quantitative studies, the 
same terms are sometimes used in the context of qualitative research – albeit with a 
slightly different understanding. More specifically, in qualitative research, internal 
validity is influenced by the research design, whereas external validity refers to the 
extension or transferability of the qualitative findings. Some scholars, however, 
recommend the use of distinct constructs in order to assess the value and logic of 
qualitative research. Munro (as cited in Smith, 1998) further argues that validity “is not a 
useful [term] in research that seeks understanding and meaning.” For the purpose of 
qualitative research, then, the term “validity” must be reconceptualized and clearly 
distinguished from the empiricist logic that drives quantitative inquiry. Four original 
constructs have been proposed in the scholarly literature: credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability (see Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Marshall & Rossman, 
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1998; Smith, 1998). Each one was scrupulously addressed within the framework of this 
study. 
Credibility 
Establishing the credibility of a study consists in showing that “the inquiry was 
conducted in such a manner as to ensure that the subject was accurately identified and 
described” (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:192). The credibility of the qualitative study 
essentially depends upon the common understanding and interpretation of concepts by 
the researcher and the study participants. This is comparable to what quantitative 
researchers focus on when determining the internal validity of their research design.  
In order to optimize the credibility of the qualitative research design of this study, 
following recommendations by McMillan and Schumacher (1997), various strategies 
were resorted to. First of all, prolonged fieldwork was a priority during and well after the 
phase involving the initial G-CDMHA grant project on the phenomenology and etiology 
of suicide terrorism. That allowed for interim data analysis as well as data substantiation, 
which ensured that study findings matched participant reality. Furthermore, precise 
accounts of interviews using verbatim statements made by the interviewees, in addition to 
strictly quoted excerpts from documents ensured that the exact language used by the 
participants or in the analyzed documents were transformed into objective data. Likewise, 
low-inference descriptors were used, so as to accurately record detailed descriptions of 
specific situations. The use of mechanically recorded data (through the extensive use of 
digital voice recorders, videotapes, and photographs) further ensured the accuracy and 
easy corroboration of the data collected. Interviewees were asked to double-check the 
accuracy of the information collected. After each interview, participants were also asked 
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to review the exactness of the information gathered and transcribed during their 
interview(s). Finally, negative cases or conflicting data likely to either stand out as 
exceptions to observed patterns or alter data patterns, if any, were controlled for, 
recorded, analyzed, and reported.  
Transferability 
Qualitative researchers must demonstrate that their study findings “will be useful 
to others in similar situations, with similar research questions or questions of practice” 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1998:193). With qualitative studies, external validity depends on 
whether the findings can be extended or transferred – either as grounded theory or as an 
analytic synthesis that may be used by other researchers to conduct further research on 
the phenomenon or at least appreciate comparable cases. Thus, knowledge can be 
produced not by replicating studies but, rather, where extensive corroborating data 
gathered via additional case studies (or even more positivist quantitative analyses) of the 
phenomenon become available.  
“A qualitative study’s transferability or generalizability to other settings may be 
problematic. The generalization of qualitative findings to other populations [or] settings . 
. . is seen by traditional canons as a weakness in the approach” (Marshall & Rossman, 
1998:193). The transferability, or extension, of qualitative findings is influenced by 
several factors. In this study, finding transferability was maximized by paying special 
attention to: (a) the researcher’s role and relationship with the study participants; (b) the 
site and key informant selection process via purposeful sampling; (c) the social context of 
both the phenomenon and the study itself; (d) the data collection and analysis strategies; 
(e) the accuracy of the narrative data; (f) the typicality of the selected groups or sites; (g) 
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the specificity and flexibility of the analytic framework; and (h) potential alternative 
interpretations. 
It is important to note that the chosen intellectual framework of this study ensures 
that both the collection and the analysis of the data are constantly steered by the use of 
specific theoretical concepts and models. Since this study is explicitly informed by a 
body of theory – namely social constructionism and, more specifically, symbolic 
interactionism – researchers or policymakers focusing on similar parameters are 
ultimately free to decide if the cases presented in this analysis are transferable to new and 
comparable research settings, or generalizable for policymaking purposes.  
One of the strengths of this study derives from its likelihood to significantly 
contribute to our empirical understanding of suicide terrorism. The qualitative research 
design used here is both empirical and interpretive, aimed at fostering substantive 
knowledge about the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and its socially constructed nature. 
Hence, although it is not purely empirical, this study has a strong potential for yielding 
empirically significant results by providing researchers and policymakers with much 
insight into the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and, ultimately, its prevention. 
In order to safeguard the empirical integrity and optimize the transferability or 
generalizability of the study, another important strategic tool was used in addition to 
systematic data collection procedures: triangulation, a concept that “has been fruitfully 
applied to social science inquiry” (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:194). The triangulation of 
multiple data sources “is the act of bringing more than one source of data to bear on a 
single point. . . . Data from different sources can be used to corroborate, elaborate, or 
illuminate the research in question. . . . Designing a study in which multiple cases, 
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multiple informants, or more than one data-gathering method are used can greatly 
strengthen the study’s usefulness for other settings” (Ibid.). Triangulation is therefore a 
corollary of the use of multiple sources of data; both ensure the collection of high-quality 
qualitative data.  
Patton (2001) stresses that “multiple sources of information are sought and used 
because no single source of information can be trusted to provide a comprehensive 
perspective. . . . By using a combination of observations, interviewing, and document 
analysis, the field worker is able to use different data sources to validate and cross-check 
findings” (2001:306). As explained by Marshall and Rossman (1998) and further clarified 
by Patton (2001:306), “[e]ach type and source of data has strengths and weaknesses. 
Using a combination of data types – triangulation . . . – increases validity as the strengths 
of one approach can compensate for the weaknesses of another approach.” Triangulation, 
like any other method, has its flaws. It is important to bear in mind that “triangulation is 
not a strategy of validation but an alternative to validation” and that “the various forms of 
triangulation can produce at best only an expanded interpretive base in a study rather than 
an objective account (an account which assumes a single, objective reality)” (Smith, 
1998). While “there is no magic in triangulation” (Patton, as cited in Smith, 1998), it is 
still useful and advantageous for researchers to “include triangulation of data sources and 
analytical perspectives to increase the accuracy and credibility of findings” (Patton, 
2001:93). 
Dependability 
Guaranteeing the dependability or trustworthiness of a study requires researchers 
“to account for changing conditions in the phenomenon chosen for study and changes in 
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the design created by an increasingly refined understanding of the setting . . . [which 
follows] the qualitative/interpretive assumption that the social world is always being 
constructed and that the concept of replication in itself is problematic” (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1998:194). During the course of this study, the initial focus on the 
phenomenology and etiology of suicide terrorism shifted towards a more specific analysis 
centered around issues of social construction and symbolic interaction. Conducting 
interviews with key informants, analyzing the phenomenon via the study of typical cases, 
and reviewing documents related to suicide bombings worldwide, from guerilla 
movements to war-zone insurgents, all contributed to the realization that there is an 
apparent underlying theme in the presentation and interpretation of bombings as suicide 
terrorism – a social constructionist theme with clear symbolic interactionist 
underpinnings. As a result, the focal point of the study became the analysis of suicide 
terrorism as a socially constructed problem. Data were subsequently aggregated, 
examined, summarized, and synthesized in a critical and systematic fashion to look for, 
identify, and interpret patterns evidencing the socially constructed nature of suicide 
terrorism. 
Overall reliability was optimized by: (a) prolonging the data gathering processes 
on site in order to ensure the dependability of the findings by providing more concrete 
information upon which to base interpretations; (b) triangulating across methods and 
sources so as not to rely exclusively on one type of observation; (c) having participants 
actively check and corroborate the interpretation of collected data; and (d) collecting 
referential materials in order to complement or support the data collected on site. 
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The limitations of purposeful sampling were of course considered. So was the 
subsequent likelihood of error. Indeed, “[i]n spite of the apparent flexibility in purposeful 
sampling, researchers must be aware of three types of sampling error that can arise in 
qualitative research. The first relates to distortions caused by insufficient breadth in 
sampling; the second from distortions introduced by changes over time; and the third 
from distortions caused by lack of depth in data collection at each site” (Hoepfl, 1997; 
also see Patton, 2001). The sampling breadth of this study was wide enough that it 
included cases from very diverse areas of the world, political or religious origins, etc. 
Changes over time were not a significant risk factor insofar as the socially constructed 
understanding of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism appears constant regardless of 
time and place. As for case-specific data collection methods, they were as thorough as 
possible, including all available and accessible information sources. 
Additionally, it is well understood that gathering data via interviews is not a 
flawless collection method (see Marshall & Rossman, 1998; Patton, 2001). Indeed, 
“[i]nterview data limitations include possibly distorted responses due to personal bias, 
anger, anxiety, politics, and simple lack of awareness. . . . Interview data are also subject 
to recall error, reactivity of the interviewee to the interviewer, and self-serving responses” 
(Patton, 2001:306). However, in this study, the triangulation of information across 
sources (interviews and document analysis) helps ensure the depth and associated 
dependability of the research. It is further taken into account that “[d]ocuments and 
records also have limitations. They may be incomplete or inaccurate . . . notoriously 
variable in quality and completeness, with great detail in some cases and virtually nothing 
in others” (2001:306-307). Nevertheless, the analysis of documents was essential to the 
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study for it complemented and strengthened the data gathered from in-depth interviews, 
while providing “a behind-the-scenes look . . . that may not be directly observable and 
about which the interviewer might not ask appropriate questions without the leads 
provided through documents” (2001:307).  
Confirmability 
This construct “captures the traditional concept of objectivity . . . to ask whether 
the study could be confirmed by another . . . [and whether] the data help confirm the 
general findings and lead to the implications” (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:194). Due to 
the very nature of qualitative inquiry, it is likely that the subjectivity of the researcher 
will influence the research. However, such subjectivity can be disciplined enough to 
ensure that the researcher not only subjects himself or herself to a scrupulous self-
examination, but also constantly reconsiders and reassesses all the stages of his or her 
research process (see Hoepfl, 1997; Kushner & Norris, 1981; Maxwell, 1992; Norris, 
1997).  
For the purpose of this study, as suggested by McMillan and Schumacher (1997), 
research bias was systematically monitored and subjectivity therefore reduced by: (a) 
keeping a field log of dates, times, locations, people, and activities for every data set 
collected; (b) keeping a field journal in order to record all decisions made while 
designing the study (including rationale for such decisions and data validity evaluation); 
(c) documenting pertinent ethical considerations, i.e., logging ethical issues, decisions, or 
actions where applicable; (d) ensuring audibility by documenting data management 
techniques, codes, categories; and (e) formally corroborating initial findings by 
conducting confirmation interviews. 
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As explained above, the conceptual framework of this study relies upon the social 
constructionist perspective and a symbolic interactionist approach to study and provide a 
better understanding of the interpretation and subjective meaning of suicide terrorism. 
Figure 2 presents a concept map that summarizes the research design of this study, 
including its goals, conceptual framework, research questions, methods, and validity 
issues.  
Data Interpretation 
This comprehensive research project yielded a profusion of rich qualitative data 
that had to be meticulously organized and analyzed. The collection and analysis of the 
data were part of a continuous cycle and iterative process. In order to structure and 
interpret the meanings derived from the raw data, the latter were methodically 
transcribed, coded, categorized, and analyzed following procedures and mechanisms 
described below.  
Constant Comparative Analysis 
As “the most complex and mysterious of all the phases of a qualitative project” 
data analysis is “an explicit step in conceptually interpreting the data set as a whole, using 
specific analytic strategies to transform the raw data into a new and coherent depiction of 
the thing being studied” (Thorne, 2000:68). Data were constantly analyzed throughout 
each and every phase of this study. Constant comparative analysis was the chosen 
analytical strategy to sort, organize, conceptualize, refine, and interpret the data collected.  
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Figure 2: Research Design Concept Map  
Research Questions 
 
▪ How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures 
involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism?  
▫ How is suicide terrorism a political weapon? 
▫ How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool? 
▫ How is suicide terrorism a politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework? 
Methods 
 
▪ Multi-case study  
▪ In-depth interviewing 
(phenomenological & elite) 
▪ Document analysis 
(general document review  
 & historical review) 
Validity 
 
▪ Prolonged investigation 
▪ Triangulation of methods & sources 
▪ Participant assessment of data 
interpretation 
▪ Collection of referential materials 
to support on-site data 
Goals 
 
▪ Improve our understanding 
of suicide terrorism 
▪ Understand the conceptualization 
and interpretation of suicide terrorism 
▪ Highlight the processes involved  
in the social construction of suicide terrorism  
Conceptual Framework 
 
▪ Social constructionism 
▪ Symbolic interactionism 
▪ Interpretive tradition 
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“Naturalistic inquiry, thematic analysis, and interpretive description are methods 
that depend on constant comparative analysis processes to develop ways of understanding 
human phenomena within the context in which they are experienced” (2000:69). Constant 
comparative analysis was initially “developed for use in the grounded theory 
methodology of Glaser and Strauss, which itself evolved out of the sociological theory of 
symbolic interactionism” (Ibid.). It consists of comparing individual parts of the data 
(e.g., an interview, an article or a theme) with the rest of the records “in order to develop 
conceptualizations of the possible relations between various pieces of data” (Ibid.). This 
suits another important goal of the study: to generate findings and new knowledge about 
common patterns and themes within human experience as relates to suicide terrorism.  
Data Transcription and Storage 
Collected data were systematically transcribed using a basic word processor 
(Microsoft Word). This process yielded over 4,500 pages of notes. As explained before, 
substantial amounts of data were gleaned from recorded observations (in-depth 
interviews), texts and archival documents (hundreds of relevant articles compiled from 
newspapers and magazines published since 1980), multi-media sources available in the 
public domain (e.g., documentaries, recruitment videos, television news, Websites, 
Internet documents), policy statements and governmental handbooks, and more. 
Hypermedia data were transcribed into text and later analyzed and interpreted as was the 
rest of the data. Hence both raw data (observations and comments as captured in notes 
and on recording devices) and summary data (objective interpretations of the raw data, 
including statements regarding emerging patterns) were transcribed and stored into a 
database created to organize all the data and help with its analysis. A traditional filing 
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technique (with a color-coded system and typed data summaries) was preferred over the 
use of a computer software program. Although the technologically advanced option 
would have been a time-saving one, many researchers – including this author – consider 
the introduction of computerized qualitative data analysis as a menace to 
“methodological purity” (Bourdon, 2002:1).  
Codes and Analytic Categories 
“A key ingredient in structuring collected data for analysis is how that data is [sic] 
captured in the first place” (Kantner, Sova, & Anschuetz, 2005:1). The higher the quality 
of the data and collection process is, the more reliable the interpretive understanding will 
be. Text and sub-texts may thus be deconstructed more efficiently and multiple meanings 
may be uncovered, which will in turn help deconstruct the meanings of the phenomenon 
of interest and present an accurate representation of social reality. This all depends on the 
quality of the thematic interpretation of meaning based on the data collected.  
The difficulty, of course, is in the coding of texts and in finding the 
patterns. . . . Deciding on themes or codes is an unmitigated, qualitative 
act of analysis in the conduct of a particular study, guided by intuition and 
experience about what is important and what is unimportant. (Bernard, 
1996:2-3) 
 
Interpreting the qualitative data gathered throughout the course of the project thus 
required developing coherent coding and category systems. The data were coded to help 
with their systematic analysis and to increase the overall reliability and validity of the 
study. Variables (concepts) and values (positive, negative, neutral) were identified by 
carefully examining indexed interview notes (transcripts), researcher memos, and all 
other forms of data available. The data were then segmented into significant analytical 
units and subsequently labeled with specific codes or category names, which were 
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purposely selected to be short and mnemonic. The categories and codes of the words and 
concepts present in the data are summarized in Table 6.  
Table 6 
Master List of Categories and Codes  
Categories Codes 
Actors ACT 
     Media      MED 
     Public      PUB 
     Social control agents      SC AGTS 
     Suicide bombers      SB 
     Groups (terrorist or otherwise)      GRP 
Political context POL CON 
     Terrorism      TERR 
     Separatism      SEPAR 
     Nationalism      NATIO 
     Elections      ELECT 
     Other      AUTR 
Religious context REL CON 
     Islam           ISL 
     Radical Islam      RAD ISL 
     Other      AUTR 
Situational context SIT CON 
     Civil war      CIV WAR 
     War      WAR 
     Insurgency      INSURG 
     Rebellion      REBEL 
     Guerrilla      GUERR 
     Democracy      DEMO 
     Other      AUTR 
Stages of moral panic MOR PAN 
     Occurrence and signification      SIGNIF 
     Social implications      SOC IMPL 
     Social control measures      SOC CTRL 
Media coverage MED COV 
     Fact-based      FACT 
     Opinion      OPI 
     Contradiction      CONTRAD 
     Distortion      DISTORT 
     Sensationalism      SENSAS 
     Moralization      MORAL 
Politicization POLITZ 
     Demonization      DEMON 
     Religiosity      RELIG 
     Moral discourse      MORAL 
     Agenda setting      AGDA 
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Key concepts formed the master codes: actors (ACT), political context (POL 
CON), religious context (REL CON), situational context (SIT CON), stages of moral 
panic (MOR PAN), media coverage (MED COV), and politicization (POLITZ). Sub-
codes (second-level coding) emerged from these major analytic categories. A priori codes 
were developed before examining the data, whereas inductive codes were created upon 
examining the data. Co-occurring codes were observed where codes partially or 
completely overlapped, i.e., where segments of data got coded with more than one code. 
A codebook was then created following three different but complementary strategies that 
fit the design and purpose of this study: coding according to theory, coding by induction, 
and coding by ontological categories. 
Coding according to theory consists of listing variables and corresponding codes 
based upon theoretical reasoning: the analytical framework or research questions of the 
study guided the creation of this part of the codebook. Such coding occurred in the 
present study with concepts inherent in the constructionist and interactionist perspectives. 
These codes include: actors (media, public, agents of social control) and stages of moral 
panics (occurrence and signification, social implications, social control measures). They 
refer to such concepts as the nature of the threat (episodic suicide bombing), the 
signification of the threat as serious and violent (by the media to the community), the 
ensuing galvanization and intensification of public attention and policymaking, the 
claims-making process inherent in the construction of fear and social problems, risk 
inflation, demonization (suicide bombers as folk devils), specific or radical rhetoric in 
official statements and media reports, moral panic, agenda setting, rule creation and 
enforcement, social control process, and so on.   
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Coding by induction follows grounded theory principles and calls for the 
incremental coding of the data set as theoretical questions emerge. It is rooted in four 
general observation categories: conditions (causes of the perceived phenomenon), 
interaction between actors, strategies and tactics used by actors, and consequences of 
actions. On the other hand, coding by ontological categories, as a middle-ground 
approach, borrows from the two previous types of coding and helps to focus on the 
context of the events, objective actions, subjective interpretations, socio-political 
processes, social structures, and strategies or responses. This type of coding was used to 
label concepts related to: political context (terrorism, separatism, nationalism, elections, 
other), religious context (Islam, radical Islam, other), situational context (civil war, war, 
insurgency, rebellion, guerrilla, democracy, other), media coverage (fact-based, opinion, 
contradiction, distortion, sensationalism, and moralization), and politicization 
(demonization, religiosity, moral discourse, agenda setting). 
Relationships among codes or between categories were also labeled using pattern 
coding in order to detect and tag inter-thematic articulations, common characteristics, 
discrepancies, and peculiarities (e.g., co-existence of two variables; exceptions to the 
norm). Whatever trends and patterns emerged within the data structure were methodically 
encoded and summarized to maximize the thoroughness and objectivity of the analysis. 
Hence, certain words and concepts were coupled with the abovementioned coding 
scheme in order to classify the concepts emerging from the data. Recurring words and 
concepts were then color-coded, labeled, tallied up, and condensed into a frequency table 
(Table 7).  
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Table 7 
Concept Frequencies, Count and Percentage By Categories  
Categories Codes Count and Percentage 
Actors ACT n=11163 
     Media      MED 1328 (11.9%) 
     Public      PUB 947 (8.5%) 
     Social control agents      SC AGTS 1423 (12.7%) 
     Suicide bombers      SB 4179 (37.4%) 
     Groups (terrorist or otherwise)      GRP 3286 (29.4%) 
Political context POL CON n=9553 
     Terrorism      TERR 8689 (90.9%) 
     Separatism      SEPAR 234 (2.4%) 
     Nationalism      NATIO 451 (4.7%) 
     Elections      ELECT 156 (1.6%) 
     Other      AUTR 23 (0.2%) 
Religious context REL CON n=2481 
     Islam           ISL 975 (39.3%) 
     Radical Islam      RAD ISL 1267 (51.1%) 
     Other      AUTR 239 (9.6%) 
Situational context SIT CON n=3399 
     Civil war      CIV WAR 206 (6.1%) 
     War      WAR 1374 (40.4%) 
     Insurgency      INSURG 806 (23.7%) 
     Rebellion      REBEL 234 (6.9%) 
     Guerrilla      GUERR 326 (9.6%) 
     Democracy      DEMO 164 (4.8%) 
     Other      AUTR 289 (8.5%) 
Stages of moral panic MOR PAN n=7641 
     Occurrence and signification      SIGNIF 2181 (28.5%) 
     Social implications      SOC IMPL 2896 (37.9%) 
     Social control measures      SOC CTRL 2564 (33.6%) 
Media coverage MED COV n=2676 
     Fact-based      FACT 364 (13.6%) 
     Opinion      OPI 566 (21.1%) 
     Contradiction      CONTRAD 98 (3.7%) 
     Distortion      DISTORT 167 (6.2%) 
     Sensationalism      SENSAS 983 (36.7%) 
     Moralization      MORAL 498 (18.6%) 
Politicization POLITZ n=2546 
     Demonization      DEMON 254 (10%) 
     Religiosity      RELIG 365 (14.3%) 
     Moral discourse      MORAL 659 (25.9%) 
     Agenda setting      AGDA 1268 (49.8%) 
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Synthetic Network Diagram 
 A synthetic network diagram is a data-based analytic tool that helps to structure 
the collected data and present them in a visually simplified fashion. Diagrams are useful 
tools to identify and explicate relations between the various elements of a phenomenon of 
interest. They also enable researchers and the reader to more clearly observe conceptual, 
categorical, situational, temporal, and causal links. Figure 3 provides such a visual aid, 
emphasizing the connections between the categories and concepts at stake in the current 
multi-case study of the social construction of suicide terrorism.  
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Figure 3: Network Diagram for the Social Construction of Suicide Terrorism 
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Chapter Four 
 
Findings 
Overview of Patterns and Themes 
 The subjective definitional and rhetorical processes involved in the social 
construction of suicide terrorism are evidenced by examining the comprehensive data 
collected via in-depth interviews, as well as the general and historical review of public 
and official documents. The outcome of the analysis, summed up below, indeed sheds 
light on the symbolic interaction of socio-political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, 
and media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism. The use of 
suicide terrorism as a political weapon, its exploitation as a communication tool, and its 
politicization to fuel moral panics are discussed in details later on in this chapter.  
 Overall, the study findings show that representations and interpretations of suicide 
bombings in public policy and the mass media are unrefined and overwhelmingly one-
dimensional: they ignore the dynamics of the historical, social, cultural, economic, and 
psychological dimensions of the events. The media and agents of social control use 
unsophisticated portrayals of suicide bombings as religiously motivated acts and usually 
describe suicide terrorism as a mere manifestation of evil. However, suicide terrorism is 
more a political act than a religious one and the main motivating factor of contemporary 
suicide bombing campaigns has consistently been foreign occupation.  
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News coverage of suicide bombings is characteristically sensationalized and uses 
overly dramatic, newsworthy stories about selected incidents or conflicts. Suicide 
bombers are selectively depicted as simplistic enemies, crazed cowards, and demonized 
foes. The vast majority of cases that are publicly acknowledged and widely analyzed 
concern Middle Eastern incidents involving Islamic fundamentalists. Likewise, public 
policy is almost exclusively based on suicide terrorism by Middle Eastern, Islamist 
groups or bombers that are described following an “Us vs. Them” outlook on the issue 
within the greater “War on Terror” framework. Secular groups, however prolific in their 
use of the deadly tactic, are seldom the focal point of policymaking efforts or media 
exposure.   
Media portrayals and public policy rely on radical perceptions and intrinsically 
flawed interpretations of suicide terrorism. They usually hinge upon erroneous “typical 
profiles” of the average bombers. Suicide attacks are thus presented as extremely violent 
and elaborate propaganda tools in the hands of dangerous religious fanatics who are 
distressed, wrathful, unstable and suicidal, and have nothing to lose. Bombers are also 
habitually described as poor, uneducated, young males who were brainwashed by the 
fundamentalist precepts of Wahhabist Islam and the promise of a glorious afterlife. This 
is in total contradiction with the reality of suicide bombings. The latter are, in fact, 
characterized by a combination of primitive means and meticulous planning (recruitment, 
formation, and training) that results in extensive physical and psychological harm. 
Moreover, suicide bombers are not primarily suicidal and generally do not suffer from 
any diagnosable psychological disorders or cognitive impairments impeding effective 
problem-solving skills. Not all suicide bombings are perpetrated by exponents of a 
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fundamentalist interpretation of Islam or any other religion, for that matter: some secular 
groups have resorted to the tactic, including the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. The 
Tigers, in fact, are to this day the most prolific users of suicide bombings. Finally, 
women and children are increasingly recruited for suicide missions by several secular and 
religious groups that view them as providing invaluable tactical advantages. Though 
media coverage of these two rising types of bombers is growing, it usually misidentifies 
their motivations for getting involved in suicide missions and minimizes their 
involvement in such operations.       
Suicide Bombings as Political Weapons 
 Suicide bombings have been a modus operandi for terrorist groups for centuries. 
The contemporary wave of suicide terrorism started in the early 1980s and clearly 
demonstrates that the phenomenon is not primarily religious, unlike what is described in 
the Western news media. Indeed, as confirmed by a recent review of “every suicide 
terrorist attack around the world since 1980” and over 460 suicide bombers, “what over 
95 percent of suicide terrorist attacks since 1980 have in common is not religion, but a 
clear strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the 
territory that the terrorists view as their homeland or prize greatly” (Pape, 2005). Suicide 
terrorism as a political weapon appears to be a strategically “logic” choice (Pape, 2003; 
2005) that can result in mass casualty situations, causes extensive physical damage and 
psychological harm, requires no escape plan for the bombers, and poses negligible 
security threats to the group since suicide bombers characteristically die in the course of 
the attacks and therefore cannot be interrogated by security forces afterward. In addition, 
suicide terrorism is as inexpensive as it is effective. 
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Estimates are that it can cost as little as $150 to conduct a suicide attack. 
Although extremely complicated attacks may cost more, the effectiveness 
of these attacks is usually worth the investment. For instance, the 
estimated cost to plan and conduct the 9/11 attacks is between $400,000 
and $500,000, yet the resulting massive casualties, economic expense to 
the United States, and the notoriety received by al Qaeda made this attack 
exceptional in terrorist value with minimal money cost. (U.S. Army, 
2005:III-1) 
 
As one interviewee (a former British military analyst) put it: 
 
What you must remember is that suicide bombings constitute a form of 
armed violence that is characteristic of asymmetric warfare... This 
essentially means that suicide bombings will unmistakably happen in 
violent, politically-based conflicts where one side does not have the same 
means available to fight equitably – conventional weapons, expensive 
tanks, cruise missiles, sophisticated helicopters, advanced technology, etc. 
Martyrdom operations are much cheaper than conventional warfare and 
they can cause extensive damage on the targets, whether it is material or 
psychological damage, in addition to killing many people. It is easy to see 
why they would be preferred as strategic weapons.    
 
At the same time, suicide bombings do not happen in a vacuum. They become 
political weapon as a result of the context they occur in, the way they are dealt with by 
the various socio-political forces involved, and how the public reacts to them. According 
to one of the British scholars interviewed: 
A suicide attack only becomes a political weapon once it is publicized by 
the media and people respond with a certain state of panic. The wave 
propagates throughout the population and then you have people who have 
never heard of a given group but fear for their life and want protection, a 
solution.  
 
 “A suicide bombing is nothing more than an explosion in an enclosed or open 
space,” another American scholar argued. “The initial response involves only first 
responders: law enforcement and emergency services, really. The rest – the mass 
hysteria, the fear that spreads like wildfires throughout the country like it did after 9/11 – 
that’s a response we can thank the media for.” The same respondent later added: “Some 
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bombings could be suicide terrorism, but no one will talk about them if they’re not 
spectacular. You have two symbolic towers collapsing in New York, that’s news. That 
sells. And it’s easier to convince people it could affect them all the way to Topeka, 
Kansas.”   
A top official from the French Ministry of Interior declared during his interview:  
If someone crashes a plane into the Eiffel Tower tomorrow, we’ll treat the 
scene as a plane crash. If a man goes into the metro and blows himself up, 
we’ll dispatch police and emergency personnel. Nothing is a terrorist 
incident until you label it as such, but what does that change for the first 
response stage? Victims need to be treated, the scene needs to be 
processed no matter who or why. If a building burns down, you send 
firefighters whether it is arson or an accidental fire, don’t you? It’s the 
same with terrorism. We don’t need to induce more chaos by frightening 
the population with terrorism rhetoric and spectacular media coverage. 
That would be like adding oil to the fire – and it would certainly serve the 
purpose of the individual or group behind the attack or give ideas to other 
groups. We basically withhold as much information as we can during the 
investigation phase and do not overemphasize the human dimension of the 
political act. 
 
Hizballah’s Brand of Destruction 
As mentioned earlier, the first attack in the contemporary wave of suicide 
bombings occurred in the Middle East when the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut was destroyed in 
December 1981 by pro-Iranian terrorists. In September 1982, the potential of suicide 
terrorism as an influential strategic political weapon was increased by the suicide-mission 
assassination of pro-Israeli Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel. The suicide bombing 
tactic was quickly transformed into a full-blown geopolitical tool by Hizballah, the Iran-
backed Lebanese Party of God, during the Lebanese Civil War. Hizballah claimed 
responsibility for the October 1983 Beirut barrack attacks against French and U.S. troops, 
which led to the southward retreat of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and prompted the 
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United States and France to withdraw their forces from Lebanon (Van de Voorde & 
Mason, 2004). The systematic suicide attack campaign also forced “Israel to abandon 
most of the territorial and political gains made during [its] 1982 invasion of Lebanon” 
(Atran, 2004, August:2). By 1992, Hizballah “had dramatically lessened its strategic 
reliance on suicide bombing . . . when it decided to participate in parliamentary elections 
and become a ‘mainstream’ political party” (Ibid.). 
LTTE Suicide Bombings and Sri Lankan Politics 
In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or Tamil Tigers, have 
consistently been the most prolific users of suicide bombings since their first suicide 
attack in 1987. Although many will argue that the LTTE terror campaign has been 
essentially unsuccessful at bringing about the political change the Tamil Tigers have been 
fighting for for decades – the creation of an independent Tamil state – their suicide terror 
campaign has become a model and an inspiration for many groups across the globe. 
Sporadic acts of violence have been increasingly documented in Sri Lanka since the late 
2002 ceasefire. Since November 2005, violence has in fact been rising in the rebel-held 
northeastern part of the island after LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran threatened to 
take up the struggle for a Tamil homeland again if the Sri Lankan government failed to 
attend to the LTTE’s grievances. On December 25, 2005, pro-rebel Tamil legislator 
Joseph Pararajasingham was assassinated during midnight mass at a Christmas service in 
eastern Sri Lanka. Following the shooting, for which responsibility was not immediately 
claimed, a pro-LTTE Website, TamilNet, posted a statement by a Tamil National 
Alliance parliamentarian placing the blame squarely on the government. The official 
declared that “targeting key Tamil political actors to weaken the Tamil struggle” was 
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typical of a state-sponsored action against the Tamils. He added, “This strategy will fail 
and in its wake will likely bring an unprecedented catastrophe to Sri Lanka.” Later that 
day, the Sri Lankan government responded in a similarly firm statement blaming the 
LTTE for assassinating one of its own supporters: “The LTTE, closely judged by the 
series of criminal acts being perpetrated in the northeast in recent few days, [was] 
desperately trying to divert the attention elsewhere and create mayhem and havoc while 
eschewing political discussions.” The building tension between the Tamil Tigers, the 
Tamil community, and the Sri Lankan government may foreshadow a resurgence of 
violence, especially a multiplication of suicide bombings, and possibly a resumption of 
the civil war that tore the island apart for many years (see Van de Voorde, 2005; Van de 
Voorde & Mason, 2004).  
Chechen Suicide Bombing Operations 
 Chechen suicide bombings did not occur until 2000: before that, the tactic was not 
once employed throughout the First Russo-Chechen War (1994-1996) or during the first 
year of the second Russo-Chechen War. Two dozen such attacks have occurred since and 
this emergence of suicide bombings can be attributed to war-related cultural and 
demographic crises, extensive human rights violations by the Russian Forces against 
Chechen civilians, and the radicalization of the resistance forces that has followed.  
The October 2002 Moscow theater hostage-taking situation marked a turning 
point in the fight between Chechen rebels and the Russian government. On October 23, 
2002, three dozen Chechen rebels took control of a crowded theater and held over 700 
people hostage. They threatened to execute the hostages if their demands were not met, 
most notably the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. A two-and-a-
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half-day siege followed and, on the morning of October 26, 2002, the theater was raided 
by the Spetsnaz, an elite commando unit of the Federal Security Service (FSB, former 
KGB). They pumped a powerful anesthetic gas into the structure and stormed the 
building. They proceeded to shoot all the rebels in the head at close range. The gas also 
killed 130 hostages, whereas two were killed by the hostage-takers, which means that 
Russian forces were eventually responsible for over sixty times as many hostage deaths 
as the Chechen rebels were. The Russian government backed the intervention despite the 
outcry it caused in the international media and general public, justifying it by the fact that 
the rebels had strapped explosive to themselves and the only way to prevent suicide 
bombings, extensive structural damage and mass casualties was to take the terrorists out 
fast and by any means necessary. 
In September 2004, another highly-publicized hostage crisis took a disastrous turn 
when Russian police and soldiers intervened to put a stop to the situation in Beslan, 
Russia. Demanding the usual withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, rebel leader 
Shamil Basayev and his fighters took hundreds of children and teachers hostage at a 
school on September 1, 2004. Three days later, the building was stormed, 336 people 
were killed, and 747 were injured. Thirty-two terrorists were killed in the explosive 
standoff, including five women. All of them had been wearing explosive belts and other 
devices. Regardless of the “imminent threat” of suicide terrorism, the intervention of the 
Russian police and military was awfully criticized by the media, the public, and foreign 
governments, including the United States and many Western European countries. A 
parliamentary inquiry was launched after the siege, especially following widespread 
accusations that the crime scenes had been arranged by the authorities and evidence 
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destroyed to cover up the abuses and failures of the officials in charge. The final report is 
due in early 2006, but a preliminary report made available on December 28, 2005 puts 
the blame squarely on Russian security forces. This has been a surprising development, 
since most people “assumed that a parliamentary inquiry into the attack would play down 
public accusations that Russian police and soldiers were partly to blame for the deaths of 
hundreds of hostages” (Griffiths, 2005). However, the victims in Beslan still believe that 
blame will be avoided in the end and that the officials responsible for the deadly siege 
will not be held accountable:    
I think that the parliamentary inquiry would like to disclose the truth, but I 
believe they will fail to do so. They will not dare do it because revealing 
the truth would implicate top officials, high echelons who are to blame, 
who let the situation go, who are corrupt. So, they will probably not dare 
give their names because of their high rank. (Ibid.) 
 
It is important to note that religious extremism is almost nonexistent as a 
motivation for Chechen suicide terrorism, which appears to above all be “a strategic 
tactic” and a political weapon being used “in an increasingly asymmetrical struggle with 
the Russians” (Reuter, 2004:2). The purpose of the Chechen suicide bombing campaign 
is “to attract support while attempting to coerce Russia into leaving the Chechnya” 
(Ibid.). Hence the major objective of Chechen implementers of suicide bombings is “a 
combination of a genuine desire to liberate the Chechen homeland and the necessity to 
attract supporters, recognition, and funding to continue their efforts” (2004:21). In 2003, 
the leader of the Chechen separatists “warned that the Chechen opposition had enough 
strength, finance and resolution to keep on fighting for people's freedom until Chechnya 
was absolutely free” (Suicide, 2003). They view suicide bombings as the most effective 
tool to achieve such goals while advancing their radical agendas. Incidentally, one of the 
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staunchest supporters of the Chechen rebel cause has been the United States (Horton, 
2005).  
“Taking cues from the ‘successful’ suicide campaigns of Hezbollah, Hamas, and 
Al-Qaeda, Chechen extremists came to view suicide terrorism as their last best option” 
(Reuter, 2004:21). Nonetheless, there has been a decline in Chechen suicide bombing 
operations since 2004. On the one hand, human rights abuses have decreased in both 
amount and frequency. On the other hand, analysts argue, it is possible that “calculating 
implementers realized that suicide terrorism was not achieving the ambitious goals that 
they had envisioned” (Reuter, 2004:21). 
The London Bombings and European Politics 
Another recent example of the use – and relative success – of suicide terrorism as 
a political weapon can be found in the suicide bombings that occurred in London, 
England on July 11, 2005. The four coordinated bombings targeted the public 
transportation infrastructure, namely the underground network (first three attacks) and the 
bus system (fourth bombing). They killed 56 people and injured more than 700. Of the 
four bombers involved, three were Britons. The attacks have been blamed on al-Qaeda, 
which had previously publicly threatened the United Kingdom in widely broadcast 
speeches attacking the British government for being a key member of the group of 
countries supporting the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, also known as the 
“Coalition of the Willing.” Osama bin Laden once stated: “We reserve the right to 
retaliate at the appropriate time and place against all countries involved, especially 
Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan, and Italy.”   
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These suicide attacks were all the more significant as they were followed ten days 
later by an attempt at another series of five bombings in central London, which proved 
unsuccessful. As the bombers eluded the police, a manhunt was launched and panic 
spread throughout the population. People feared more bombings would happen and, via 
the media, began to pressure Prime Minister Blair to pull troops out of Iraq. Security 
alerts reached their highest level throughout the United Kingdom and elsewhere in 
Europe. The London attacks compounded the social and geopolitical consequences of the 
ten coordinated train bombings of March 2004 in Madrid, Spain, which have the highest 
toll of all European bombings thus far in terms of dead and injured (the Madrid 
bombings, which have been attributed to al-Qaeda, had a direct impact on the outcome of 
the Spanish general elections that month and prompted the new government to pull all 
Spanish troops out of Iraq). Thus the London bombings illustrate the main political 
objective of the uses of suicide terrorism: to combat (and ideally bring to an end) the 
foreign occupation of one’s homeland or sacred land. Iraq is located in what used to be 
Mesopotamia, the Cradle of Humanity, and part of the Arabian Peninsula, which is a 
Holy Land for Muslim.  
Suicide Terrorism as a Communication Tool 
Suicide bombings are a spectacular weapon in the arsenal of terrorist groups today 
more than ever. We are in a media-saturated era where global communication networks 
make it possible to spread news of suicide terror attacks across the world in a matter of 
seconds. “Propaganda by deed” has taken a whole new global meaning now that groups 
can easily promote their agendas and share their accomplishments via satellite television, 
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the Internet, and more high-end technological tools. As one of the Interpol representatives 
put it in his interview: 
Terrorist groups have grown international by cleverly networking around 
the world, with supporters, sympathizers, and other groups alike. They 
have created a web that enables them to find well-wishers, new recruits, 
financial assistance, or popular support far away from their base. Look at 
Al-Qaeda, for instance, or the LTTE. They started out as small groups 
fighting for a specific cause within a specific region or against a specific 
ideology. Today, they are international organizations with roots in several 
countries and tens of thousands of supporters worldwide. All of that 
happened because they have mastered the use of the mass media, 
particularly the news and the Internet, to serve their purpose. Same thing 
with the Chechens. They came out of nowhere and became media icons 
thanks to their constant use of television and newspapers to spread their 
message against the Russian occupation.  
 
Indeed, Chechen separatist leaders have repeatedly used the media, including the 
Website of the Chechen-Press news agency, to call upon the international community to 
interfere into the conflict in Chechnya (Suicide, 2003; Reuter, 2004). They have also 
exploited the strategic advantage presented by female suicide bombers to cause greater 
psychological harm on their targeted audience and “attract more publicity and attention” 
(Reuter, 2004:27), as evidenced by the sudden increase in the summer of 2003 of 
international media coverage of female suicide bombings. The Chechen suicide bombing 
campaign thus illustrates the potential uses of the violent tactic as a communication tool.  
Overview of Media Coverage of Suicide Bombings 
The suicide attack method, favored to this day by military and paramilitary 
groups, was introduced to the general public during World War II, when Japanese 
kamikaze pilots crashed their airplanes into Allied military targets. The first use of the 
phrase “suicide bombing” in the news can be traced back to an August 1940 New York 
Times article about World War II German military tactics. In March 1942, the same 
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newspaper ran an article about Japanese troops that had tried to carry out a “suicide 
bombing” against a U.S. carrier. In August 1945, the London Times described a kamikaze 
plane as a “suicide bomb.” In April 1947, referred to a new type of radio-controlled 
missile in those terms: “designed originally as a counter-measure to the Japanese 
‘suicide-bomber,’ it is now a potent weapon for defence or offence.”  
 The use of the expression “suicide bombing” in its current context dates back to 
1981, when the Associated Press introduced it in relation to the first attack of the 
contemporary wave of suicide bombings: the December 15, 1981 car-bomb destruction of 
the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 61 people. It was then used heavily to 
describe and analyze two major events of the Lebanese Civil War: the April 1983 U.S. 
Embassy bombing perpetrated by Hizballah in Beirut, as well as the October 1983 
barrack attacks against U.S. Marines and French Paratroopers who were part of the 
international peacekeeping corps. These bombings claimed over 300 lives and left 
hundreds of people injured.  
 Since the mid-1980s, suicide bombings have become prime weapons in the 
arsenal of guerrilla, insurgent, and terrorist groups. Sri Lanka and the Middle East, as 
explained earlier, have been pivotal regions for the development of the deadly tactic. Sri 
Lanka, however, has not received nearly as much coverage in the news or official policy 
as the Middle East, especially in recent years. Although the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) were 
the main users of suicide bombings in the world until 2001 (in terms of both number of 
attacks and death toll), little to no attention has been paid to their terrorist campaign in 
the Western news media or official policy. They are never part of any “Global War on 
Terror” speech and barely make the news when a bombing or any LTTE-related incident 
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occurs. In fact, although the transnational organization has been listed as an FTO by the 
U.S. Department of State (in contradiction with the policies of other Western countries), 
it is not referred to as terrorist in U.S. news. The Tamil Tigers, including the Black Tigers 
of the suicide bombing squad, are typically described more neutrally or positively as 
“separatists,” “fighters,” “attackers,” “rebels” or “truce violators.”   
As a top-ranking U.S. military officer stressed in his interview,  
Words have an amazing power. We called them terrorists while they call 
themselves freedom fighters. Israelis call suicide bombings mass murder 
or crimes against humanity, whereas Palestinians argue that ‘martyrs don’t 
commit murder.’ We consider the Tamil Tigers ‘rebels’ because they are 
in Sri Lanka and our interests in the area are limited to nonexistent, but in 
Iraq we fight the ‘War on Terror’ against immoral suicide bombers who 
are hell bent on destroying freedom. Think about it… Who in the United 
States would pay attention to news reports about suicide bombings by 
Hindu nationalists in Sri Lanka? Most people equate terrorism with 
Islamic extremists from the Middle-East and, if it happens elsewhere like 
southeast Asia, it had to be perpetrated by Middle-Eastern fanatics. It’s 
going to be hard to shake that out of people’s heads if they are bombarded 
with the wrong information in the media.   
 
 Islamist terrorists do seem to have a monopoly on suicide bombings – at least in 
today’s mainstream media and official policy. News coverage and governmental 
guidelines tend to have adopted a myopic vision of suicide terrorism that focuses 
predominantly – if not solely – upon radical Muslims or “fundamentalists.”  In particular, 
suicide bombings of the al-Aqsa Intifada and the Iraqi insurgency have dominated the 
general, contemporary understanding of the concept of suicide terrorism. Although these 
have been the most frequent and cumulatively damaging bombings since 2000, they 
certainly should not obscure the significant global patterns and worldwide dynamics of 
suicide terrorism.  
 As emphasized by one of the interviewees, a French anti-terrorism agent: 
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Of course, there is a problem with Islamic militants. Of course, there are 
growing issues throughout the Islamic world that ought not to be ignored. 
However, suicide terrorism is not about Islamic world domination. There 
are non-Muslim groups that have used this technique for years –and 
successfully so in some cases, as shown by the LTTE. People need to be 
very careful in their appraisal of what suicide terrorism entails. Once you 
have labeled a certain group of people ‘evil’ or ‘crazy terrorists,’ as is the 
case with Muslim extremists in Western politics and in our mass media, 
you end up stigmatizing an entire population and you exacerbate tensions 
between people who basically don’t know anything about each other’s 
religions or cultures. The media – whether in the US or Western Europe – 
always portray the ‘evil Islamists’ as the perpetrators of suicide bombings. 
First in Israel, now in Iraq. They never really focus on the source of the 
problem: why suicide bombings are considered by their perpetrators and 
supporters to be legitimate weapons in a war where using conventional 
tactics and strategies is simply impossible. 
 
The Media as Publicity Agents 
Television – both traditional networks and satellite television – is a primary tool 
for communication between terrorist groups, the media, governments, and the general 
public. “Suicide bombing is, after all, perfectly suited to the television age” (Brooks, 
2002). Newspapers are also often used by terrorist groups to relay messages to the 
general public or other members of the organization. For example, in recent years, 
Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev has repeatedly used the mass media in order to 
arouse public awareness of the Chechen cause and the state-sponsored acts of violence 
committed by the Russian military against the Chechen population. In 2002, during the 
Moscow theater hostage crisis mentioned above, Basayev issued the following video-
recorded statement through the news media:  
Every nation has the right to their fate. Russia has taken away this right 
from the Chechens and today we want to reclaim these rights, which God 
has given us, in the same way he has given it to other nations. God has 
given us the right of freedom and the right to choose our destiny. And the 
Russian occupiers have flooded our land with our children's blood. And 
we have longed for a just solution. People are unaware of the innocent 
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who are dying in Chechnya: the sheikhs, the women, the children and the 
weak ones. And therefore, we have chosen this approach. This approach is 
for the freedom of the Chechen people and there is no difference in where 
we die, and therefore we have decided to die here, in Moscow. And we 
will take with us the lives of hundreds of sinners. If we die, others will 
come and follow us—our brothers and sisters who are willing to sacrifice 
their lives, in God's way, to liberate their nation. Our nationalists have 
died but people have said that they, the nationalists, are terrorists and 
criminals. But the truth is Russia is the true criminal. 
 
Using the media can be an excellent tool for propaganda and publicity in general. 
Osama Bin Laden has been consistently portrayed in Western news as a universal threat 
to the very fabric of our free society. In the spring of  2003, one of the interviewees in 
Turkey’s Ministry of Interior declared:  
Bin Laden is going to take over airwaves one way or another. Since the 
September 11 attacks, he has been omnipresent already, in news coverage, 
special media reports, and with video and audio tapes of his messages. 
That is not going to stop. The repercussions on September 11 are going to 
be felt for many years, even if another spectacular attack against American 
interests happens. The media will not let go of a story like that one. The 
government, President Bush will not either. He is going to play with the 
global fear of insecurity, inflate it, disseminate it with the help of the mass 
media, and probably get re-elected because of all that. The invasion of Iraq 
is a bonus. It shows the U.S. is actively doing something to fight terrorism. 
In reality, however, none of it is true. They are fighting the wrong people 
in the wrong region, but the public does not see that. They see action and 
initiative: that is enough for them.  
   
Within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, “Palestinian and Arabic 
regional media outlets have followed the events of the Israeli-Palestinian clashes closely, 
and the degree of media coverage reflects the immense impact that the clashes have had 
on Palestinian and Arab society” (Human Rights Watch, 2002:36). Palestinian media 
outlets have been accused of actively encouraging support for suicide bombings. “Israeli 
and other critics have argued that the Palestinian media contribute to suicide attacks on 
civilians by placing an inappropriate, commendatory emphasis on martyrdom” (Ibid.). 
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Due to curfews and limitations on movement in the Occupied Territories, “the 
importance of media – and particularly television – as the primary source of public 
information has increased” (Ibid.). Farewell or last-will videos made by the bombers 
“provide compelling footage, as do the interviews with families. The bombings 
themselves produce graphic images of body parts and devastated buildings” (Brooks, 
2002). In effect, “vast segments of Palestinian culture have been given over to the 
creation and nurturing of suicide bombers. Martyrdom has replaced Palestinian 
independence as the main focus of the Arab media” (Ibid.).  
Then there are the ‘weddings’ between the martyrs and dark-eyed virgins 
in paradise (announcements that read like wedding invitations are printed 
in local newspapers so that friends and neighbors can join in the 
festivities), the marches and celebrations after each attack, and the 
displays of things bought with the cash rewards to the families. Woven 
together, these images make gripping packages that can be aired again and 
again. (Ibid.) 
 
Recruitment videos made by terrorist groups are also broadcast by certain 
networks. In early July 2005, the Al-Arabiya television network aired a segment 
“showing an Iranian suicide bomber recruiter drive” (Nahmias, 2005a). In the short piece, 
the Iranian Movement of Martyrdom Seekers declared it had “40,000 ‘time bombs’ ready 
to attack [and] carry out suicide bombings in Israel and the United States” (Ibid.). 
Numerous Iranian youths can be seen training in a camp.  
‘This is our choice and we have no fear,’ a masked woman told a reporter 
from Al-Arabiya. ‘We adhere to the legacy of our late leader, Imam 
Khomeini.’  
‘There is no God but Allah!’ shout a group of women, covered in 
hijabs, in unison.  
‘These young women have forsaken the temptations of life, and have 
chosen the hard way. Indeed, they have chosen martyrdom as a way of 
liberating Islamic lands,’ says the Al-Arabiya reporter. ‘40,000 time 
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bombs in Iran – this is the number of volunteers so far, and the registration 
is still open.’ (Ibid.) 
 
On July 26, 2005, Iran publicly acknowledged it was running an official “suicide 
column” program with full-blown training camps within its borders and actively 
recruiting members of public to become suicide bombers across the country (Nahmias, 
2005b). Officials of the Iranian government had denied for many years any involvement 
in suicide bomber recruiting or training activities. The President of Iran himself has since 
openly glorified suicide bombers. An article published in the London-based daily Asharq 
Al Awsat reported that senior Iranian leader Ayatollah Muhammad Taki Misbah Yazari, a 
spiritual counselor of President Muhammad Ahmadinejad, had used an Iranian 
newspaper to call on the Iranian public “to join the swelling ranks of Iran’s homegrown 
suicide bombers” (Ibid.). The message read as follows:  
Suicide operations are the peak of the nation, and the height of its bravery 
. . . Commander Khamani has announced that registration for the suicide 
bomber force is open all over the country, and encourages Iranians to join 
in order to safeguard Islam and fight against its enemies. This holy 
organization of the Islamic Republic is aimed at those who are interested 
in suicide. The volunteer will join specialist courses. Brothers and sisters 
who believe and are interested in defending Islam are invited to get in 
touch via P.O. Box Number 1653-664, Teheran, and are asked to send two 
photos, a copy of their birth certificate. Please enlist in the suicide squad. 
  
The suicide organization, Zaytoon, was created in early 2005 “for men and women who 
wished to carry out suicide bombings against the enemies of Islam and the Iranian 
revolution -- in particular, the Americans, British, and Israelis” as well as “Arab and 
Muslim countries . . . considered friends of the United States” (Ibid.). It is purportedly 
headed by Elias Nedran, who is the leader of the parliamentary conservative bloc and a 
former intelligence officer in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. Zaytoon has already 
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held several rallies, which have each been attended by hundreds of men and women 
usually between the ages of 14 and 30. During one of these meetings, Ayatollah Yazari, 
who is firmly opposed to Iranian reformers, “emphasized the need to volunteer rapidly 
and to attend specialist training courses which enable members to carry out suicide 
bombings in Iraq and other areas, including Israel” (Ibid.). What the many volunteers are 
usually told is that “the gates of heaven are open for you; there are beautiful, black-eyed 
virgins there who are waiting for you on the banks of golden rivers” (Ibid.).  
 More recently, Iran also made international news following the October 28, 2005 
broadcast of an animated movie on how to become a suicide bomber. The ten-minute 
graphic cartoon was shown as an after-school special on Iran’s IRIB 3TV channel 
(MEMRITV, 2005). It illustrates recent efforts by certain groups, including religious ones 
in Palestine and secular ones such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka, to actively recruit children 
to join the ranks of the suicide bombers. Like women, children present tactical and 
strategic advantages that are not lost to terrorists.  
The Use of the Internet 
The World Wide Web has been used for years by terrorist groups and anti-
terrorist organizations alike. The former use its openness and instantaneous global reach 
to get their message to millions of people across the globe, to recruit, advertise, and 
otherwise communicate about their cause. The latter use the Internet in order to track the 
activities of known or supposed terrorists around the world, be it “propaganda,” 
recruiting activities, fundraising, secret communications via e-mail or instant messenger 
(“increased chatter”), and so on.  
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The Internet is also a fertile ground for political satire and is commonly used to 
disseminate political caricatures and various forms of cartoons, images, and skits. For 
instance, a Website called strangemilitary.com features a parody of a self-help book 
entitled “Jihad for Dummies: The Fundamentals of Fundamentalism,” the cover of which 
reads: “Thinking about SUICIDE BOMBING? Get it right the FIRST time!” or “Learn 
how to declare your very own fatwa!” German carmaker Volkswagen recently used the 
Internet to advertise for its new Polo, using the usual slogan “Small but tough” along with 
a less usual mainstream television ad protagonist: a suicide bomber who detonates his 
bomb belt inside the Polo without anyone noticing his actions outside the car. Thus 
suicide bombers have entered the collective mind and are taking root as popular icons 
even in Western culture. 
More seriously, Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network has become a global jihadist 
movement that has perfected the use of multimedia technology over the past few years. 
Some argue that it is now essentially Web-directed and primarily steered by ideology and 
the Internet. The spread of jihadist rhetoric and Wahhabist ideology has been 
significantly facilitated by the World Wide Web. Al-Qaeda’s “online jihad” has in 
essence provided a “virtual university of global jihad” (Pavlova, 2004). In recent years, 
al-Qaeda has used the Internet for financing and publicity purposes, to organize 
recruitment, to network and mobilize further support, and to collect and share information 
somewhat effortlessly. Al-Qaeda’s many Websites, which appear and disappear in a 
matter of seconds, as well as various related promotional Internet sites have been used 
notably to post audio messages by Osama bin Laden and other leaders, so as to ensure 
their worldwide dissemination without editing. In August 2004, al-Qaeda even created a 
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special Website for women, calling upon them “to persuade their men to take up the 
jihad. The pretty pink web site, which included beauty tips, did not call on women to 
become bombers” (Bloom, 2005c) and yet, within a year, female Al-Qaeda fighters 
began resorting to suicide bombings.  
The distinctive dynamics of the Internet account for its widely popular use 
amongst jihadists today and fit within more general media globalization trends: 
The same forces that gave rise to the Al-Jazeera and the Al-Arabiya TV 
networks are at play with jihadist web sites worldwide. In contrast to the 
pre-September 11 pro-Bin Laden Internet pages – the majority of which 
were hosted and maintained from within Europe and the United States – 
the recent trend is that such web sites are more ‘localized.’ They are 
hosted in countries as far apart as Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 
Turkey, Bosnia, and Great Britain, and cater to domestic audiences on 
their respective languages. The second fact to be observed is the 
astounding technological advancement and professionalism of their 
authors and creators. Graphical design is put o maximum effect, and often 
pictures and videos – taken from their original web sites of appearance – 
are refurbished into new formats and styles to evoke utmost possible 
emotional response. (Pavlova, 2004) 
 
Film Portrayals of Suicide Bombers 
 
The Terrorist (1999) is an Indian film directed and written by Santosh Sivan. Shot 
entirely in Tamil but not explicitly set in Sri Lanka, it follows Malli, a hardcore 19-year-
old female terrorist who suddenly has reservations about her suicide assassination 
mission and doubts the legitimacy of the ultimate sacrifice she has been asked to make. 
Beyond an aesthetic achievement, this film is a powerful portrayal of Malli’s personal 
struggle, from joining the terrorist group as a child following the death of her young 
brother to her late teenage years. The story is neither apologetic nor politically charged 
nor explicitly violent. Yet, the U.S. promotional campaign for the film, which was based 
freely on the May 1991 assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the 
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LTTE’s Thenmuli “Dhanu” Rajaratnam, describes the heroine as “a natural born killer” 
whose “death will not be ordinary.”   
The War Within (2005) is an American film directed by Joseph Castelo, who co-
wrote it with Tom Glynn and Ayad Akhtar. Akhtar also plays the main character, a 
Pakistani man who has a conscience crisis as he is about to carry out a suicide bombing 
in New York City. Another recent feature film on suicide bombings, Paradise Now 
(2005), tells the story of Said and Khaled, two Palestinian childhood friends who are 
recruited to carry out a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. The controversial film, which 
follows the last two days of the young men and delves into the psyche of suicide 
bombers, was directed by Palestinian and Israeli-born director Hany Abu-Assad, who co-
wrote the screenplay with Bero Beyer and Pierre Hodgson. So far, the Arabic-language 
film has received nominations for several prizes and won 9 major awards, including the 
Amnesty International Film Prize at the 2005 Berlin International Film Festival and the 
2006 Golden Globe for Best Foreign Language Film. Interestingly, the latter was 
awarded under the category “Palestine” even though the film was officially produced by 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Israel. Many have argued that Paradise Now – 
much like the two movies mentioned above – humanizes suicide bombers and is nothing 
more than a propaganda tool. On the other hand, film critic Roger Ebert (2005) argues: 
On his video, Said articulates the Palestinian position, expressing anger 
that the Israelis have stolen the status of victims he believes belongs by 
right to his own people. Does this speech make the film propaganda, or 
does it function simply as a record of what such a man would say on such 
an occasion? I'm not sure it matters. If we are interested in a film that 
takes us into the lives of suicide bombers, we must be prepared to regard 
what we find there. Certainly what Said says will not come as a surprise to 
any Israeli. It's simply that they disagree. 
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We may disagree, too, and yet watch the film with a fearsome 
fascination. The director and co-writer, Hany Abu-Assad, uses the 
interesting device of undercutting the heroism of his martyrs with 
everyday details. During one taping of a farewell message, the camera 
malfunctions. During another, one of the bombers interrupts his political 
sermon with a personal shopping reminder for his mother. . . . 
It hardly matters, in a way, which side Abu-Assad's protagonists are 
on; the film is dangerous because of its objectivity, its dispassionate 
attention to the actual practical process by which volunteers are trained 
and prepared for the act of destruction.  
 
These three independent films have in common the fact that they put a face on the 
suicide bombers and show us their human features and humane qualities. They also 
illustrate the utter lack of suicidality (suicide attempts or ideation) of the bombers. Each 
one focuses on the uncertainties and doubts of suicide bombers, thus indeed humanizing 
them. However, though they avoid demonizing the terrorists, they do not glorify the 
martyrs either. If anything, “that creates not sympathy, but pity; what a waste, to spend 
your life and all your future on behalf of those who send you but do not go themselves” 
(Ibid.). 
An even more recent film hailing from the United States is Stephen Gaghan’s 
Syriana (2005), a “politically-charged epic about the state of the oil industry” based on a 
Robert Baer book (IMDb, 2005). The reason why this movie stands out is that it is the 
first to fully integrate the suicide bomber at the core of the narrative. This introduction of 
suicide terrorism as a major plotline in a big-budget Hollywood production marks a 
milestone in the global entertainment enterprise. The film has received much praise 
already, but its shortcomings have also drawn criticism. Ventura (2005) argues that 
“Syriana offers American audiences a peek into the insidious work of fundamentalism on 
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the idle minds. . . . While contextualizing the roots of discontent is a worthy goal, the 
movie does so at the expense of shedding light on true fanaticism.”   
Moral Panics and the Politicization of Suicide Terrorism 
 Suicide terrorism has been described as “the crack cocaine of warfare” (Brooks, 
2002), a metaphor reminiscent of the pungent rhetoric used in the “War on Drugs.”  
It doesn’t just inflict death and terror on its victims; it intoxicates the 
people who sponsor it. It unleashes the deepest and most addictive human 
passions – the thirst for vengeance, the desire for religious purity, the 
longing for earthly glory and eternal salvation. Suicide bombing isn’t just 
a tactic in a larger war; it overwhelms the political goals it is meant to 
serve. It creates its own logic and transforms the culture of those who 
employ it. (2002:18) 
 
The occurrence of suicide terrorism, the signification of suicide bombings as a 
particularly violent and pervasive threat, the wider social implications that have 
galvanized public attention, and the measures of social control that have been adopted to 
seek resolution of the crisis and greater societal malaise – all of these correspond to 
stages of moral panics propagated by the media and resulting in sweeping policy reforms 
to make the public feel empowered, safe, and satisfied. Major findings concerning the 
interpretation of, overreaction to, and politicization of suicide terrorism are described 
below.   
Suicide Bombers as Contemporary Folk Devils 
Suicide bombers are usually depicted in the media and public policy as irrational 
individuals, crazed fanatics, immoral cowards, socially inadequate, economically 
deprived, religious zealots, and suicidal young men who have been brainwashed by evil 
Islamists to carry out suicide missions. The complex reality of suicide bombers and their 
motivations is mostly ignored. These issues are further discussed below. One of the 
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Turkish scholars interviewed in mid-2004 for the G-CDMHA project described the issue 
in these terms: 
Suicide bombings are publicized in a very specific way in Western media. 
The reports almost always provide the same image of the deranged 
terrorist, the fanatic, the lunatic who had nothing to lose and everything to 
win – namely, money for his family, eternal life and virgins for himself. 
This is wrong. Completely wrong. It is a simplistic portrayal that 
perpetuates stereotypes and misconceptions about suicide bombings. 
However, it is acceptable from a political standpoint because it fits the 
ongoing agenda of the self-proclaimed number one country in the world. 
How are you going to fuel fears about terrorism and further justify a 
‘global war on terror’ if you start broadcasting reports that try to really 
decipher what lies behind the act. Most people would think that 
decomposing motivation and analyzing the persona of the bomber could 
somehow justify the act in the eyes of some people. God forbid we 
humanize those evil people! They must be portrayed as mad, pitiless, 
heartless, cold-blooded killers with nothing to live for. They are the 
contemporary demons, the ‘evil’ empire that must be fought by the joined 
forces of the ‘good’ coalition. That is what it boils down to, in U.S. 
politics, in the media, in the public’s mind: a war between Good and Evil. 
That is quite clever, you must admit, although not very original. First, it 
sells news and that means ratings and money for media corporations, 
especially the ones that side with Bush. Second, it justifies going after a 
group or its sponsors as swiftly and as hard as possible. People want 
retaliation, people want justice done. That is not going to happen if you 
paint a meek picture of terrorists. You have to exploit their actions, beat 
them at their own game, fire up everyone to ‘go and get them.’ You have 
to exaggerate the threat to make sure people get scared about the ‘scourge’ 
of terrorism, the ‘epidemic’ of suicide bombings. Once they feel really 
unsafe because of your radical talk, you can have them blindly agree to or 
condone any kind of measure, even the most extreme ones like the use of 
the atomic bomb in 1945, the war in Iraq today, nuclear war in the future – 
who knows? 
 
Typical profile of a suicide bomber. On December 12, 1983, the French and U.S. 
Embassies in Kuwait City were partially destroyed by suicide truck bombs that killed 6 
and injured dozens of people. Then a suicide bomber used a truck bomb and killed 15 
people at a French Army building in Beirut on December 21, 1983. On December 26, 
1983, Newsweek published the following ill-fated commentary:  
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Experts in Israel, which has been subject to suicide terrorism for more 
than a decade, believe the threat is not likely to spread beyond the Middle 
East. The Israelis have drawn a psychological profile of the suicide 
terrorist based on an analysis of more than a dozen who survived their 
high-risk attacks on Israel, as well as a study of World War II Japanese 
kamikaze strikes. Several characteristics stand out. Guerrillas who 
undertake certain-death missions tend to have a cultural predisposition to 
view suicide as an honorable way of entering the afterlife, and more 
importantly, a psychopathological desire to die. Those elements must be 
set into play by indoctrination from a highly respected authority figure. 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary Iran would seem to be a perfect 
breeding ground for such terrorists. According to Israeli findings, the more 
time that elapses between the terrorist’s last exhortation and his arrival at 
the target, the less likely he is to act. Even a determined terrorist can drop 
his plans under the impact of such simple culture shock as landing at a 
faraway airport. One Israeli specialist predicts that ‘there will be more 
suicide strikes against the Americans and French in the Middle East, but 
not many. There is still less danger that there will be attacks overseas.’ 
(Gelman, 1983) 
 
Since then, suicide terrorism has spread overseas in a spectacular fashion, from 
Israel to Indonesia, Kenya to Turkey, Tanzania to England and Morocco – and even the 
United States. The desire has been strong to categorize suicide terrorists into certain 
deviant types, not necessarily to help understand their motivations and actions but to at 
least make their castigation easier. Typologies of suicide bombers have been developed 
primarily to describe Palestinian suicide bombers acting against Israel. One such 
typology was recently developed for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Kimhi & 
Even, 2003) and rather inopportunely extended to non-Palestinian suicide bombers by 
(amongst others) the U.S. military (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2005). 
The classification distinguishes between four prototypes: the religious fanatic, the 
nationalist fanatic, the avenger or revenge seeker, and the exploited. To each type 
correspond certain prerequisites, supporting factors, and hypothetical dominant 
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personality traits (Table 8). These four profiles are adequate summaries of the ways that 
suicide bombers are systematically portrayed in the media and public policy. 
Table 8 
Kimhi & Even’s Classification of Suicide Bomber Prototypes and their Correlates 
Prototype Prerequisites Supporting Factors Hypothetical Personality Traits 
 
Religious 
Fanatic 
 
- Religious indoctrination 
encouraging and urging suicide 
attacks 
- Charismatic religious leaders with 
great influence on candidates for 
suicide operations 
 
- Sympathetic public 
atmosphere within the 
religious community 
that praises martyrs, 
which includes 
publicity, great honor, 
and commemoration 
 
Faithful, steadfast, goal-
focused, belief in 
divinely determined 
fate, influenced by 
people whom s/he 
reveres, belief in the 
world to come 
 
Nationalist 
Fanatic 
 
- Well-developed political 
consciousness, along with a sense of 
an uncompromising struggle to 
liberate the homeland 
- A clear feeling that the armed 
struggle and suicide attacks are an 
effective and necessary weapon in 
achieving political goals 
 
- Participation of the 
organization to which 
the individual belongs in 
the suicide attack 
- Sympathetic public 
atmosphere that praises 
the sacrifice 
- Media that ensures 
wide coverage both in 
local community and 
internationally 
 
Steadfast, sure in his/her 
ways, willing to 
sacrifice him/herself for 
the general public 
(idealist) 
 
Avenger 
 
Psychological injury based on one or 
more of the following events: 
- Death or serious injury of a family 
member or another close individual 
- Trauma related to foreign 
occupation of homeland (personal 
humiliation, or witnessing the 
humiliation of a relative) 
- Personal or family problems 
resulting in an individual’s feeling 
that his or her life is worthless 
(culminating in or including 
depression) 
 
- Sympathetic public 
atmosphere that praises 
the martyrs, which 
includes publicity of 
names, great honor, and 
commemoration 
- Financial support for 
the family of the 
deceased suicide 
terrorist 
 
Hopeless, vengeful, 
tendency to see their life 
as worthless 
 
Exploited 
 
Suicide terrorists who are unable to 
withstand the organization’s 
pressures to “volunteer” for a suicide 
operation, such as: 
- Children and youth 
- Adults in social distress 
(collaborators, homosexuals, moral 
offenders) 
- People with weak personalities 
 
- Sympathetic public 
atmosphere that praises 
the martyrs 
- Suicide terrorists’ 
belief that all their sins 
will become “white as 
snow” and that they will 
be granted full 
atonement for their past 
 
Dependent, anxious, 
difficulty withstanding 
pressure, recognition 
seeking 
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On the evening of October 1, 2005, a University of Oklahoma (OU) engineering 
student strapped explosives to himself and detonated them 500 feet away from the 
campus stadium in Norman, Oklahoma, which was filled with 84,000 college football 
supporters. The bomb blast shook the stadium and was heard five miles away. The 
bomber, Joel Henry Hinrichs III, was a 21-year-old white male who did not fit the typical 
profile of the average suicide bomber. The case, officially described by the Norman 
police as a suicide bombing, was reportedly investigated by Homeland Security, but then 
quickly dropped from newscasts. As it turns out, the young man, originally from 
Colorado, had tried to purchase ammonium nitrate, the same kind of fertilizer used in 
April 1995 by Timothy McVeigh to destroy a federal building in Oklahoma City. 
Hinrichs, who had a Pakistani roommate, had apparently converted to Islam and attended 
the same Norman mosque as Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called “20th hijacker” of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks. Speculations about the motivation of the young man and his 
possible ties to an Islamist network at OU and in the greater Norman area were 
widespread in the local media following the bombing. Muslim students and citizens were 
targeted by law enforcement (including the FBI) and others in the community. The 
situation and related rumors worsened after local police and federal agents handcuffed 
and held at gunpoint an Egyptian OU instructor and several other foreign individuals. To 
this day, the case has not been clearly elucidated. However, Hinrichs has been 
consistently described by the media and local authorities as a “loner” who was “deeply 
depressed.” His suicide has now been classified as an “individual act of despair.”  
The Hinrichs case, as many others, is representative of the discrepancy between 
the reality of suicide bombings and the interpretation of suicide terrorism by the media 
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and agents of social control. Media reports and political agendas are focused on a virulent 
Middle Eastern brand of suicide terrorism that entails religious extremism and irrational, 
delusional, brainwashed bombers with nothing to live for. The public has been sensitized 
to perceive suicide bombers as “unbalanced sociopaths” and “uneducated religious 
fanatics” (Bloom, 2005c). The media and political actors neglect the fact that suicide 
bombings have no necessary connection to Islam and that bombers are by and large 
“upper-middle class, well-educated, successful, socially connected people who know 
exactly what they are doing” and who “give their lives to kill people as part of a strategic 
campaign aimed at the people of the West, to turn us against our governments, and to 
force them to end the occupations and protections” (Horton, 2005).  
The use of women in suicide bombing missions. The Syrian Socialist National 
Party (SSNP), a pro-Syrian, Lebanese secular terrorist group, was the first group to use a 
female suicide bomber, seventeen-year-old Sana’a Mehaydali, against an Israeli convoy 
in Lebanon in 1985. The SSNP soon became responsible for a total twelve suicide attacks 
– five of which were carried out by women. Female bombers increasingly appeared in 
others parts of the globe after the mid-1980s, including in Sri Lanka (most notably with 
the 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by a teenaged female Tamil Tiger), Turkey, Israel 
and the occupied territories, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Chechnya, and now Iraq. 34 
percent of the suicide bombings carried out since 1985 have been perpetrated by women 
(Gunaratna, 2000; Bloom, 2005c). “Most have belonged to secular separatist 
organizations, such as the LTTE and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)” (Bloom, 
2005b). In fact, only secular groups such as the SSNP, the LTTE or the PKK initially 
recruited and used female bombers for suicide missions. In recent years, however, “the 
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worrisome emergence of women suicide bombers in religious organizations” has been 
observed (Bloom, 2005b).  
The role of Palestinian women in suicide terror campaigns has now been strongly 
established, especially within the context of the al-Aqsa Intifada where they became 
known as the “Army of Roses” (Dickey, 2005; Victor, 2003). The first Palestinian female 
suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, struck in Jerusalem in January 2002. More than 20 cases 
involving women have thus far been documented (they constitute about 5 percent of all 
attacks). As explained by Israeli security forces: 
The terrorist organizations behind the attacks want to exploit the 
advantages of dispatching females to perpetrate them, primarily within the 
Green Line. This is under the assumption that a female is thought of as 
soft, gentle, and innocent and therefore will arouse less suspicion than a 
man. In the cases in which females were involved, the terrorists were 
aware of their need for camouflage that would help them blend in on the 
Israeli street. The female terrorists attempted to Westernize their 
appearance, among other things wearing clothing that was not 
conservative, such as short skirts, or maternity clothes, and having modern 
haircuts. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003b) 
  
These women typically “do not fit the accepted image of the ‘average Palestinian 
woman’” (Ibid.) or, for that matter, that of the average suicide bomber. They come from a 
variety of economic and social backgrounds, they are often well-educated, and some are 
mothers with children. The motivational patterns of these women typically fit the 
“avenger” type described above, though most media reports focus on women being 
exploited, coerced, and otherwise blackmailed to “volunteer” for suicide missions. 
Teenage girls especially have been the focus on much media and official scrutiny, since 
they have been used increasingly as recruiters or facilitators and appear to be even more 
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personally, emotionally, and socially vulnerable than adult women (Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2003a). 
The majority of Chechen suicide bombers are women. 68 percent of attacks 
involve women and 50 percent of all attacks are carried out exclusively by female 
bombers. They have been dubbed the “Black Widows” and have effectively altered the 
face of female suicide terrorism over the past five years (Bloom, 2005c; Dickey, 2005; 
Reuter, 2004). Their prevalence has been explained by a combination of factors: the 
tactical advantage of their low suspiciousness level, the publicity- and attention-driven 
strategic element derived from the “greater psychological impact on the target audience,” 
and “the main undercurrent of the broader suicide terrorism phenomenon in Chechnya” 
linked to “desperation and hopelessness” and “feelings of helpless anger” or anxiety that 
are “easily exploited by recruiters” (Reuter, 2004). Since they target mainly Russian 
objectives, their suicide bombings have not received much coverage in the Western news 
media. Nonetheless, the Black Widows of Chechnya have become an “example among 
heroines of jihad” and “an important factor in the spread of suicidal terror” (Dickey, 
2005).  
The tales of these Chechen women are as much about tawdry 
victimization as battlefield heroics. They come from a rugged society 
where an old tradition, made worse after years of gunslinging war and 
anarchy, allows men to kidnap the bride of their choice. The kidnappers 
can settle disputes with the woman’s family in cash, or with violence. . . . 
[O]nce she’s been taken, she’s unlikely to find another husband. ‘No 
intelligent, nice young man in Chechnya would marry a nonvirgin girl.’. . .   
Some Chechen women who have lost husbands or sons in the war 
want to live only long enough to take revenge. The first attack by a ‘black 
widow,’ in the summer of 2000, killed 27 members of the Russian Special 
Forces. Then the spectral, silent presence of 18 ‘widows’ during the 
deadly hostage siege of a Moscow theater in 2002 heightened their 
mystique. Over a four-month period in 2003, Chechen women carried out 
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six out of seven suicide attacks on Russian targets, killing 165 people. 
Women bombers allegedly brought down two Russian airliners last year, 
killing all 90 passengers and crew. (Ibid.) 
 
 These two brands of suicide bombings – the Palestinian version and the Chechen 
type – illustrate a significant characteristic of the peculiar rationale for the involvement of 
Muslim women in suicide attacks. “The underlying message conveyed by female 
bombers is: Terrorism has moved beyond a fringe phenomenon and insurgents are all 
around you” (Dickey, 2005). Moreover, as explained by Bloom (2005c): 
What is so compelling about why women become suicide bombers is that 
so many claimed to have been raped or sexually abused by enemy forces, 
according to interviews with those who knew them. Once dishonored, they 
are no longer marriageable. Joining a terrorist group is one of the few 
remaining options for women who, according to the strict honor code 
followed in some Islamic societies, must otherwise be executed by their 
own families. With their deaths they reinvent themselves as martyrs, 
redeeming the family name and recouping lost honor. 
           
In early November 2005, a young white woman and Islam convert from Belgium 
made international news when she blew herself up in Baghdad. Described both as a “girl 
next door” and “an Islamic extremist,” Muriel Degauque “achieved a grim milestone by 
becoming the first female European convert to commit a suicide bombing in Iraq” 
(Rotella, 2005). According to one article in the Los Angeles Times (Ibid.),  
The 36-year-old woman died Nov. 9 in the car bombing of a U.S. military 
convoy after traveling with her Moroccan-born husband to Iraq to join 
other foreign fighters in a network led by militant kingpin Abu Musab 
Zarqawi. . . .  
Investigators said the incident illustrated the growing role of converts 
and women in Europe’s increasingly fierce and violent Islamic networks. 
It also apparently is the first suicide bombing anywhere by a female 
Islamic convert of European descent. 
 
The added significance of the Degauque incident is that it prompted Newsweek to 
publish a well-timed special report entitled “Women of Al Qaeda” on December 12, 2005 
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(Dickey, 2005) - the first notable attempt by a mainstream news media outlet at a 
thorough analysis of the participation of women in suicide bombings. The report opens 
with the following statement:  
Jihad used to have a gender: male. The men who dominated the movement 
exploited traditional attitudes about sex and the sexes to build their ranks. 
They still do that, but with a difference: even Al Qaeda is using female 
killers now, and goading the men. (Ibid.)    
 
The report reviews the evolution of female suicide bombings over the past two 
decades, from its SSNP origins to its perfection by the LTTE’s Black Tigers and 
including the Palestinian Army of Roses and the Chechen Black Widow 
bombings. It offers insight into the motivations of female bombers in the global 
Islamist terrorist network, notably with regard to women and the promise of an 
afterlife. 
Reem Riashi, a mother of two, recorded a videotape before her mission, 
saying she hoped her ‘organs would be scattered in the air’ and her soul 
‘would reach paradise.’ Would there be 72 houris to greet her there? No. 
The religious scholars who endorse suicide attacks have described an 
alternative paradise for women. Thauria Hamur, a 26-year-old captured by 
the Israelis before she could set off a bomb in May 2002, told 
NEWSWEEK in a prison interview that women martyrs would ‘become 
the purest and most beautiful form of angel at the highest level possible in 
heaven.’ (Ibid.)    
 
Meanwhile, although such investigative efforts as Newsweek’s recent report are needed 
and welcome pieces of information, the recruitment, training and use of female bombers 
by secular groups remains understudied by the media and neglected by policymakers. 
The priorities in the current global “War on Terror” have been squarely set within an 
agenda focused solely upon Islamist terrorism and, more specifically, Middle-Eastern-
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based or al-Qaeda-related terrorist initiatives. Within such a limited framework, the 
perpetration of suicide bombings by secular groups.     
Symbols and Demonization: The Post-September 11 Rhetoric 
 “This is not an isolated criminal act we are dealing with, it is an extreme and evil 
ideology whose roots lie in a perverted and poisonous misinterpretation of the religion of 
Islam.” British Prime Minister Tony Blair uttered that statement following the July 11, 
2005 London bombings. His choice of words echoed speeches made after the September 
2001 attacks in the United States. The dominant discourses, frames, and representations 
that have informed the media and public debate over suicide terrorism are now presented 
with a focus on the post-September 11 framework.  
The clash of civilizations model. On the afternoon of September 11, 2001, Israeli 
leader Ariel Sharon appeared on television to convey his regret, condolences, and 
assurance of Israel’s support in the war on terror. Sharon called for a coalition against 
terrorist networks, setting the civilized world against the barbaric world of the terrorists 
and pitting “the free world” against “the forces of darkness” that are trying to destroy 
“freedom” and “our way of life.” Sharon declared “This is a war between good and evil 
and between humanity and the bloodthirsty” and added that the attacks were “a turning 
point in the war against international terror.” British Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a 
statement that described the attacks as “perpetrated by fanatics who are utterly indifferent 
to the sanctity of human life” and continued to assert that “we, the democracies of this 
world, are going to have to come together to fight it and eradicate this evil completely 
from our world.” In German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s opinion, the attacks “were 
not only attacks on the people in the United States, our friends in America, but also 
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against the entire civilized world, against our own freedom, against our own values, 
values which we share with the American people.” Canadian Prime Minister Jean 
Chrétien called the attacks “a cowardly act of unspeakable violence . . . It is impossible to 
fully comprehend the evil that would have conjured up such a cowardly and depraved 
assault.” Even President General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, one of three countries 
then recognizing the Taliban government, criticized the attacks and asked for 
international cooperation to fight the “modern-day evil” of terrorism. Pope John Paul II 
qualified the attacks as an “unspeakable horror” and, during his weekly general audience 
in St. Peter's Square, the pontiff told Americans that "those who believe in God know that 
evil and death do not have the final say” (International, 2001).  
On the evening of September 11, 2001, President Bush made a televised and 
radio-broadcast address to the nation. His opening statement was: “Today, our fellow 
citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and 
deadly terrorist acts.” President Bush then declared: “Thousands of lives were suddenly 
ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.” He went on to make the following statements:  
America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for 
freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light 
from shining. Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. 
. . . The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I’ve 
directed the full resources for our intelligence and law enforcement 
communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice. We will 
make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and 
those who harbor them. . . . America and our friends and allies join with 
all those who want peace and security in the world and we stand together 
to win the war against terrorism. Tonight I ask for your prayers for all 
those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for 
all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I pray they 
will be comforted by a power greater than any of us spoken through the 
ages in Psalm 23: ‘Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of 
death, I fear no evil, for You are with me.’ This is a day when all 
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Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and 
peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this 
time. None of us will ever forget this day, yet we go forward to defend 
freedom and all that is good and just in our world. (Text, 2001) 
 
Bushspeak. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the rhetoric of the 
Bush administration followed a pattern for which a precedent had been set throughout the 
day by world leaders. Indeed, as illustrated by the abovementioned speech excerpt, 
President Bush condemned the “evil” of terrorism and the evil terrorists, whom he 
referred to as “a faceless coward” soon after the attacks (Bush, 2001). The word “evil” 
itself was used four times in the very first official speech made on the eve of the attacks. 
Moreover, President Bush repeatedly portrayed the conflict as a “war between good and 
evil” in which the United States was going to “eradicate evil from the world” and to 
“hunt down” and “smoke out evildoers,” those “barbaric people.”  The President’s 
vernacular style soon became referred to as “Bushspeak” and illustrated how he “rarely 
puts ten words together in a major address without taking a position, passing a judgment, 
or proclaiming a purpose” (Gourevitch, 2004).  
The Bush administration also used various cowboy metaphors (calling for Osama 
bin Laden “dead or alive” for example), as well as several figures of speech with heavy 
religious overtones. The most documented one is President Bush’s initial description of 
the anti-terrorism campaign as a “crusade.” Although it was in line with his “good vs. 
evil” interpretation of the situation, he was advised that the term carried a highly 
offensive historical connotation in connection with earlier wars between Christians and 
Muslims. At the outset of the campaign, the Pentagon named the war against terror 
“Operation Infinite Justice.” They, too, were advised that only God could dispense such 
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“infinite justice” and that Americans and others could be troubled by a war expanding to 
infinity. In outlining the goals of the war, not once did President Bush mention 
democracy. The new name for the war on terrorism became “Operation Enduring 
Freedom.” From that point on, the Bush administration mantra frequently reaffirmed that 
the global war against terrorism was being fought “for freedom.”     
The “terrorist” label. An important issue related to the role of the media and their 
coverage of suicide bombing events relates to the labeling of certain groups as “terrorist” 
whereas others are continuously referred to in more positive or simply neutral terms – 
even if they are listed as FTOs in the United States for instance. This has been a point of 
contention amongst political and media analysts, as well as military experts, for many 
years. Terrorism, as explained earlier, has yet to be clearly and uniformly defined and 
remains, as a result, a very subjective concept influenced by socio-political conditions, 
cultural circumstances, and political agendas. After the September 2001 attacks, 
President Bush declared open season on terrorists, “freedom haters,” and various 
“evildoers” who instantly became the prime targets of his “War on Terror.” Incidentally, 
President Bush, his administration, and the mass media have failed to include most 
terrorist groups, as defined by the U.S. Department of State itself, in this global war on 
terrorism. Any reference to the “War on Terror” usually implicitly refers to “sub-state 
movements like al-Qaeda whose activities [are] directed against the West, often with the 
support of radical Middle Eastern governments and intelligence services” (Jenkins, 
2003:20). That has prompted many to criticize the new Bush Terror Doctrine as a 
prejudiced and potentially harmful campaign against an inflated threat that should not 
have superseded other pressing national or foreign policy issues – including blatant and 
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documented terrorism problems elsewhere in the world. Moreover, some were quick to 
argue that the United States was “as truly a rogue state as Libya or Iraq” and that, as far 
as causing harm was concerned, terrorist groups did “not approach the scale of savagery 
of states, including the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. thus had no moral authority to 
denounce anyone else as a terrorist” (Ibid.). 
The Council on Foreign Relations (2004) argues that “being saddled with the 
pejorative label ‘terrorist’ focuses attention on a group’s methods, not its message, and 
can delegitimize its cause in the public eye.” Some fighters may welcome the expression, 
on the other hand, as Jenkins (2003) notes about an Algerian member of al-Qaeda: 
My ideological commitment is total and the reward of glory for this 
relentless battle is to be called a terrorist. I accept the name of terrorist if it 
is used to mean that I terrorize a one-sided system of iniquitous power and 
a perversity that comes in many forms. (2003:17) 
 
As far as suicide bombings are concerned, several alternate expressions have been 
used to describe essentially similar actions while subjectively framing them in a different 
way. Western (English-language) media and governmental documents choose the terms 
“suicide attacks,” “suicide terror attacks,” or “suicidal bombings” to refer to events 
involving “suicide terrorism.” On the other hand, the same incidents are described in 
Middle Eastern (Arabic) media and official policies as “martyrdom operations” 
perpetrated by “liberation fighters” or “resistance movements.” For instance,  
[i]n Palestinian Arabic, the phrase for a bombing attack in which the 
perpetrator is killed is an amaliyya istishhadiyya, a ‘martyrdom operation,’ 
or an amaliyya fida’iyya, a ‘sacrificaial operation.’ In the Israeli Arabic-
language media, the preferred term is an amaliyya intihariyya, a ‘suicide 
operation.’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002:36). 
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This lends a special meaning to the popular saying “One man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter.” This qualification is evidently more positive and lays emphasis on the 
glorified notion of self-sacrifice of the bomber, who is called a shahid (martyr) or 
shahida for a woman (shuhada in the plural). One of the goals of such a positive 
construal of the act is to provide an incentive for future recruits or bombers currently in 
training. Another major justification for the use of the martyrdom concept is that it 
clearly defines the operation as a testament of one’s faith in Allah. As explained in 
Chapter Two, the legitimacy of suicide bombings has been highly debated among Islamic 
scholars: while some view it as a purely suicidal act that is in contradiction with the 
Qur’anic prescription against suicide, others perceive it as a selfless act of someone 
willing to die while fighting the Cause of God (jihad fi sabilillah) through a just jihad 
(struggle) by the sword (jihad bis saif). The latter interpretation justifies the 
rationalization of suicide bombings as martyrdom operations, as adopted by Hamas, the 
al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, and other Palestinian 
factions known for perpetrating suicide bombings. Secular groups involved in suicide 
bombings, such as the LTTE and the PKK (today’s KONGRA-GEL or KGK), also refer 
to their suicide bombing operatives as martyrs and the suicide missions are also described 
as martyrdom operations in order to give special emphasis to the fact that the bomber 
gave his or her life in defense of the noble and greater cause fought by the group. 
Likewise, there is a strong tendency to describe suicide bombers as “terrorists,” 
“Islamic fundamentalists,” “crazed fanatics,” and “evildoers” or “evil cowards” who 
either strike in the Middle East, typically in Israel, or perpetrate attacks in the name of al-
Qaeda. Iraqi insurgents, also known alternatively as “freedom haters” and “enemies of 
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freedom,” are also graced with the same labels, though the Bush administration and the 
mainstream media have significantly reduced their unfortunate amalgam of war and 
terrorism in public discourse over the past few months. Other suicide bombers (e.g., 
Tamil Tigers, Chechens) are described as “rebels,” “insurgents,” “radicals,” “separatists,” 
“revolutionaries,” and so on. Such terms, though mostly accurate in principle, draw 
attention away from the – technically-speaking – terrorist activities perpetrated by the 
suicide bombers and backed by whichever groups they belong to. Such subdued 
phraseology also serves the essential purpose of not calling the attention of the general 
public to political struggles outside the realm of the paradoxically Middle-East-based 
“Global War on Terror.” 
A terminology twist worthy of attention can be found in French-speaking news 
(e.g., in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Québec). Following a trend that started in France, 
suicide bombers are described as “terrorists” and sometimes as “human bombs.” More 
importantly, they are referred to as “kamikazes,” which evidence a patent 
misunderstanding of the historical background and intrinsic features of suicide bombings. 
As explained in Chapter Two, “kamikaze” is a Japanese term that means “divine wind” 
and was used to characterize World War II Japanese pilots who were recruited for suicide 
missions against key military targets. They were used for the first time in the November 
1944 Battle of the Philippines. Convinced that conventional warfare could not guarantee 
success, most volunteered for the suicide missions, which were called tokkotai (“special 
attacks”). In the April 1945 Battle of Okinawa, more than 2,000 kamikazes crashed fully 
fueled fighter planes into over 300 ships, killing 5,000 Americans, which prompted the 
U.S. government to approve the use of the atomic bomb to bring the war to an end. Taken 
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out of its inherently Far-Eastern context, the term “kamikaze” has obviously little to no 
meaning when applied to Middle-Eastern, Chechen or Sri Lankan suicide bombers who 
strap explosives around their waist or drive explosive-laden trucks into buildings. To 
some extent, the comparison could undergo a test of congruence when the label is applied 
to the September 11 hijackers, but their actions were not sponsored by a state or a formal 
government and therefore do not justify such a figure of speech.    
Another noteworthy politicized issue that emerged in recent years is that of 
homicide bombers. In an April 12, 2002 press briefing, former White House Press 
Secretary Ari Fleischer expressly referred to a suicide bombing that had occurred in 
Jerusalem that morning as a “homicide bombing”:  
From there, the President had his intelligence briefings with the CIA and 
then the FBI. He convened a meeting of the National Security Council. At 
which point, in the middle of the meeting, the President was informed 
about this morning's homicide bombing in Jerusalem. (Fleischer, 2002; 
emphasis added)  
 
He then went on to declare:  
 
The President condemns this morning's homicide bombing in Jerusalem. 
There are clearly people in the region who want to disrupt Secretary 
Powell's peace mission. And the President will not be deterred from 
seeking peace. There are people who don't want peace. The President 
wants peace, and that's why he condemns in the strongest terms possible 
this morning's homicide attack. (Ibid.) 
 
Following Mr. Fleischer’s remarks, a journalist aptly asked for clarification. Mr. 
Fleischer thus explained the White House’s new terminology of choice as part of an 
effort to underscore the negative overtones while putting less emphasis on the notion of 
self-sacrifice inherent in the tactic of suicide bombing: 
Journalist - Q At the same time that conservative Republicans are sharply 
criticizing this President for his Mideast policy, which they describe as 
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being too tough on Israel, you, the President, others in this White House 
have adopted a term called homicide bombings instead of suicide 
bombings. Is that a coincidence, or is this an attempt to pacify his political 
base that's criticizing him?  
 
Mr. Fleischer - David, I don't think pacification comes from lexicon. I 
think people support the President --  
 
Journalist - Then why change the term, why adopt this --  
 
Mr. Fleischer - I think people support the President because of the 
principles that he has so strongly stood for in the war against terrorism and 
in his actions here in the Middle East. But the reason I started to use that 
term is because it's a more accurate description. These are not suicide 
bombings. These are not people who just kill themselves. These are people 
who deliberately go to murder others, with no regard to the values of their 
own life. These are murderers. The President has said that in the Rose 
Garden. And I think that is just a more accurate description of what these 
people are doing. It's not suicide, it's murder. (Ibid.) 
 
According to the St. Pete Times of April 13, 2002 (New, 2002): 
Fox News Channel began using ‘homicide bombing’ to refer to Friday's 
Jerusalem attack almost as soon as the news broke. Dennis Murray, 
executive producer of daytime programming, said executives there had 
heard the phrase being used by administration officials in recent days and 
thought it was a good idea.  
CNN and MSNBC used ‘suicide bomber’ to refer to Friday's attack. 
ABC News also plans to stick with ‘suicide bomber.’ ‘We believe that is a 
more descriptive term,’ CNN spokeswoman Christa Robinson said. ‘A 
homicide bomber could refer to someone planting a bomb in a trash can.’ 
 
CNN mentioned the briefing and the adoption of the new label, along with a 
report that U.S. officials had confirmed that very same day that Israel had “shared with 
the administration new documents Israel says show high-level Palestinian Authority 
involvement in financing and supporting terror strikes on Israel” (King, 2002). However, 
official attempts to make the phrase “homicide bombing” popular in the news and the 
mind of the general public failed. Most major news companies dropped the phrase within 
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weeks of Ari Fleischer’s briefing. Only News Corp outlets, such as FoxNews and the 
New York Post, have consistently used the phrase since.  
Summary of Findings 
 As highlighted by these results, the social construction of suicide terrorism 
involves several key players: the suicide bombers and their supporters (i.e., the folk 
devils), the media, the public, and agents of social control (politicians, law makers, law 
enforcement, and action groups). Various socio-political processes, bureaucratic 
mechanisms, and media structures interact to shape suicide terrorism as a social problem, 
a threat to society and civilization as a whole, and a pressing issue that can only be solved 
with immediate, drastic measures. Suicide terrorism is used as a political weapon to 
promote ideological agendas on both sides of the terrorism equation. It is also exploited 
as a communication tool and politicized in order to feed into moral panics and the politics 
of fear. Representations and interpretations of suicide bombings are very much one-
dimensional and present the issue as a monolithic way. Simplistic portrayals of bombing 
attacks and suicide bombers are used to depict suicide terrorism as a pure manifestation 
of evil. News coverage of suicide bombings is characteristically sensationalized to 
capitalize on feelings of collective insecurity and warmongering policies.  
The results of this study in effect provide a canvas for an in-depth discussion of 
the data collected, which shall make it possible to not only derive meaningful conclusions 
from its theoretical import but also make informed policy recommendations based on its 
practical and empirical significance. The following chapter presents such discussion, 
conclusions, and recommendations. Suggestions for future research are also mentioned. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Discussion & Conclusions 
Summary of Study 
The focal point of this study is suicide terrorism, a violent, complex, and highly 
adaptable form of terrorism that has received extensive media coverage over the past few 
years and has become a key issue in contemporary political agendas. More specifically, 
this study provides an analysis of the subjective definitional and rhetorical processes 
involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism. The goal of the constructionist 
approach, strengthened by a symbolic interactionist perspective, was to demonstrate that 
suicide terrorism is essentially a subjective concept and a socially constructed problem. 
In effect, the study was designed to move the analysis of suicide terrorism beyond 
traditional essentialist debates and into more nuanced understandings of cultural 
meaning, human action, and human interaction. Hence the study focused on determining 
(a) how the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a subjective 
representation of events and their alleged causes and (b) how such biased representation 
is conditioned by deliberate attempts to stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate 
public perceptions, and promote certain political interests. Consequently, the main 
research question was: “How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and 
media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism?” A three-fold 
subset of questions was then developed: (a) “How is suicide terrorism used as a political 
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weapon?”; (b) How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool?”; and (c) “How is 
suicide terrorism a politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework?”.   
 The study was designed as a qualitative research project in order to fulfill the 
main objective of improving our understanding of the complex phenomenon of suicide 
bombings. Such a research design helped to fully capture the definitional and rhetorical 
mechanisms at play while taking into account the multifarious context in which suicide 
terrorism is profoundly rooted. The overall strategy favored for this study was a multi-
case study, an adaptive and innovative qualitative approach specifically intended to 
provide an in-depth knowledge of an organizational phenomenon. The instrumental 
collective case study thus developed allowed the observation and assessment of several 
sites using cross-case comparisons and explanation-building techniques to analyze the 
data. Patterns and themes were subsequently discerned across cases, which added depth 
to the study and solidified its findings. Cases were identified via purposeful sampling, 
which consisted of sampling unique research sites and key participants, that is, 
information-rich cases particularly well-suited for the in-depth study of the social 
construction of suicide terrorism. Data collection methods relied on a triangulation of 
ideas, that is, a convergence if data sources, theories, and methodologies, in order to help 
develop themes. Case studies also allowed for extensive data collection drawing on 
multiple sources of information, including extensive field research, in-depth expert 
interviews, and analysis of public and official documents. Such a diversity of sources and 
collected data guaranteed a more complete depiction of the phenomenon.  
 The study findings, which are recapitulated following the main research questions 
in the preceding chapter, highlight that many actors are involved in the social 
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construction of suicide terrorism: the suicide bombers and their supporters (the folk 
devils), the media, the public, and agents of social control. As a result, the social 
construction of suicide terrorism is conditioned and influenced by the interaction socio-
political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures. Suicide bombings are 
political weapons, used as a communication tool and exploited as a politicized issue that 
fuels moral panics and the politics (and marketing) of fear surrounding suicide terrorism. 
Representations and interpretations of suicide bombings are overwhelmingly one-
dimensional: they ignore the dynamics of the historical, social, cultural, economic, and 
psychological dimensions of the events. The media and agents of social control use 
unsophisticated portrayals of suicide bombings and usually describe suicide terrorism as 
a mere manifestation of evil. Terrorist groups and suicide bombers are selectively 
depicted as simplistic enemies, crazed cowards, and demonized foes. News coverage of 
suicide bombings is characteristically sensationalized: they are presented as extremely 
violent and elaborate propaganda tools in the hands of dangerous religious fanatics who 
are distressed, unstable and suicidal, and have nothing to lose. Bombers are also 
habitually described as poor, uneducated, young males who were brainwashed by the 
fundamentalist precepts of radical Islam. This is in total contradiction with the reality of 
suicide bombings. The latter are, in fact, characterized by a combination of primitive 
means and meticulous planning (recruitment, formation, and training) that results in 
extensive physical and psychological harm. Moreover, suicide bombers are not primarily 
suicidal and generally do not suffer from any diagnosable psychological disorders or 
cognitive impairments impeding effective problem-solving skills. Not all suicide 
bombings are perpetrated by exponents of a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam or any 
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other religion, for that matter: some secular groups have resorted to the tactic, including 
the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. The Tigers, in fact, are to this day the most 
prolific users of suicide bombings. Finally, women and children are increasingly 
recruited for suicide missions by several secular and religious groups that view them as 
providing invaluable tactical advantages, but their presence in the media and public 
policy is still scant.   
Such findings are particularly meaningful today, all the more as suicide terrorism 
has gained in both sustainability and popularity worldwide and the fast-growing 
radicalization of opposing factions and terrorist cells has increasingly become a concern 
for policymakers and other agents of social control. More than two thirds of 
contemporary suicide bombings have occurred since 2000 and at least one suicide 
bombing is reported about in international news every day. The timeliness and relevance 
of this study is indisputable. It is therefore critical to thoroughly explore and reflect upon 
its essential findings, as well as its overall contribution to both knowledge and practice.  
Theoretical Implications of Results 
Appropriateness of the Theoretical Framework 
 As evidenced by the findings presented in the previous chapter, the moral 
signification of suicide terrorism can be successfully illustrated via a social 
constructionist study of suicide bombings. More specifically, this study shows that the 
construction of suicide terrorism as a new social problem and burning policy issue, as 
well as the contested claims made within that framework by the variety of actors 
involved, can be effectively analyzed and better understood within Cohen’s moral panic 
framework. Consequently, a social constructionist perspective makes it possible to 
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understand not only the emergence of suicide bombers as contemporary folk devils, but 
also the moral crusade and the moral panic that resulted from it. Additionally, social 
constructionism does seem to allow us to emphasize the negative and not necessarily 
anticipated effects of social control policy with regard to suicide terrorism, including the 
greater cohesion of terrorist groups and their increased polarization against the rest of 
society and the agents of control (politicians, lawmakers, law enforcement, and action 
groups) actively involved in the “War on Terror.” This methodical social constructionist 
investigation also enables us to focus on the role played by the mass media – both news 
and entertainment outlets – in publicizing and sensationalizing suicide bombings, setting 
off a contagion effect, and promoting the ideological and commercial exploitation of 
suicide terrorism. 
This study further illustrates the meaning and significance of symbols. Symbols 
are social objects that are “used to represent . . . whatever people agree they shall 
represent” (Charon, 2004:47-48). Words and acts are symbols. As such, they are social, 
“defined in interaction, not established in nature” (2004:48). Additionally, they are 
meaningful: their users clearly understand what the words or acts represent. 
Consequently, words and acts are also significant. People use certain words or resort to 
certain actions deliberately, not unintentionally, so as “to give off meaning to others” 
(2004:49). In concordance with the symbolic interactionist perspective, this study thus 
shows that the use of language should not be taken for granted. Symbolic communication 
is inherent in human life and necessary for social reality to develop from human 
interaction (2004:43). As explained earlier, physical objective reality, which refers to the 
“situation as it exists” (Ibid.), is subject to interpretation and objective acts are 
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systematically defined within a working context – a socially defined reality. Upon that 
social reality people also build their personal reality in interaction with themselves to 
reach their own interpretation and understanding of the physical world and human lived 
experience. Hence people interpret the reality of suicide terrorism within their own 
symbolic framework. Their perspectives evolve as they interact with others and within 
their social worlds or reference groups.  
Hence the study findings outlined in Chapter Four coincide with the theoretical 
framework guiding this research. The analysis of the socio-political processes, 
bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures involved in the social construction of 
suicide terrorism is discussed in detail below. In particular, the use of suicide bombings 
as a political weapon, their exploitation as a communication tool, and their politicization 
in order to feed into moral panics are dissected in an attempt to fully grasp the 
conceptualization and interpretation processes associated with this violent tactic and 
thereby improve our understanding of suicide terrorism.  
The Use of Suicide Bombings as a Political Weapon 
Suicide bombings as a winning practice of asymmetrical warfare. Regarding the 
success of suicide bombings as political weapons, ICT Education Project head and senior 
researcher Yoram Schweitzer (2000) once stated that, from the Israeli perspective of now 
twenty-two years of suicide terrorism,  
one may conclude that it has not been a ‘winning card’ in the hands of 
terror organizations, nor has it changed dramatically the inherent 
imbalance between states and terror organizations in favor of the terrorists. 
However, it was proven to be an effective instrument in the service of the 
terrorists’ agenda. 
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On the other hand, Pape (2005) argues that “as we saw in the recent London attacks, 
suicide terrorism works, particularly against democracies.” Likewise, suicide terrorism 
arguably “worked” for the PKK in Turkey or Hizballah in Lebanon and it is currently the 
best strategic weapon available to Chechen terrorists. Yet, the concrete political outcome 
of a suicide terror campaign is unimportant compared to the fundamental appeal of the 
method as a persuasive political weapon against foreign occupation and other sorts of 
politically-based conflicts. Suicide terrorism is regarded as the “ultimate weapon” 
(Schweitzer, 2001) and “the most politically destabilizing” form of terrorism (Atran, 
2004, August:1). Over the last few years, it has been used increasingly across the world 
by secular and religious groups that construe it as their most promising tool for political 
change and promote it – with the welcome though not always intentional help of the 
media and agents of social control – as the most effective weapon in their arsenal.  
Strategic and tactical usefulness. Suicide bombings are characterized by the use 
of rather primitive means which, thanks to meticulous planning (including the 
recruitment, formation, and training of the bombers or attack teams), result in 
considerable physical and psychological harm. Suicide bombings happen without 
warning and are virtually always successful in wreaking utter chaos upon entire 
populations. They are prime weapons of psychological warfare and, as such, constitute 
one of the most dangerous weapons available to terrorists today. Their political nature is 
enhanced by the fact that terrorists (notably Islamic extremists in recent years) turn their 
attacks into spectacles of terror and huge media events for the main purpose of promoting 
their political agenda. The strategic and tactical usefulness of suicide bombings as 
outstanding political weapons is therefore emphasized in our media-saturated society. In 
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today’s global politics and global media world, the purpose of such extravagant terror 
spectacles as the September 2001 attacks is not only to gain worldwide attention, but also 
to dramatize the issues and grievances of the groups involved and to achieve specific 
political goals.  The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks has also shown how 
spectacles of terror can also be used by democratic leaders (for instance, the Bush 
administration) to promote their own geopolitical agendas.  
The Use of Suicide Bombings as a Communication Tool 
The mass media can be powerful actors in the long-standing battle between 
terrorist groups and governments. The media can indeed have an effect on public 
perception of terrorist acts and government actions. This, in turn, may affect the latter, as 
well as the operations and agenda of the terrorist groups.  
Terrorists, governments, and the media see the function, roles and 
responsibilities of the media when covering terrorist events from differing 
and often competing perspectives. Such perspectives drive behavior 
during terrorist incidents--often resulting in both tactical and strategic 
gains to the terrorist operation and the overall terrorist cause. The 
challenge to both the governmental and press communities is to 
understand the dynamics of terrorist enterprise and to develop policy 
options designed to serve the interests of government, the media, and the 
society. (Perl, 1997) 
 
The media’s perspective. What news media outlets strive to accomplish by 
covering suicide bombings so considerably is quite simple: they want to beat the 
competition, be the first to cover a breaking story, and present it as dramatically as 
possible. “Breaking news” has become the catchphrase and the main objective of news 
coverage today. “Old news is no news” and “pressure to transmit real time news instantly 
in today’s competitive hi-tech communication environment is at an all-time high” (Perl, 
1997). Wilkinson (1997) further argues that 
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major US networks all compete fiercely for an increased market share of 
the audience and for the higher advertising revenue they can gain through 
exploiting the public’s insatiable interest in the coverage of major terrorist 
‘pseudo-events.’ (1997:57). 
 
The faster you can provide background information on the “terrorist group” supposedly 
involved, the more trustworthy and thorough your newscast will be perceived by the 
audience. It does not much matter if you are providing incorrect information, as long as 
the news bit sounds persuasive enough. For instance, immediately following the suicide 
bombings of March 11, 2004 in Madrid, Spain, newsrooms across the world, from 
Europe to the United States, were focusing their special editions on the Basque separatist 
group ETA, which had been blamed by the Spanish Prime Minister and was quickly 
found to have had nothing to do with the al-Qaeda-sponsored synchronized attacks.  
Sensationalizing a well-timed story is another important element of contemporary 
news making that also is characteristic of the creation and diffusion of moral panics 
(which will be discussed in details below). Spectacular footage, dramatic music, and 
striking visual effects are used to ensure the news is not only informative but also 
thrilling to watch. FoxNews and CNN have seemingly entered a “graphics war” to show 
which network can have the most gripping, enthralling news production of flashy short 
sequences, occasionally inaccurate information, and strings of interviews with highly-
paid “terrorism experts.” Other programs, such as Democracy Now for instance, would 
rather focus on a low-budget, objective (and therefore more ethical) presentation of 
factual news based on sources that have been carefully double-checked and are then 
dissected by low-profile yet reliable political analysts or military historians. As 
Wilkinson (1997) explains: 
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The free media clearly do not represent terrorist values. Generally they 
tend to reflect the underlying values of the democratic society. But the 
media in an open society are in a fiercely competitive market for their 
audiences, constantly under pressure to be first with the news and to 
provide more information, excitement and entertainment than their rivals. 
Hence they almost bound [sic] to respond to terrorist propaganda of the 
deed because it is dramatic bad news) (1997:54). 
 
Some news media outlets justify their theatrical or sometimes shocking coverage of 
suicide bombings with a common “people have the right to know” argument. Yet, the 
hypocrisy of such a statement becomes obvious when a brief analysis of such sensational 
coverage shows a deliberate attempt to subjectively and arbitrarily select certain pieces 
while deliberately censoring actual footage of perpetrators at the preparation stage, actual 
suicide bombings or their bloody aftermath. U.S. coverage of such events, for example, is 
typically limited to clouds of smoke, gutted buses, and speeding ambulances – but no 
bodies or severely injured victims are ever shown. The “right to know” argument is 
usually countered here by an active effort to preserve the psychological well-being of all 
direct and indirect victims (including viewers or readers). In Europe or Asia, on the other 
hand, blown up bodies and whatever remains of the suicide bomber(s) are frequently 
pictured on television or in printed news in order to display the full horror of the 
bombings and illustrate the gravity of the incidents.   
The media additionally try to safeguard their free operation throughout their 
operations. One of the pillars of democratic societies is freedom of the press. Many 
journalists covering terrorism and suicide bombings in particular have complained that 
they have been unable to report the news as accurately and objectively as their 
professional and ethical standards dictate. This has been especially true for coverage of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, considering the close ties of the U.S. government with its 
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Israeli counterpart, and the Iraqi insurgency. Regarding the latter, claims have multiplied 
over the past two years concerning restraints imposed on news agencies with regards to 
producing stories portraying the Bush administration and its so-called “liberation efforts” 
in a negative light. Freedom of the press has also been jeopardized by terrorist groups 
who have retaliated against journalists and other members of the press corps involved in 
terrorism coverage. 
Journalists generally want the freedom to cover an issue without external 
restraint--whether it comes media owners, advertisers, editors, or from the 
government. . . . In many instances, this concern goes beyond protecting 
their legal right to publish relatively unrestrained; it includes personal 
physical security. They want protection from threat, harassment, or violent 
assault during operations, and protection from subsequent murder by 
terrorists in retaliation providing unfavorable coverage (the latter 
occurring more often abroad than in the United States). (Perl, 1997)  
 
The terrorist perspective. Terrorists essentially want people to have an auspicious, 
if not sympathetic, view of their cause. Although people who are aware of suicide 
bombings may not believe the end justifies the means, they may sympathize – or even 
empathize – with the predicament of the groups resorting to the deadly tactic. “Terrorists 
believe the public ‘needs help’ in understanding that their cause is just and terrorist 
violence is the only course of action available to them against the superior evil forces of 
state and establishment” (Perl, 1997). Therefore, they must make sure that they establish 
and preserve healthy, steady relations with the media. Terrorist groups sometimes get 
directly involved in news media structures, especially small ones they can control by 
providing financial support, or pursue more sensitive or supportive press personnel who 
may portray them in a less negative fashion. 
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The main purpose of these groups is to ensure the news media portray them and 
their cause in a more sensible way. “Terrorist causes want the press to give legitimacy to 
what is often portrayed as ideological or personality feuds or divisions between armed 
groups and political wings” (Perl, 1997). They usually believe that a more objective 
portrayal of the armed struggle on the one hand and the political activities on the other 
will help them find more supporters, recruit additional followers, and secure more 
external financial backing.  
Terrorist groups further covet media reporting that harms or is in any way 
detrimental to their enemies. This is especially true when a group does not claim 
responsibility for a suicide bombing or does not explicitly provide a rationale for it. Al-
Qaeda, for instance, has mastered this approach in recent years. This ensures maximum 
media coverage, the amplification of the feeling of collective insecurity, as well as the 
intensification of fear and the ensuing moral panic. In addition, such “anonymous 
terrorism” may cause significant short- or long-term economic losses. It may also “make 
populations loose faith in their governments’ ability to protect them” and “trigger 
government and popular overreaction to specific incidents and the overall threat of 
terrorism” (Perl, 1997). This was clearly illustrated in the aftermath of the September 11, 
2001 attacks in the United States.  
The key element here is publicity. Terrorist groups are extremely keen on 
publicity and will exploit media infrastructures to maximize it, even if it is not always 
positive publicity. As Brian Jenkins once emphasized, “terrorism is theatre” (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2004). In the late nineteenth century, Anarchist terrorists of 
Narodnaya Volya famously described their violent activities as “propaganda by deed.” 
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For decades now, “terrorists have tailored their attacks to maximize publicity and get 
their messages out through all available channels” (Ibid.). Thus the media play a crucial 
role in the spectacle of terrorism. As Wilkinson (1997) explains:  
In dealing with the relationship between terrorism and the mass media, the 
most useful approach is to attempt to understand the terrorist view of the 
problem of communications. It cannot be denied that although terrorism 
has proved remarkably ineffective as the major weapon for toppling 
governments and capturing political power, it has been a remarkably 
successful means of publicizing a political cause and relaying the terrorist 
threat to a wider audience, particularly in the open and pluralistic countries 
of the West. When one says ‘terrorism’ in a democratic society, one says 
‘media’. For terrorism by its very nature is a psychological weapon which 
depends upon communicating a threat to a wider society. (1997:53) 
 
Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once declared that “publicity is 
the oxygen of terrorism” (Perl, 1997; Wilkinson, 1997), which illustrated that public 
opinion was a foremost terrorist target and how the media provided essential tools to 
influence and alter it. This may have changed since. While it could have been argued a 
decade ago that  
terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead . . . the 
emergence of religious terror groups with apocalyptic outlooks and the 
availability of weapons of mass destruction may indicate that inflicting 
mass casualties has supplanted publicity as the primary goal of some 
terrorist campaigns. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2004) 
 
Suicide bombings appear to be incidents that are particularly tailored to the 
media. The purpose of groups that use this tactic is to get the attention of governments 
and the general public, which is facilitated by the mass media. Attracting media attention 
is a rather easy task for terrorist groups and organizations. They often plan the timing and 
location of their attacks to ensure maximum media coverage. For instance, many analysts 
have argued that the coordinated attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 
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September 2001 were specifically “designed to provide billions of television viewers 
with pictures symbolizing U.S. vulnerability, and they prompted extensive reporting on 
al-Qaeda and its Islamist agenda” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2004). Terrorist groups 
analyze the media closely and learn from their operations and processes. Some – like the 
Tamil Tigers (LTTE), Lebanon’s Hizballah, or the Kurdish KGK (former PKK) – have 
even put in place their very own media structures, radio broadcasts, and sponsored 
Websites. 
 Suicide bombings are glaring examples of premeditated violence targeting 
symbols (political, economic, religious or otherwise) and sending a political or religious 
message. “[G]oals might also include winning popular support, provoking the attacked 
country to act rashly, attracting recruits, polarizing public opinion, demonstrating their 
ability to cause pain, or undermining governments” (Ibid.). This is clearly illustrated by 
Israel’s typical reaction to Palestinian suicide bombings, which usually consists of 
immediate retaliation, especially against the families of the bombers, and heavy military 
intervention, including targeted missile strikes. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the extensive media coverage it has generated 
further illustrate how media attention can actually benefit terrorist groups. “From the 
terrorist perspective, media coverage is an important measure of the success of a terrorist 
act or campaign” (Perl, 1997). Even if the only casualty in a suicide attack is the bomber 
himself or herself, the incident will garner attention and be broadcast worldwide. 
Responsibility will be claimed and announced in the news within seconds, which 
guarantees immediate attention to the claims and overall cause of the group implicated in 
the bombing. Intensive public opinion debates will ensue and policymakers will also get 
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involved worldwide, which may speed up the political process necessary to legitimately 
achieve the goals the group is fighting for. Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and 
several other Palestinian groups have received as much worldwide attention for deadly 
bombings that claimed dozens of deaths and injured scores of bystanders as they have for 
attacks that resulted in the sole death of the bomber and some material destruction. 
Conversely, it has also been argued that media coverage can harm the cause of a 
group that resorts to suicide bombings. Indeed, if an attack does not go according to plan, 
it can easily backfire on the group or organization: 
Attacks can spin out of control or have unintended consequences; too 
much slaughter can alienate potential supporters and sympathizers; 
terrorist activities have different meanings for different audiences; and 
even when terrorists’ attack plans work, they cannot necessarily control 
how their actions are covered or perceived. (Council on Foreign Relations, 
2004) 
 
Either way, many groups have learned to use the media to their advantage 
whenever necessary and thus have turned suicide bombings into a powerful 
communication tool. Transnational organizations like the LTTE and al-Qaeda 
have adapted to new technologies and successfully broadcast messages via 
satellite television or the World Wide Web. It should be noted that the use of the 
Internet, in particular, has made it possible for these organizations to extend their 
global network and deliver their ideology to millions of passive and active 
supporters they would have had great difficulty reaching only a decade ago. They 
have also been able to communicate furtively via Internet portals, virtual chat 
rooms or instant messaging services, and to use pseudo-charitable Websites to 
raise funds for their violent campaigns. Video broadcasts via satellite television 
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(e.g., al-Jazeera, the Arabic cable news network) have included recordings of the 
last testaments of Palestinian suicide bombers and gruesome footage of suicide 
bombing scenes in Israel or Sri Lanka, which are typically censored in the United 
States, as well as statements by leaders of the al-Qaeda terror network, including 
Osama bin Laden. Another example of a valuable instrument in al-Qaeda’s public 
relations arsenal has been their tendency not to claim responsibility for suicide 
bombings and other types of attacks, which has helped to disseminate and 
maintain general feelings of insecurity while compelling more media coverage.  
The governmental perspective. What governments fighting suicide terrorism 
essentially look for is “understanding, cooperation, restraint, and loyalty from the media 
in efforts to limit terrorist harm to society” (Perl, 1997). Governments overtly want to 
capture and punish people responsible for suicide bombings or other types of terrorist 
acts. As a result, they seek coverage that will promote governmental priorities, not 
terrorist agendas. 
Governments can use the media in an effort to arouse world opinion 
against the country or group using terrorist tactics. Public diplomacy and 
the media can also be used to mobilize public opinion in other countries to 
pressure governments to take, or reject, action against terrorism. (Ibid.) 
 
Therefore, governments tend to view mainstream news media outlets as an 
instrument of public policy, a mere extension of their official agendas. The media should 
thus serve as mouthpieces for governments and never as platforms (voluntary or 
otherwise) for terrorist groups – unless of course if doing so were to hasten the 
impending doom of the terrorist group. The purpose of such an interpretation of the role 
of the media is to clearly segregate media structures and terrorist groups and ensure 
 161
neither one uses the other to their advantage. Governments also use suicide terrorism 
coverage (or lack thereof) to guard against “disinformation from terrorist allies, 
sympathizers, or others who gain from its broadcast and publication” (Ibid.). This 
constitutes a basic damage control technique, in a sense, and illustrates the determination 
of governments not to provide any mainstream media platforms for terrorist claims 
making – whether the claims are true or not.   
From a governmental (and fundamentally Occidental) viewpoint, the media are 
also supposed to portray suicide bombers and related terrorist groups as criminals. Media 
coverage should therefore never promote sympathetic or empathetic reactions in the 
public. Suicide bombers should not be glamorized, bombings need not be sensationalized. 
Yet, as explained above, sensationalizing a newsworthy story is a major component of 
contemporary news making. The objectives of governments and the imperatives of the 
media sometimes clash as a result of these opposing realities. Governments often 
disapprove of media representations that may distract attention away from the criminal 
actions and focus instead on the cause being fought with the help of – amongst other 
methods – suicide bombings. As a result, governments may seek to control, directly or 
indirectly, the production and dissemination of news by certain media outlets. This is 
illustrated by the close ties between the Bush administration and right-wing network 
FoxNews, which is part of Bush supporter Rupert Murdoch’s planetary media 
conglomerate, and the open reprisal campaign against journalists whose style of reporting 
was not fully in line with White House policies. Of course, this is in total contradiction 
with basic but non-negligible (and therefore constitutionally protected) rights such as 
freedom of expression and freedom of the press. 
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Overall, governments may benefit from regulating how much information 
terrorists can gain access to. Ongoing and future anti-terrorism measures, for instance, are 
typically not divulged to the media in order to ensure they remain known only to people 
directly involved in their development and implementation. Likewise, vulnerability 
assessments are not – or should not – be made public, or else the media could 
inadvertently inspire or even facilitate future bombings. That would undoubtedly 
represent a perverse effect of the media’s “right to know” approach to public news 
reporting. In recent months for instance, public officials harshly attacked continuous 
coverage of all the “weak points” and other “high-risk potential targets” still left 
unprotected in the United States and abroad that could be “easy objectives” for suicide 
bombers. That denoted again how governmental strategic or tactical priorities can easily 
conflict with the propensity of the media to saturate their coverage with whatever is 
sensational enough to be deemed newsworthy and likely to generate more ratings (and 
therefore more money).  
In hostage-taking crises, the news media are often the only instrument available 
for terrorists to both follow outside events as they unfold and get information on how 
much exposure their actions are receiving. News coverage can therefore make rescue 
operations (or military intervention) difficult if too much information is provided to the 
hostage takers. Consequently, governments may decide to prohibit the media from 
accessing the immediate area or covering the story live altogether. On the other hand, if 
journalists gain access to the scene, governments typically demand live information be 
communicated to them first. This is generally justified by a willingness to efficiently 
diffuse the situation as peacefully as possible. In recent years, as explained in the 
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previous chapter, critical hostage-taking incidents involving Chechen suicide bombers in 
Russia have illustrated how such events can take an exceptionally deadly turn if they are 
not handled properly by the media and government authorities alike.  
With a related security goal in mind, governmental officials usually do not 
disclose any sensitive or classified information about preventive or operational measures 
related to suicide bombings. Fruitful counterterrorism operations are seldom publicized 
and details almost never provided to the media or the general public. We may know that 
“dozens of attacks have been thwarted” but we will not know how, when, and where or 
who was involved. Not only does this give the public a false sense of reassurance that 
whatever policies are in place are indeed working, it also supposedly prevents would-be 
suicide bombers to imitate the disrupted attack in the future. One may want to argue, 
however, that terrorist groups that recruit and train suicide bombers are resourceful and 
creative enough to figure out how to conduct destructive attacks and wage an efficient 
psychological warfare. The use of fully-fueled jetliners in high-profile suicide attacks, for 
example, was not heavily publicized after attempts in Israel and France, and yet, al-Qaeda 
successfully coordinated devastating attacks in the United States years later. 
The media may also be exploited by politicians and government agencies needing 
to improve their public image or looking for a complete public relations makeover. Thus 
certain politically favorable news outlets or journalists may be favored over others for 
“exclusive interviews” or “breaking news” coverage. This recurring practice effectively 
turns the network into a political platform – but in an ironically acceptable fashion since 
it serves the interests of the governments involved. 
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Governments also benefit heavily from the process of demonization that media 
portrayals of suicide bombers and supporters of suicide terrorism feed into. This is 
encouraged by media saturation: the more the news features stories about suicide 
bombers, casting them as folk devils and “freedom haters,” the more persuasively the 
media will convey their message of fear, global threat, and collective insecurity to the 
general public. Once public concern and media attention are galvanized, the 
demonization of suicide bombers and related terrorist groups is emphasized by the use of 
threatening metaphors and simplistic statements, the construal of suicide terrorism as a 
scourge or an epidemic, the construction and propagation of fear, the warrior mentality 
and “War on Terror” rhetoric of the social control agents, and the politicization of the 
issue. These concepts are henceforth discussed in more details within the moral panic 
framework. 
The Politicization of Suicide Terrorism and Moral Panics  
Suicide terrorism and moral panics. “The American public has been inundated 
with highly mediated images of terrorists and terrorism since September 11, 2001” 
(Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004:327). The complex phenomenon of suicide terrorism and its 
social construction can be analyzed from the moral panics perspective, as explained in 
Chapter Two, and broken down into five overlapping phases that apply to crime and 
criminality in other studies (see Buffington, 2003; Cohen, 2002): 
1) A period of social upheaval produced by and contributing to a major 
shift in the nation’s political economy. 
2) The generalized perception of endemic crises, represented in public 
opinion as a crime wave, and taking the form of a series of moral 
panics about the state of the nation.  
3) A concerted response (especially but not exclusively on the part of 
state policymakers), represented in public opinion as a war on crime 
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and taking the form of “new” discourses, practices, institutions, and 
technologies of social control. 
4) The consolidation of a new criminal justice paradigm, often in the 
form of new laws and institutions, along with its inevitable 
contestation and negotiation by vested elite interest groups and the 
often targeted popular classes.  
5) The accumulation of “anomalies” – inconsistencies, contradictions, 
failures – in the dominant criminal justice paradigm that render it 
unstable and thus vulnerable to the next sustained period of social 
upheaval (which restarts the cycle). (Buffington, 2003) 
 
The social, political, and legal climate of the United States since September 11, 
2001, in addition to its avowed fight against terrorism, is a perfect illustration of this five-
phase cycle. Without over-simplifying the events leading up to the September 2001 
attacks on U.S. soil or their significant short- and long-term outcomes, one can find 
explanations for each phase in any and all manifestations of today’s U.S.-led War on 
Terror. The September 11 events characterize Phase One, following several suicide terror 
attacks against U.S. interests abroad over previous years (e.g., 1998 West Africa attacks 
against U.S. Embassies, 2000 USS Cole bombing in Yemen).  
Phase One (notwithstanding the attacks that occurred abroad) was a spectacular, 
brief stage, not a continued period of social turmoil per se (such as the Lebanese Civil 
War, for instance, which began in 1975 and laid the foundation for Hizballah’s 
unprecedented 1980s suicide bombing campaign). Phase Two, the crime wave and 
subsequent moral panics, was encouraged by official speeches and fueled by the 
mainstream media. The crisis was emphasized by expressions like “the scourge of suicide 
terrorism” or “the terrorist cancer,” as well as scores of articles presenting suicide 
terrorism as an “epidemic” that had to be contained by any means necessary.  
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Phase Three, the concerted response, was the product of President Bush’s 
infamous comeback about “hunting down evil cowards” and “smoking out evildoers.” 
Declaring the dawn of a “War on Terror” in the post-9/11 world, much like President 
Nixon had declared a “War on Drugs” three decades earlier, President Bush introduced a 
new discourse of fear and warmongering in foreign policy and international relations. 
Innovative technologies also emerged in the wake of the September 2001 attacks. 
Security measures and techniques were altered in mass-transit hubs throughout the 
United States, mainly at airports. Procedures and infrastructures were heavily modified to 
ensure the public believed maximum security had been achieved and that public spaces 
were safe again. For instance, airline pilots are now allowed to carry guns for their 
personal safety and more armed sky marshals are supposedly randomly assigned to 
domestic and international flights than before the fall of 2001.  
Phase Four, the consolidation of a new criminal justice paradigm, quickly 
followed. In an obvious knee-jerk reaction, a new federal legislation was passed 
immediately after September 11: the USA PATRIOT Act, also known as the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. The official purpose of this controversial Act is to “deter 
and punish American terrorists in the United States and around the world, to enhance law 
enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes” (United States Senate, 2001). 
The noticeably problematic and contentious phrase “for other purposes” encompasses the 
detection by any means (including illegal or unconstitutional ones) and the prosecution of 
alleged future crimes that are not terrorist in nature. The extension and renewal of the Act 
has been fought vehemently in Congress. Another major institutional change that was a 
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direct result of the September 2001 suicide terror attacks was the creation of the United 
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a Cabinet department of the U.S. 
federal government. The DHS mission is to safeguard the people of America from harm 
and to protect American property from damage or destruction. The reforms it has 
introduced have been forcefully contested. Nonetheless, government officials have 
consistently reported successful counterterrorism operations (without further details).  
Suicide bombers as folk devils. It is much easier to condemn suicide terrorism 
than to try to understand it. Likewise, it is easier to attribute devastating suicide bombings 
to “folk devils” and ascribe a moral meaning to the acts. This helps to amplify the threat, 
exploit the panic it creates in the public, and market the fear it produces. It also helps 
propagate war fever, encourages retaliatory feelings and discourses, and promotes 
military solutions as relevant, proportionate, and necessary ones. Finally, it opens the 
door for dangerous measures, such as shifty legislative reforms (e.g., the USA PATRIOT 
Act) and dubious policies (e.g., racial and ethnic profiling).  
A common notion in the U.S. administration and media spin on the war 
against terrorism is that suicide attackers are evil, deluded or homicidal 
misfits who thrive in poverty, ignorance and anarchy. This portrayal lends 
a sense of hopelessness to any attempt to address root causes because 
some individuals will always be desperate or deranged enough to conduct 
suicide attacks. But as logical as the poverty-breeds-terrorism argument 
may seem, study after study shows that suicide attackers and their 
supporters are rarely ignorant or impoverished. Nor are they crazed, 
cowardly, apathetic or asocial. The common misconception 
underestimates the central role that organizational factors play in the 
appeal of terrorist networks. A better understanding of such causes reveals 
that the challenge is actually manageable: the key is not to profile and 
target the most despairing or deranged individual but to understand and 
undermine the organizational and institutional appeal of terrorists’ 
motivations and networks. (Atran, 2004, August:5) 
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The politicization of religion and religiosity that has characterized agenda setting 
and policymaking since September 2001 is a precarious choice and a misleading 
approach at best. “When religion is involved, it sidesteps the issue, since religion 
provides an absolute rationale” (Ebert, 2005). The Bush administration should not 
emphasize that it is the responsibility of the United States “to rid the world of Evil,” as 
President Bush has repeatedly declared. Labeling suicide terrorists as “evildoers” or “evil 
cowards” contributes nothing positive or productive to the fight against suicide terrorism 
or global terrorism. It shows a profound misunderstanding of the “enemy” and its goals, 
which goes against any basic military strategies. Publicly pitting the moral world of 
Good, as defined by the United States, versus the amoral world of Evil of the terrorists 
only promotes a reductionist and simplistic rhetorical style that actually feeds into the 
similarly dichotomous Islamic worldview setting the House of God against the House of 
War that fundamentalists exploit with their radical interpretation of Islam. Additionally, 
in view of the principle of separation of Church and State, it seems rather misguided for 
President Bush to rely on scriptures in official terrorism-related speeches. Christian 
metaphors (such as the crusade imagery that followed the September 2001 suicide 
attacks) can only exacerbate tensions and further dichotomize the forces at play. Instead 
of imposing an American style of democracy onto others as the one and only sustainable 
mode of civilization across the globe, the United States must work towards better 
understanding the socio-cultural context, the political processes and claims, and the 
religious values of the countries where suicide bombers and their supporters flourish.  
Regarding the introduction of the phrase “homicide bomber” by the White House 
in 2002 and its subsequent adoption by News Corp media outlets, it appears that they 
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were anything but innocuous. What should not be overlooked here is that Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Corp is one of the largest media corporations on the planet and a major 
right-wing actor in today’s global communications world. Its socio-political and 
economic influence extends across the world via a multitude of powerful holdings. The 
latter include the Fox Broadcasting Company, a US-based nationwide broadcast 
television company, and Fox Television station groups, in addition to major North 
American, South American, European, Asian, and Australian satellite television 
providers and cable television services, dozens of key newspapers and magazines 
worldwide, Internet portals, major movie studios and film production companies, book 
publishing companies, and more. The adoption and, in effect, promotion of the phrase 
“homicide bombing” can be criticized as directly supporting attempts by the Bush 
Administration to not merely clarify its “Terror Doctrine” but shape public perceptions of 
suicide terrorism and influence national policy through the deliberate and cunning use of 
doublespeak and dysphemisms. By introducing this new phrase, the Bush administration 
also tried to produce a new reality in order to influence how people would view 
bombings and suicide terrorism in general. This seemingly innocent rhetorical device was 
in fact a premeditated effort to ensure the news media would detect the new catchphrase, 
disseminate it, and abuse it until it became engrained in public consciousness that the key 
feature of these bombings was the fact they were perpetrated by terrorists and killed 
innocent victims. By obliterating an essential feature of suicide bombings – the ensured 
death of the bomber – and explicitly targeting Palestinian terrorist groups (and especially 
Arafat), all that the Bush administration, FoxNews, and the like accomplished was 
refusing even more categorically to legitimize the cause or consider the bombers 
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sensibly. This is not to say that it would have been preferable or more productive to 
declare the actions of the bombers to be justifiable or legitimate. The peace process could 
have been improved, however, if the fundamentally valid political claims of the groups 
and their fighters (namely, the independence of their state) had been considered 
dispassionately by all involved – while remembering that the end certainly was not 
justifying the means. 
Collective insecurity and the politics of fear. The mass media play a significant 
role in providing, maintaining, and regulating the available frameworks and definitions of 
suicide terrorism. As a result, they help structure both public awareness of and attitudes 
towards suicide bombing campaigns. The mass media, however, are not the only actors 
involved in influencing the public’s perception of suicide terrorism as a critical collective 
threat. Political actors are also key participants in the social construction of suicide 
terrorism, the construction and advertising of collective insecurity within a wider threat 
structure, as well as the marketing of fear. Political actors and strategies help guarantee 
that “repressive fear” remains “an enduring tool of economic and political domination in 
the United States (Béland, 2005:2) and to ensure that the fear and collective insecurity 
that are associated with suicide terrorism (or terrorism in general) supply an impetus for 
electoral support. This was illustrated by President Bush’s heavy “War on Terror” 
rhetoric during his 2004 reelection campaign.  
The context of collective insecurity and the politics of fear is suited for the 
analysis of the social construction of suicide terrorism (and vice versa):    
Collective insecurity is a social and political construction. Far from 
meaning that people live in a world of pure illusions, the idea of social and 
political construction of reality refers to the manner in which actors 
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collectively make sense of the world in which they live. . . .[C]ollective 
insecurity first emerges through the transformation of personal and 
environmental matters into social and political issues. . . . [It] is ‘the 
product of processes by which groups and individuals learn to acquire or 
create interpretations of risk. . . . After perceived sources of insecurity are 
defined as collective problems affecting a significant segment of the 
population, they can enter the policy agenda. (2005:4) 
 
Suicide terrorism represents a highly episodic threat (as opposed to a structural 
one, such as unemployment or lack of healthcare coverage). Within the threat 
infrastructure, suicide terrorism is therefore more conducive of moral panics and it allows 
politicians to easily inflate the threat it poses or exploit the feelings of collective 
insecurity it generates. What political actors want is to shape the threat of suicide 
terrorism and spread fear among the public, so they can later gain electoral support and 
influence policy outcomes.    
In liberal democracies, politicians pursue at least four main goals within 
the political field (i.e. the structured arena of political competition). First, 
they seek election and reelection. Second, once elected, they attempt to 
increase their institutional power within their party or government. Third, 
they seek to build a political legacy that could make them look good to 
their contemporaries and to future generations. Fourth, in some contexts, 
politicians promote an ideological agenda or a certain vision of ‘public 
interest’ in a manner that may prove unpopular and, consequently, 
detrimental to the attainment of the three others goals.” (2005:10) 
 
Two important stratagems come into play here: credit claiming and blame 
avoidance. They are used by politicians either to claim responsibility for “good news” 
related to the fight against terrorism or to protect elected officials from getting blamed for 
“bad news,” such as further suicide bombing attacks, which could “exacerbate economic, 
social, and environmental insecurity” (2005:11). Unfavorable news are politically 
hazardous since “elected officials are regularly blamed for ‘bad news’ even when it is not 
directly related to their decisions” (Ibid.). After the September 11, 2001 events, for 
 172
instance, the Bush administration was heavily criticized for its reluctance or inability to 
prevent the attacks. A national bipartisan commission, commonly known as the “9/11 
Commission,” was even specially appointed to investigate the “terrorist attacks upon the 
United States” and the failures of the administration (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks, 2004). Therefore, blame avoidance strategies are useful when suicide bombings 
or other terrorist incidents occur as they enable politicians to “blame their predecessors 
for the gaps in the security apparatus that could have facilitated terrorist actions” (Béland, 
2005:12-13). This is exactly what President Bush did by blaming the Clinton 
administration for laying a solid foundation for the massive intelligence failure that 
precipitated the September 2001 attacks.  
In addition, the threat of suicide terrorism is bound to be the center of political 
attention since it saturates contemporary media coverage. Government officials and the 
public are seemingly passionate about finding an immediate solution to the crisis and 
imposing severe punishment on the cowardly and evil culprits, regardless of the inherent 
complexities of suicide terrorism. “Violent, spectacular, and highly episodic threats like 
terrorism are quicker to stimulate sweeping legislative actions” (2005:15) and a prefect 
illustration of this knee-jerk reaction is the enactment (and recent relative extension) of 
the infamous USA PATRIOT Act, a 342-page document that became law on October 24, 
2001 (United States Senate, 2001).  
Finally, the social construction of suicide terrorism, the amplification of the 
threat, and the increase in insecurity and fear related to it clearly influence how political 
agendas are established and outlined. The public interpretation of the suicide terrorist 
threat is what politicians rely on “to depict themselves as the best providers of collective 
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protection in order to increase their popular support and shape a positive and lasting 
legacy” (2005:15-16). This is arguably what happened after the September 2001 attacks 
when President Bush chose to depict the whole world as a dangerous place and military 
force as the only logical – not only justified but also mandatory – option against 
international terrorism. As a decisive stage in the social construction of suicide terrorism, 
agenda setting and execution “constitutes a key phase of the policymaking process” 
(Béland, 2005:15). Hence it is essential to further probe the significant practical 
implications of the results this research project has yielded.  
Practical Implications of the Results 
Specifying and exploring the findings of this qualitative study is a difficult task 
that requires a prudent appraisal of their relevance and application to everyday 
policymaking or practice and a certain reserve concerning their relative significance. This 
innovative study neither provides definitive answers nor aspires to be the ultimate 
analysis of suicide terrorism. One of the major strengths of this study is its potential for 
significantly contributing to our empirical understanding of suicide terrorism. This 
empirical and interpretive research was designed to substantively advance our knowledge 
about the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and its socially constructed nature. As such, 
although it is not purely empirical, it could yield empirically significant results by 
providing researchers and policymakers with much insight into the phenomenon of 
suicide terrorism and its prevention. There is no panacea for suicide terrorism and the 
purpose of this research project was certainly not to find or even suggest a universal 
remedy for suicide bombings. Nevertheless, much practical wisdom can be derived from 
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this theoretical contribution as a whole and, more specifically, from the results that arose 
from a cunning combination of complementary research instruments. 
Countering Suicide Terrorism 
Contrary to common belief and what policymakers and the media have insinuated 
in the past few years, suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It originated in ancient 
times and has simply evolved over time, developing as other forms of terrorism have. 
Thus, rather than a new weapon in the arsenal of terrorists groups, suicide terrorism is a 
long-standing, highly adaptive and extremely violent tool of propaganda by deed that is 
constantly reshaped by technological advances and contemporary social events. Its 
causes, manifestations, and ramifications vary across time, countries, cultures, and 
groups. The use of fully-fueled commercial jetliners in the September 2001 attacks, for 
example, proves how adaptable and destructive suicide terrorism can be and how the 
phenomenon is all but dwindling away. This is also confirmed by the increasing number 
of suicide bombing operations, most notably in the Middle East and Western Europe, in 
response to the U.S.-led “War on Terror” and the illegal occupation of Iraq.  
The urgency of developing efficient preventive measures to uncompromisingly 
combat suicide terrorism was evidenced by the unprecedented attacks orchestrated by al-
Qaeda in the United States in September 2001. By proving its ability to permeate U.S. 
defensive measures and reach almost all of its intended symbolic targets, al-Qaeda 
showed the United States and other Western countries just how vulnerable they truly 
were to suicide terrorism.   
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Suicide Terrorism Prevention: Why Preventive Measures Have Not Worked 
 The findings of this study (and history, incidentally) illustrate the fact that certain 
counter-terrorism measures, though favored by some countries, do not work to fight and 
prevent suicide terrorism. First of all, conventional top-heavy coercive methods (e.g., 
strategic bombardment, invasion, occupation) cannot efficiently reduce popular support 
for suicide bombers, help capture the latter, or help eliminate such a complex and 
adaptable phenomenon as suicide terrorism. Coercive and repressive measures in both 
Israel and Russia, for instance, have failed to stop Palestinian and Chechen suicide 
bombings. It appears that army intervention usually feeds into the problem instead of 
helping solve it. Indeed, it usually results in an upsurge in popular support for terrorist 
groups favoring suicide bombings. As a result, the impact of such groups on the larger 
society (notably its ruling elites) becomes greater. Preemptive strikes against wrongly 
perceived supporters of suicide terrorism typically increase the incidence of and support 
for suicide terror attacks. As for heavy retaliation campaigns following suicide bombings, 
they generally reinforce and intensify people’s sense of victimization and readiness to 
behave according to organizational doctrines and policies structured to take advantage of 
such feelings. Finally, it should be noted that the outcome of the study also demonstrates 
why fundamentally ill-advised ethnic or racial profiling techniques and practices can only 
exacerbate ethno-cultural tensions and eventually encourage support for suicide terrorist 
campaigns. They also take attention and resources away from homegrown terrorists who 
may be appealed by the overall ideology opposed to President Bush’s outlook on the 
“War on Terror” and may be enticed by the strategic and tactical advantages presented by 
suicide bombings.   
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Social control policies are futile unless they address the actual threat objectively 
and take into account all its complexities. Three possible lines of defense are possible 
against suicide terrorism. The last line of defense consists of drastically reducing 
receptivity of potential recruits to recruiting organizations. The middle line of defense 
requires infiltrating and breaking up recruiting institutions and isolating group leaders. 
The first line of defense involves preventing suicide bombers from reaching their 
intended targets. Each line shows potential for effective prevention, but certain 
impediments may render them useless. 
The last line of defense (preventing suicide bombers from reaching their intended 
targets) is the most expensive and least likely to succeed. Setting up checkpoints and 
conducting more random bag or body searches are not very effective security measures 
against people determined to die. Vulnerable and accessible targets will always be found 
by determined suicide bombers. Furthermore, deploying uniformed soldiers or police 
officers, creating covert observation stations or using complex surveillance systems in 
order to intercept potential bombers requires a great deal of human, technological, and 
financial resources that may not always be available. 
The middle line of defense (infiltrating and breaking up recruiting institutions and 
isolating group leaders) may be a valuable short-term option. However, it can easily 
backfire considering it is likely to lead to the growth of more opposition groups or 
factions dedicated to the same greater cause. Still, this approach and the previous one are 
the most popular in today’s War on Terror.  
The first – and most propitious – line of defense (significantly decreasing the 
responsiveness of prospective recruits) requires overcoming various obstacles for positive 
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outcomes to be reached. The first hurdle is reducing poverty, which may be ineffective 
and could be counterproductive if a decline in poverty for the entire population results in 
a reallocation of resources that takes away some people’s wealth. Boosting literacy rates 
is another issue to tackle: it may prove ineffective and could hinder the attainment of 
desired goals if improving literacy enables more people to get a hold of terrorist 
propaganda. Finally, putting an end to occupation or alleviating perceived degradation is 
a promising approach that may be ineffective if people believe the victory to have been 
brought about by terror (see Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon following a string of 
suicide bombings). 
Some Promising Counterterrorism Practices 
Suicide terrorism is first and foremost an institution-level phenomenon. 
Countering and preventing suicide terrorism may therefore involve finding a balance 
between a reasonable amount of coercion and adequate incentives, so as to induce change 
and lead communities to stop supporting institutions that recruit suicide attackers. There 
are of course several pitfalls to watch for. First of all, destroying the social fabric or the 
political structure until people stop backing suicide terrorism operations (or their 
sponsors) is not only difficult to achieve but also morally unacceptable. For instance, the 
Kamikaze pilots met their demise at the end of World War II, but only after the 1945 
nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Moreover, retaliation is morally 
objectionable, especially if the retaliating party is looking for allies in its fight against 
terrorism. For example, Israel’s systematic military strikes following suicide bombings 
have not garnered many supporters and Israel is often pointed at as the terrorist actor in 
the Israelo-Palestinian conflict. Finally, coercive tactics or military strategies alone can 
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intensify the problem of suicide terrorism instead of providing any immediate or long-
term solution. The example of the U.S.-led war in Iraq and the ensuing relentless suicide 
bombing campaign organized by the Iraqi insurgency is emblematic of the harmful 
consequences such interventions may have. 
Another important point to consider is that terrorist groups obtain information, 
recruit new members, and essentially survive owing to their ethnic, political, and 
religious connections. Terrorist groups consequently cannot prosper unless they get 
support from the community. Hence the foundation of community support for groups and 
organizations sponsoring suicide bombing operations must be the major long-term 
priority of those who want to counter suicide terrorism. It is also crucial to understand 
and take into consideration that popular backing of suicide terrorism will not cease to 
exist on its own and people will not spontaneously stop being influenced by promises of 
spiritual or financial rewards. 
What the United States and its allies in the “War on Terror” should focus on, as 
should any other countries involved in the actual fight against suicide terrorism 
worldwide, is the dynamics of the phenomenon and the complex socio-cultural context it 
is rooted in. Scrutinizing political and economic conditions is critical but not enough. 
Identifying sacred values in different cultures and the dynamic mechanisms through 
which they win people over is what will allow for a comprehensive understanding of how 
to keep such values from degenerating and leading to conflict between people. Sacred 
values strengthen cultural identity and faith in society. Where suicide terrorism is 
motivated by religion, for instance, these feelings are affected and reshaped by terrorist 
group leaders, recruiters, and trainers, typically to the advantage of the group and not the 
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individual. Suicide terrorism prevention will thus require collaborative efforts by 
international policymakers in order to fully comprehend the socio-historical, political, 
and cultural circumstances and recruitment methods that motivate people to sacrifice 
their own lives in support of a greater cause.  
Informing the general public is also important, insofar as people will become 
desensitized and more confident if they are aware of the nature of the threat and can 
readily access reliable information. Working with the media in a concerted effort to 
decrease popular support of suicide terrorism is therefore primordial. Above all, the 
media should avoid: providing sensational coverage of suicide bombing operations; 
presenting suicide bombings as an effective tactic and a winning strategy for achieving 
political goals; glorifying suicide bombers; presenting simplistic, one-dimensional 
explanations for suicide bombings; and illustrating or reporting “how to” descriptions of 
suicide bombing techniques. 
The top priorities to successfully combat and prevent suicide terrorism should be: 
1. Working with the international community to address the real or perceived 
historical and personal grievances of populations that have been unable to fulfill 
basic objectives, such as personal safety, cultural recognition, social stability, and 
collective peace; 
2. Encouraging Muslim communities to stop supporting religious schools and 
charities that play a part in terrorist networks; 
3. Financing civic education and interfaith programs; 
4. Creating sustained dialogue lines with Muslim religious leaders and community 
notables in order to ensure that Islamic customs and religious law better 
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correspond to international legal principles of crime, punishment, and human 
rights; 
5. Encouraging moderates in the community to consider other fruitful options for a 
new social order.  
6. Allowing moderate members of the terrorist groups to challenge the 
contradictions or shortcomings of their own worldviews (e.g., viewing others as 
evil), values (e.g., lack of respect for life), and behavior (e.g., support for killing), 
and to confront other group members in order to bring about long-term changes; 
7. Supporting democratic self-determination, which will reduce suicide terrorism 
more efficiently than further military intervention or counterinsurgency aid; 
8. Promoting economic choice without forcing people to radically alter their 
business traditions (people should not have to renounce newly acquired economic 
freedom for a system of privatization, “free market” or globalization);  
9. Actively opposing violations of civil liberties and human rights by refusing the 
political or military support of the countries that officially back the U.S. “war on 
terrorism” but steadily violate the fundamental human rights of their people and 
reject any free political expression. In such countries as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia, the practices of extremely 
repressive regimes can only spawn more popular resentment and terrorism – and 
therefore should not be supported. 
Using Intelligence: Why Might Is Not Always Right 
 Suicide terrorism should be fought with intelligence, not use of force. Under the 
Bush administration, Cold War intelligence policies regarding national security 
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information have been thoroughly modified in response to ongoing terrorist threats 
against the United States. The suicide terrorist attacks of September 2001 shed light on 
the deficiencies of the counterterrorism apparatus of the United States and the failures of 
its own intelligence gathering and analysis mechanisms. The homeland security plan 
subsequently devised by the Bush administration entails innovative intelligence efforts 
aimed at quashing threats within the United States, protecting U.S. borders, reducing 
infrastructure vulnerabilities, and improving emergency responses. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) is now responsible for organizing such strategies and ensuring 
that detailed and comprehensive information reaches the people who need it. 
Until recently, intelligence gathering and analysis was perceived as hermetically 
separate from the policymaking community and the rest of the government. It has now 
become painfully obvious that such separation hinders counterterrorism efforts. The 
intelligence community must therefore strive to provide useful, timely, and accurate 
intelligence that meets the needs of civilian and military policymakers, as well as 
strategic and tactical decision-makers. The processes involved are part of what is 
commonly referred to as the Intelligence Cycle, which consists of six phases: collection, 
evaluation, collation, analysis, production, and dissemination of information. Both the 
White House and the intelligence community face a slew of coordination issues in their 
efforts to avoid errors, missed opportunities, as well as contradictory policies or 
superfluous measures.  
All actors concerned with the fight against suicide terrorism should keep in mind 
that intelligence is not purely domestic and unilateral. It must be construed within an 
international and multilateral framework. As the U.S. counterterrorism intelligence 
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structure is being wholly reshaped, it is important to remember that a lot can be learned 
from the successes and failures experienced by America’s allies in their fight against 
terrorism. Valuable counterterrorism lessons can be learned from the experience of the 
domestic intelligence agencies of such countries as the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, 
or even Israel. Optimizing information-gathering techniques is consequently of utmost 
importance if governments want to develop effective and efficient preventive security 
measures to counter suicide terrorism worldwide.  
To avoid intelligence and communication breakdowns between all the actors 
involved in the intelligence community, it is indispensable to ensure the highest levels of 
coordination between all the agencies involved in the intelligence cycle around the world. 
The U.S. federal government is striving to improve how threat information is analyzed 
and disseminated, although much more progress is needed. A potentially useful initiative 
that could enhance government performance is the Terrorist Threat Integration Center 
(TTIC), which was introduced by President Bush in early 2003 (see Appendix C). 
Improving terrorism warnings and sharing actionable intelligence may also prove 
beneficial. For example, the DHS color-coded national threat level system, known as the 
Homeland Security System (see Appendix D) has been sharpened over the past couple of 
years in order to guarantee more reliable information specific to certain geographic areas 
and based on both actual and potential threats. 
It is crucial to develop not only more threat assessments but also more 
vulnerability assessments. Improving threat and vulnerability assessments makes it 
possible to develop national risk assessments for critical target sets (e.g., social or 
economic infrastructures, U.S. landmarks). Moreover, this could help State and local 
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governments in high-risk areas to conduct location- or community-specific risk 
assessments (including real-time risk assessments in response to actionable intelligence). 
At the same time, such assessments and the funding they generate must of course not 
exclude low-risk target areas. Hence the way the DHS decides on or heightens alert levels 
must be reliable and invariable. Flexibility in handling alerts is good; inconsistency is 
not. 
Adjusting Priorities and Re-Setting Agendas  
Suicide terrorism is arguably the most serious threat in today’s war on terrorism. 
In order to counter and pre-empt suicide terrorism, the international intelligence 
community and governments around the world must concentrate their counterterrorism 
efforts on interrupting suicide terror attacks in their preparatory phase. Interrupting 
suicide terrorism at the planning and preparation stage is essential.  
It is impossible to assert or even envisage that terrorism, especially suicide 
terrorism, will ever be eradicated. People have fought over religious, political, and other 
ideological causes for centuries and it would be naïve to trust that they will some day 
spontaneously stop doing so. Nonetheless, focused and concerted counterterrorism efforts 
are critically needed to concretely curtail the increasing success and popularity of suicide 
bombing operations and, ultimately, prevent or even interdict suicide terrorism. Ever 
since the early 1980s, policymakers have clearly struggled with the problems posed by 
the resurgence and gradual metamorphosis of terrorist suicide attacks. The challenge is 
getting even more complex today as terrorist groups use creative ways of reaching out to 
new recruits, garnering community support, and taking advantage of technology to attain 
their goals, while guaranteeing maximum destruction and casualties. The demise of 
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suicide terrorism may in fact depend on the willingness of Western governments to 
promote substantial reforms of their own political and socioeconomic structures.  
In order to prevent suicide terrorism, it is crucial to fully comprehend what 
combination of psychological and social-cultural factors exhorts people to join a terrorist 
group and unites them behind common ideologies and grievances. It is furthermore 
important to bear in mind that radicalization and the sustainability and growing 
popularity of suicide terrorism are directly affected by the foreign policies of the Western 
nations leading the “global war on terrorism,” as well as their overall social, political, 
economic, and cultural agendas.  
Since it is a prime and avowed enemy of terrorist groups today, especially those 
resorting to suicide terrorism, the United States has a momentous responsibility to ensure 
that multilateral and international counterterrorism efforts are well-directed, productive, 
and uniform across the globe (i.e., not focused solely upon countries where special 
interests are to be preserved or advanced). The etiology and dynamics of suicide 
terrorism as a complex, extremely violent, and highly adaptive form of terrorism must be 
thoroughly studied and clearly understood. Target hardening, intelligence gathering and 
analysis, as well as reducing community support for suicide bombings should be top 
priorities. The U.S. and others in the intelligence community must further take into 
account the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other 
unconventional tactics in conjunction with the perpetration of suicide terror attacks. 
Acting unilaterally and relying heavily on military intervention are not acceptable 
or productive solutions against suicide terrorism. Governments and the intelligence 
community must instead consider alternatives that will prove more sensible and useful in 
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the short and long term. They must take into account that supporters of suicide terrorism 
may be highly receptive to what soft-power options entail, which most Muslims are 
actually favorable to, such as democratically electing a government, enjoying civil 
liberties and human rights, exercising freedom of expression, celebrating a cultural 
heritage, taking advantage of educational opportunities, and having unlimited economic 
choices.  
In order to build these substantial conclusions into findings that genuinely have a 
practical significance, much future research is needed. Suicide terrorism has become one 
of the most massively debated issues in the media and political agendas today, both in the 
United States and abroad. Only through rigorous scholarly research will we be able to 
improve our insight into suicide bombings and to resourcefully impinge upon the 
misrepresentation of and overreaction to suicide terrorism as a pressing socio-political 
problem.   
Study Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
The main objective of this research project was to provide a theoretical 
framework to help answer key questions on the complex subject of suicide terrorism. 
How is it used as a political weapon? How is it exploited as a communication tool? How 
is it a politicized issue that fuels moral panics? This study, inasmuch as it is essentially 
exploratory, does not offer final answers to these important questions. It does, however, 
offer a set of theoretical remarks based on a social constructionist approach and a 
symbolic interactionist perspective that may well guide future scholarship about this most 
important issue. This study additionally derives its strength from its potential to inform 
practice and effect major policy changes thanks to a sound theoretical input. Nonetheless, 
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in order to stimulate further research about the social construction of suicide terrorism 
and the symbolism of social reality, it is important to highlight the main limitations of 
this contribution. Following this overview of study limitations, suggestions for future 
research will be offered.  
Limitations 
As stated earlier in this study, the credibility of a qualitative study depends upon 
the common understanding and interpretation of concepts by the researcher and the study 
participants. Qualitative studies, by definition, call for a more personal analysis of the 
data collected. One may then reasonably argue that the integrity of the data collected for 
this study could have been compromised by researcher bias. In addition, the study 
distinctively focuses on the subjective definitional and rhetorical processes involved in 
the social construction of suicide terrorism. This increases the likelihood of bias in the 
analysis phase. For example, with media sources alone, analytical procedures had to be 
constantly adapted to check for accuracy (factual and technical errors), bias and distortion 
(media accounts are rarely neutral), and audience context (potential misinterpretation by 
an outsider). Ensuring the credibility of the analysis and the findings was therefore 
fraught with obstacles. However, each of them was conscientiously and methodically 
surmounted.  
First of all, credibility was optimized by conducting prolonged fieldwork during 
the initial G-CDMHA grant project on the phenomenology and etiology of suicide 
terrorism. Interim data analysis and data substantiation ensured that study findings 
matched participant reality. Precise accounts of interviews using verbatim statements 
made by the interviewees, in addition to strictly quoted excerpts from documents ensured 
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that the exact language used by the participants or in the analyzed documents were 
transformed into objective data. Likewise, low-inference descriptors were used, so as to 
accurately record detailed descriptions of specific situations. The use of mechanically 
recorded data (through the extensive use of digital voice recorders, videotapes, and 
photographs) further ensured the accuracy and easy corroboration of the data collected. 
Interviewees were asked to double-check the accuracy of the information collected. After 
each interview, participants were also asked to review the exactness of the information 
gathered and transcribed during their interview(s). Finally, negative cases or conflicting 
data likely to either stand out as exceptions to observed patterns or alter data patterns, if 
any, were controlled for, recorded, analyzed, and reported.    
From a purely methodological standpoint, it should further be noted that a 
thorough symbolic interactionist study of the construction of suicide terrorism, in order to 
be true to the Blumerian tradition, should include extensive fieldwork within the secular 
and religious groups that have been stigmatized and, in essence, demonized as fanatical 
terrorists. To fully comprehend the transactional or interactionist nature of the 
phenomenon, researchers should invest their scholarly efforts in an objective analysis of 
the folk devils, their identity and status, their actions, their environments, and the various 
symbols attached to them. Such approach would be costly and time-consuming, not to 
mention extremely dangerous, but it would undoubtedly enrich our knowledge and 
understanding of suicide bombings worldwide and, as a result, promote more productive 
and effective measures to prevent suicide terror attacks.  
The limitations of the chosen purposeful sampling technique were considered, as 
clarified in Chapter Three, as was the subsequent likelihood of error inherent in the 
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qualitative study design. However, the sampling breadth of this study was wide enough 
that it included cases from very diverse areas of the world, political or religious 
backgrounds, socio-cultural frameworks, and more. Changes over time were not a 
significant risk factor insofar as the socially constructed understanding of the 
phenomenon of suicide terrorism appears constant regardless of time and place. As for 
case-specific data collection methods, they were as thorough as possible, including all 
available and accessible information sources. In retrospect, it seems that snowball 
sampling and informal enquiries would also be useful techniques, all the more as 
bureaucratic hurdles and the clandestine nature of most groups studied can occasionally 
make it difficult to access informants.  
As for the transferability of the findings of this study, it depends on their 
usefulness to other qualitative researchers who would approach the analysis of suicide 
bombings with comparable research questions or practical inquiries. As explained in 
earlier descriptions of pertinent methodological concerns, the generalizability of the 
findings requires their applicability as an analytic synthesis or as grounded theory. This is 
necessary for other researchers to conduct further research on the social construction of 
suicide terrorism. Knowledge may thus be generated not by replicating this study but, 
rather, where extensive corroborating data becomes available through additional case 
studies of the social construction of suicide terrorism.  
In this study, finding transferability was maximized by paying special attention to: 
(a) the researcher’s role and relationship with the study participants; (b) the site and key 
informant selection process via purposeful sampling; (c) the social context of both the 
phenomenon and the study itself; (d) the data collection and analysis strategies (including 
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the triangulation of data and methods); (e) the accuracy of the narrative data; (f) the 
typicality of the selected groups or sites; (g) the specificity and flexibility of the analytic 
framework; and (h) potential alternative interpretations. It is important to note that the 
chosen intellectual framework of this study ensures that both the collection and the 
analysis of the data are constantly steered by the use of specific theoretical concepts and 
models. Since this study is explicitly informed by a body of theory – namely social 
constructionism and, more specifically, symbolic interactionism – researchers or 
policymakers focusing on similar parameters are ultimately free to decide if the cases 
presented in this analysis are transferable to new and comparable research settings, or 
generalizable for policymaking purposes. Ultimately, what is most important to 
remember here is that the need for generalization of these qualitative findings is 
secondary – or almost insignificant – compared to the significance of the in-depth 
understanding and the wealth of knowledge obtained on the phenomenon of interest. 
Future Research 
First and foremost, future research on suicide terrorism and its social construction 
should rely more steadily on the collection of raw data to contribute original information 
to our knowledge base of the phenomenon on the whole. Researchers should recoil from 
the literature integration trend that is plaguing suicide terrorism research today. Such 
approach is intellectually questionable and does not contribute to the advancement of the 
scholarly study of suicide terrorism. More multiple-case studies including in-depth 
interviews instead of mere historical surveys should be developed in order to extend the 
findings of this study and continue to enrich our understanding of the reality of suicide 
bombings. Overall, more qualitative studies involving triangulation of data and methods 
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appear to be crucial to the formation of a methodologically sound, reliable body of 
scholarly literature on this highly relevant socio-political issue.  
Moreover, it is of utmost importance today to favor methodological designs that 
will enable researchers to integrate micro and macro levels of analysis in order to study 
suicide bombings and bombers more comprehensively, both at the individual level and at 
the institutional or structural level. Viewing suicide terrorism as the sole outcome of 
individual rational choice is simplistic. Likewise, interpreting suicide bombings as the 
manifestations of structural dysfunction is dubious at best. In order to be comprehensive 
and reliable scholarly research should, instead of opting for one-dimensional 
explanations, delve into individual motivational factors while incorporating group 
dynamics and social or institutional elements as well. Terrorist campaigns never happen 
in a vacuum: the importance of individual factors must be evaluated against the 
significance of structural ones and vice versa. Future research must therefore integrate a 
combination of psychological, political, historical, economic, and socio-cultural factors to 
explicate what exhort people to join a terrorist group, unite behind common ideologies 
and grievances, and give their own life for what they perceive to be a noble cause.  
A related and potentially promising research endeavor would consist of studying 
suicide bombings from a perspective focusing on the social causes of the act of suicide 
itself. Instead of concentrating on or exaggerating the individual motivations of the 
bombers, such as suicidality or other pathological or clinical features, informed 
researchers should favor a more pragmatic methodology based on the fundamentally 
selfless nature of the act. Give up one’s life in a suicide bombing is more an expressive 
act than an instrumental one. It is the expression of an emotion resulting from group 
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dynamics and ideological motivation to fight for a just cause and die a noble death. 
Researchers should not consider suicide bombings as the outcome of a cost-benefit 
calculation or as a means to an end, as is regularly the case in the extant literature. In 
order to be fruitful, scholarly efforts should instead be focused on analyzing suicide 
bombings as ultimate examples of altruistic suicide, in the Durkheimian sense, not 
manifestations of egoistic, anomic, or fatalistic types of suicide characterized by lack of 
status or religious integration or by the state of social regulation. 
The political ramifications of the social construction of suicide terrorism deserve 
much more attention in scholarly writings. Specifically, more studies need to investigate 
the politicization of suicide bombings and their resonance within more general trends: the 
politicization of law and order and the politicization of religion and religiosity. These are 
significant elements of today’s U.S.-led “War on Terror” and foreign policy as a whole, 
both inside and outside of the United States. Researchers should try to determine how 
these multiple facets of politicization affect public policy regarding terrorism in general 
and suicide terrorism in particular, all the more as the sustainability and increasing 
popularity of the tactic are significantly conditioned by the foreign policies of the 
Western nations implicated in the “War on Terror.” 
Similarly, the threat infrastructure of anti-terrorism policies is worthy of further 
analysis as well. The research community and policymakers (and ultimately society at 
large) would greatly benefit from a careful examination of the reasons why suicide 
terrorism has generated such a moral panic while other insecurity episodes have not (and 
probably never will). It would also be tremendously worthwhile to scrutinize why suicide 
bombings have been only marginalized and essentially minimized in some areas of the 
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world, while they have resulted in outbursts of fear, anger, and anxiety elsewhere. Future 
studies should therefore probe not only the role of the mass media in the social 
construction of suicide terrorism and the creation of synthetic panics that stigmatize and 
demonize “the Other,” but also how political actors actively contribute to the politics of 
collective insecurity, including the subjective or selective formation of the threats and the 
propagation and marketing of fear. Such studies could focus on both proactive 
involvement (political actors who are influential in getting a threat on the policy agenda) 
and reactive roles (political actors who try to influence the threat awareness and 
assessment once others have turned the threat into a key socio-political issue).  
Scholars should earnestly endeavor to contribute to the development of a more 
impartial analysis of suicide terrorism and its social construction not only by contributing 
sound research to academic journals with a limited readership, but also by offering their 
scientific, unbiased knowledge to the media and policymakers. Newsmaking 
criminologists, for instance, could play a significant role in the presentation of a more 
objective interpretation of suicide bombings and a more realistic image of the dynamics 
involved. This would help demystify the phenomenon by offsetting the subjective and 
overdramatic nature of contemporary media coverage of suicide bombings, which 
typically favors the sensationalistic and highly selective treatment of events in regions of 
the world where the United States has political or economic interests. Truly fair and 
balanced information would finally take over the promotion of self-interests.  
Above all, principled scholars must strive to develop an original and cohesive 
research agenda to not only ensure fruitful investigative efforts but also promote a 
thorough, objective investigation of the complex dynamics of suicide bombings. Suicide 
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terrorism must be analyzed methodically and – above all – dispassionately, as a relative 
phenomenon that occurs within diverse cultures and evolves within a variety of symbolic 
frameworks and moral universes. More studies of suicide bombings should focus on the 
dynamics of the phenomenon, as well as the dynamics of human interaction in general as 
it influences people’s symbolic framework for interpreting and understanding this violent 
tactic. Suicide terrorism should not be viewed as a static or monolithic social problem 
that does not vary across countries or cultures. Only a dispassionate and methodically 
sound analysis including a variety of perspectives on the issue will foster a clear 
understanding of the reality and dynamics of suicide bombings.  
Only objective, elaborate scholarly studies and methodical investigations of the 
phenomenon and its intricate context can effectively filter through the socio-political 
processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures involved in the social 
construction of suicide terrorism. Such analyses have the potential to significantly affect 
all major actors in the moral panic surrounding suicide bombings today: the folk devils, 
the media, the public, and the agents of social control involved in rule creation and 
enforcement. Today, the dominant interpretational framework promotes a simplistic 
dualism of suicide terrorism as a violent political and religious weapon that evidences a 
fundamental misunderstanding of suicide bombings, in addition to a misleading, 
counterproductive, and therefore harmful construal of the threat they pose worldwide. 
This has already had serious adverse consequences: a chronic lack of knowledge about 
the context and symbols of suicide terrorism; the trivialization and misrepresentation of 
meanings and beliefs associated with suicide bombers; a mass media and ideological 
exploitation of suicide bombings as deviant or even evil acts; extreme perceptions and 
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moral campaigns that spill into subjective interpretations of the actors behind the violence 
(on both sides) and result in moral panics; the adoption of misguided, inappropriate, and 
arbitrary policies; the polarization of demonized deviants against the rest of society; and 
the increased cohesion of terrorist groups in response to misguided counterterrorism 
measures or suppression attempts by ill-advised agents of social control. Still, amidst all 
these negative outcomes is a fantastically fertile ground for excellent research in the near 
future. May the high potential for controversy not be a deterrent.  
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Appendix A: Foreign Terrorist Organizations (2005) 
1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)  
2. Abu Sayyaf Group  
3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade  
4. Ansar al-Islam  
5. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)  
6. Asbat al-Ansar  
7. Aum Shinrikyo  
8. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)  
9. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)   
10. Continuity Irish Republican Army   
11. Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)  
12. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)  
13. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)  
14. Hizballah (Party of God)  
15. Islamic Jihad Group  
16. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)  
17. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)  
18. Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)  
19. al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)  
20. Kahane Chai (Kach)  
21. Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK)  
22. Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)  
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23. Lashkar i Jhangvi  
24. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)  
25. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)  
26. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)  
27. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)  
28. National Liberation Army (ELN)  
29. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)  
30. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)  
31. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF)   
32. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)  
33. al-Qa’ida  
34. Real IRA  
35. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)  
36. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)  
37. Revolutionary Organization 17 November  
38. Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)   
39. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)  
40. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)  
41. Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (al-Qaida in Iraq) (formerly 
Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, JTJ, al-Zarqawi Network)  
42. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 
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Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are 
designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight 
against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities 
and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.  
 
Identification  
The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department 
(S/CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to 
identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, S/CT looks 
not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the 
group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or 
retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.  
 
Designation 
Once a target is identified, S/CT prepares a detailed "administrative record," 
which is a compilation of information, typically including both classified and open 
sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been 
satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the designation, Congress is notified of the 
Secretary’s intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the 
designation, as the INA requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period  
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and in the absence of Congressional action to block the designation, notice of the 
designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes 
effect. By law an organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the 
designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not 
later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register. 
Until recently the INA provided that FTOs must be redesignated every two years 
or the designation would lapse.  Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 (IRTPA), however, the redesignation requirement was replaced by certain 
review and revocation procedures.  IRTPA provides that an FTO may file a petition for 
revocation 2 years after its designation date (or in the case of redesignated FTOs, its most 
recent redesignation date) or 2 years after the determination date on its most recent 
petition for revocation. In order to provide a basis for revocation, the petitioning FTO 
must provide evidence that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation are 
sufficiently different as to warrant revocation. If no such review has been conducted 
during a five year period with respect to a designation, then the Secretary of State is 
required to review the designation to determine whether revocation would be appropriate.   
In addition, the Secretary of State may at any time revoke a designation upon a finding 
that the circumstances forming  the basis for the designation  have changed in such a 
manner as to warrant revocation, or that the national security of the United States 
warrants a revocation. The same procedural requirements apply to revocations made by  
the Secretary of State as apply to designations. A designation may be revoked by an Act 
of Congress, or set aside by a Court order. 
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Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended 
1. It must be a foreign organization.  
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 
(a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in 
section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 
and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent to 
engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.  
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. 
nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the 
economic interests) of the United States.  
 
Legal Ramifications of Designation 
1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to a 
designated FTO. (The term "material support or resources" is defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A(b)(1) as " any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including 
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, 
explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and 
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) 
provides that for these purposes “the term ‘training’ means instruction or teaching  
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designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.” 18 U.S.C. § 
2339A(b)(3) further provides that for these purposes the term ‘expert advice or 
assistance’ means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge.’’  
2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are 
inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States 
(see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)).   
3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or 
control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must 
retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.  
 
Other Effects of Designation 
1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and to encourage other nations to 
do the same.  
2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally.  
3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named 
organizations.  
4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations.  
5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations. 
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* Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA defines "terrorist activity" to mean: "any activity 
which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if 
committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or 
any State) and which involves any of the following: 
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, 
vessel, or vehicle). 
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to 
detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a 
governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an 
explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or 
detained. 
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined 
in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of 
such a person. 
(IV) An assassination. 
(V) The use of any-- 
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or 
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere 
personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one 
or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property. 
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing." 
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Other pertinent portions of section 212(a)(3)(B) are set forth below: 
(iv) Engage in Terrorist Activity Defined  
As used in this chapter [chapter 8 of the INA], the term ‘engage in terrorist activity’ 
means in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization– 
1. to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an 
intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;  
2. to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;  
3. to gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity;  
4. to solicit funds or other things of value for– 
(aa) a terrorist activity; 
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or 
(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can 
demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the 
solicitation would further the organization’s terrorist activity; 
I. to solicit any individual–  
(aa) to engage in conduce otherwise described in this clause; 
(bb) for membership in terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or  
(vi)(II); or 
(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless 
the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably 
have known, that the solicitation would further the organization’s terrorist 
activity; or  
 262
Appendix A: (Continued) 
II. to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, 
affords material support, including a safe house, transportation, 
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial 
benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including 
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training– 
(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity; 
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know, has 
committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity; 
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or 
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the actor can 
demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the act 
would further the organization’s terrorist activity. 
This clause shall not apply to any material support the alien afforded to an 
organization or individual that has committed terrorist activity, if the Secretary of State, 
after consultation with the Attorney General, or the Attorney General, after consultation 
with the Secretary of State, concludes in his sole unreviewable discretion, that that this 
clause should not apply."  
 
(v) Representative Defined 
As used in this paragraph, the term ‘representative’ includes an officer, official, or 
spokesman of an organization, and any person who directs, counsels, commands, or 
induces an organization or its members to engage in terrorist activity.  
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(i) Terrorist Organization Defined 
As used in clause (i)(VI) and clause (iv), the term ‘terrorist organization’ means an 
organization-- 
I. designated under section 219 [8 U.S.C. § 1189];  
II. otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by the Secretary of 
State in consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney General, as a terrorist 
organization, after finding that the organization engages in the activities described 
in subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause (iv), or that the organization provides 
material support to further terrorist activity; or  
III. that is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages 
in the activities described in subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause (iv).  
 
** Section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 
1989 defines "terrorism" as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."  
 
Source: United States Department of State, 2005 (http://www.state.gov) 
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1. To what extent does your work expose you to or require you to deal with the 
phenomenon of suicide terrorism?  
2. Suicide terrorism is not a sui generis phenomenon, but an integral feature of the 
historical development of oppositional terrorism worldwide. It is usually the result 
of an assortment of typical tactics, goals, and motives characteristic of more 
conventional terrorism. Should the same tactics and policies that have been 
implemented to fight terrorism in general be applied to suicide terrorism? Why / 
Why not? 
3. If you answered “yes” to Question 2, how do you suggest the same policies be 
applied to both dimensions? If you answered “no,” how would you develop 
policies to specifically and effectively target suicide terrorism? 
4. Suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon either. It is rooted in the historical, 
social, and psychological dimensions of international terrorism, as a result of 
centuries of opposition between various terrorist groups and their actual or 
perceived enemies. How can governments, non-governmental organizations 
(NGO’s), and other entities efficiently and effectively take all these different 
dimensions of suicide terrorism into account? 
5. Suicide terror operations are politically motivated violent attacks perpetrated by 
self-aware individuals who actively and purposely cause their own death by 
blowing themselves up along with their chosen target(s). How can the inherently 
political nature of the problem be addressed? 
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6. Suicide terrorism has become one of the most spectacular and dreadful weapons 
available to terrorists (along with blowing up airplanes in mid air and using 
weapons of mass destruction). How high of a priority is suicide terrorism in your 
agency/country today?  
7. If applicable, how has your country addressed the problem of suicide terrorism 
thus far?  
8. If applicable, has your agency/organization compiled a database of past suicide 
terror attacks? If so, how has it been used? 
9. If a suicide terror attack occurred in your jurisdiction or country next week, how 
prepared would you (i.e., as an agency or a country) be to respond to the critical 
incident and manage its outcomes? 
10. If a suicide terror attack occurred in your jurisdiction or country next week, what 
protocols would be set into motion in order to respond to and recover from the 
incident? 
11. Has there been any attempt in your country at training first responders and law 
enforcement personnel in general to respond specifically to suicide terror attacks 
(at the local, regional or national level)?  
12. About fifteen religious or secular terrorist groups have used or are capable of 
using suicide terrorism against their own governments and foreign governments. 
How important is it to adapt antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies to the 
secular or religious nature of the terrorist group resorting to suicide terrorism?  
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13. How should antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies be tailored to fit the 
nature of the threat? 
14. One of the distinctive characteristics of suicide terrorism is the motive of 
individual self-sacrifice and martyrdom. How can these two elements be 
specifically addressed in developing and enforcing policies to counter and prevent 
suicide terrorism? 
15. How can strategies and policies be formulated and enforced in order to address 
the issue of suicide terrorism at the micro- (individual), meso- (group), and 
macro- (societal) levels? 
16. Should these levels be clearly identified and autonomously targeted by these 
antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies or policies? Why / Why not? 
17. Suicide terrorism represents a substantial intensification of a group’s terrorist 
activity. Suicide terrorism is difficult to combat; it results in high casualty tolls 
and often inspires considerable religious and/or ideological zeal. When suicide 
terrorism is associated with religious extremism, what kind of strategies and 
public policies do you suggest be created/implemented? 
18. Secular groups may also resort to suicide bombings in their terrorist campaigns. 
Two examples are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and 
KONGRA-GEL (former PKK) in Turkey. The latter has stopped using suicide 
terrorism as a tactic, whereas the LTTE is still the world leader in suicide 
terrorism. Given the context of the Kurdish issue, why do you think a group like 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL gave up?  
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19. What policies could be enforced in order to incite a secular group (e.g., the LTTE) 
to stop using suicide terrorism and ultimately cease resorting to terrorism in 
general? 
20. Suicide terror attacks are either battlefield operations (e.g., Japanese Kamikazes 
during WWII, “enemy combatants” in Iraq in the past few months) or off-the-
battlefield operations involving single suicide bombers and sometimes even 
multiple suicide bombers (e.g., Hamas, LTTE). Should strategies and policies be 
different depending on the type of operations concerned?  
21. Or should they be applicable to both but flexible enough to adapt to the kind of 
operations a region/country may face? 
22. The targets of suicide terror operations are generally varied. They can be either 
stationary or mobile, human beings or infrastructures; their nature can be civilian, 
military, political, economic, or cultural. How can comprehensive strategies be 
developed to include all potential targets?  
23. What are the practical risks involved in creating and implementing such wide-
ranging strategies (cost, paranoia, etc.)? 
24. The high number of casualties in suicide attacks warrants worldwide media 
coverage, which guarantees suicide terrorist groups exposure on the international 
scene. How may media coverage affect the effectiveness and potential of 
antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies?  
25. In light of current or recent events, should the role of the mass media be 
downplayed or enhanced?  
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26. The participation of women in suicide terrorism, though not a new feature, is an 
increasing phenomenon that has compelled authorities to react accordingly (e.g., 
by adapting their profiling techniques). How can preventive and operational 
strategies address this particular issue? 
27. Can criminal/psychological profiling be an effective tool in the fight against 
suicide terrorism? Why / Why not? 
28. The primary purpose of contemporary suicide terrorism is to cause maximum 
physical damage and subsequently paralyze entire populations with overwhelming 
fear and angst. This guarantees the devastating, negative psychological effect of 
the impromptu operations (traumatic stressors) not only on the direct victims of 
the attacks, but also on entire populations. What policies exist in your country to 
address the psychological consequences or overall mental health outcomes of 
suicide terrorism?  
• Primary victims (individuals directly exposed to the elements of the 
suicide terror attack, who experienced the life-threatening situation 
personally) 
• Secondary victims (close family members and personal friends of the 
primary victims) 
• Tertiary victims (individuals whose occupation demand they respond to 
the attack) 
• Quaternary victims (displaced workers, as well as sensitive and caring 
members of communities in and beyond the directly impacted areas) 
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29. Suicide terrorism is not a domestic problem affecting certain countries, but an 
international phenomenon that endangers the safety of entire populations. How 
important is it for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to communicate, 
share intelligence and expertise, and expand their existing cooperation?  
30. Several terrorist groups have been building worldwide networks to mainly ensure 
their logistical growth and financial stability. Should uniform international 
policies be formulated and enforced in order to: (a) freeze the financial assets of 
terrorist groups; (b) prohibit fundraising in the name of religious or social goals to 
actually finance terrorist operations or propaganda activities?  
31. Should uniform international policies be formulated and enforced in order to 
prohibit governments from sponsoring or actively participating in terrorism and 
suicide terrorism?   
32. What kind of new technologies and tactics could be developed to counter suicide 
terrorism at the international level?  
33. How should existing special counterterrorist units (task forces) be strengthened? 
34. Should international funds be allotted to conduct more research on countering 
suicide terrorism? 
35. Additional comments. 
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The Terrorist Threat Integration Center 
 In his January 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush announced a new 
initiative to better protect America by continuing to close the “seam” between analysis of 
foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism.  
 The President announced that he had instructed the Director of Central Intelligence, the 
Director of the FBI, working with the Attorney General, and the Secretaries of Homeland 
Security and Defense to develop the Nation’s first unified Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center. This new center will merge and analyze terrorist-related information collected 
domestically and abroad in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture.  
 Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has been working together and 
sharing information like never before. The creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center is the next phase in the dramatic enhancement of the government’s 
counterterrorism effort. The President has now directed his senior advisors to take the 
next step in ensuring that intelligence information from all sources is shared, integrated, 
and analyzed seamlessly -- and then acted upon quickly.  
 The Administration will ensure that this program is carried out consistently with the 
rights of Americans.  
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The New Terrorist Threat Integration Center  
 Elements of the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI’s Counterterrorism 
Division, the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center, and the Department of Defense will form a 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center to fuse and analyze all-source information related to 
terrorism.  
 The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will continue to close the “seam” between 
analysis of foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism.  
 Specifically, it will:  
• Optimize use of terrorist threat-related information, expertise, and capabilities to 
conduct threat analysis and inform collection strategies.  
• Create a structure that ensures information sharing across agency lines.  
• Integrate terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in order 
to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture.  
• Be responsible and accountable for providing terrorist threat assessments for our 
national leadership.  
 The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will be headed by a senior U.S. Government 
official, who will report to the Director of Central Intelligence. This individual will be 
appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the 
FBI and the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security.   
 The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will play a lead role in overseeing a national 
counterterrorism tasking and requirements system and for maintaining shared databases.  
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 The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will also maintain an up-to-date database of 
known and suspected terrorists that will be accessible to federal and non-federal officials 
and entities, as appropriate.  
 In order to carry out its responsibilities effectively, the Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center will have access to all intelligence information -- from raw reports to finished 
analytic assessments -- available to the U.S. Government.  
 A senior multiagency team will finalize the details, design, and implementation 
strategy for the stand-up of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.  
 
Transforming the Federal Bureau of Investigation  
 Immediately after September 11, the President directed the FBI and the Attorney 
General to make preventing future terrorist attacks against the homeland their top priority 
-- and they have responded.  
 The FBI has:  
• Disrupted terrorist plots on U.S. soil.  
• Established 66 Joint Terrorism Task Forces across America, with full 
participation from, and enhanced communications with, multiple federal, state, 
and local agencies.  
• Created a National Joint Terrorism Task Force at FBI Headquarters.  
• Established a 24-7 Counterterrorism Watch center.  
• Created new counterterrorism “Flying Squads” to deploy into the field at a 
moment’s notice.  
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• Created Intelligence Reports Offices to facilitate the vital flow of information.  
• Trained new analysts for the Counterterrorism Division, using a curriculum 
developed with assistance from the CIA.  
 The FBI is establishing an intelligence program to ensure that the collection and 
dissemination of intelligence is given the same institutional priority as the collection of 
evidence for prosecution. A new Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence will have 
direct authority and responsibility for the FBI’s national intelligence program. The FBI is 
establishing intelligence units in all of its Field Offices.  
 The FBI is implementing a revolutionary new data management system to ensure that 
it shares all the FBI’s terrorism-related information internally and with the CIA, the 
Department of Homeland Security, and other appropriate agencies.  
 Last year, by enacting the USA PATRIOT Act, the President and Congress took an 
important step to enhance the ability of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to 
investigate and prosecute terrorism, and to share information with other government 
agencies.  
 
Enhancing CIA’s Counterterrorism Capabilities  
 Counterterrorism is a long-standing priority of the CIA and the CIA has been pivotal to 
the major successes in America’s War on Terror. The CIA has:  
• Disrupted dozens of planned terrorist attacks around the world.  
• Continued to expand our insight into terrorist organizations and plans.  
• Greatly enhanced its working relationships with foreign partners.  
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 Since September 11, 2001, the Director of Central Intelligence has dramatically 
redeployed analysts and operatives against the terrorist target. He has:  
 Doubled the size of the Counterterrorist Center.  
 Quadrupled the number of personnel engaged in counterterrorism analysis.  
 Detailed 25 experienced analysts to work side by side with their counterparts at FBI.  
 The DCI created the position of Associate Director of Central Intelligence for 
Homeland Security to ensure timely, effective and secure flow of intelligence to agencies 
engaged in Homeland Security.  
 
A Key Role for the Department of Homeland Security  
 The Department of Homeland Security will add critical new capabilities in the area of 
information analysis and infrastructure protection.  
 The Department’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate will:  
• Perform comprehensive vulnerability assessments of the Nation’s critical 
infrastructure and key assets.  
• Receive and analyze terrorism-related information from the Terrorism Threat 
Integration Center, as well as open sources, the public, private industry, state and 
local law enforcement, and the entire federal family.  
• Map the threats against our vulnerabilities, in order to develop a comprehensive 
picture of the terrorist threat and our ability to withstand it.  
 275
Appendix C: (Continued) 
• Take and facilitate action to protect against identified threats, remedy 
vulnerabilities, and preempt and disrupt terrorist threats, as consistent with the 
operational authorities of the Department’s constituent agencies.  
• Set national priorities for infrastructure protection, strategically designed to 
maximize the return on the investment.  
• Take a lead role in issuing warnings, threat advisories, and recommended 
response measures to America’s public safety agencies, elected officials, industry, 
and the public.  
 The Department will be a full partner in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.  
 The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will help the Department perform its critical 
missions. It will provide the Department with a full and comprehensive picture of the 
terrorist threat that will inform the actions of the Department.  
 Some of the Department’s functions are expected to be performed at the new facility 
housing the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The integration of elements of the 
Department into the Terrorist Threat Integration Center will ensure an unimpeded two-
way flow of terrorist threat information.  
 The Department of Homeland Security, working hand in hand with the FBI, will be 
responsible for ensuring that threat information, including information produced by the 
Center, is disseminated quickly to the public, private industry, and state and local 
governments as appropriate.  
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Contributions of the Department of Defense  
 The Department of Defense has been a key player in the global war on terrorism, 
including prosecuting the war on terrorism overseas. Intelligence elements of the 
Department, including the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, continue to make crucial contributions to our 
terrorism intelligence collection overseas.  
 Appropriate DOD intelligence elements will participate fully in the TTIC, providing 
information, receiving information, and contributing to analytic efforts, under their own 
current authorities.  
 DOD will have no new operational authority or responsibility under the President's 
announced program. The TTIC does not involve new activities by DOD; rather, it seeks 
to maximize and "fuse" the efforts of all of our counterterrorism intelligence efforts, as 
has been called for by many experts on both sides of the aisle. 
 
Source: U.S. Department of State, 2003 (http://www.state.gov) 
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Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies 
The world has changed since September 11, 2001. We remain a nation at risk to terrorist 
attacks and will remain at risk for the foreseeable future. At all Threat Conditions, we 
must remain vigilant, prepared, and ready to deter terrorist attacks. The following Threat 
Conditions each represent an increasing risk of terrorist attacks. Beneath each Threat 
Condition are some suggested Protective Measures, recognizing that the heads of Federal 
departments and agencies are responsible for developing and implementing appropriate 
agency-specific Protective Measures:  
 
1. Low Condition (Green). This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist 
attacks.  
Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in 
addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures they develop and implement:  
• Refining and exercising as appropriate preplanned Protective Measures;  
• Ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory 
System and specific preplanned department or agency Protective Measures; and  
• Institutionalizing a process to assure that all facilities and regulated sectors are 
regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all reasonable 
measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities.  
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2. Guarded Condition (Blue). This condition is declared when there is a general risk of 
terrorist attacks. 
In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Condition, Federal 
departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to 
the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:  
• Checking communications with designated emergency response or command 
locations;  
• Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and  
• Providing the public with any information that would strengthen its ability to act 
appropriately.  
 
3. Elevated Condition (Yellow). An Elevated Condition is declared when there is a 
significant risk of terrorist attacks.  
In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal 
departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to 
the Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:  
Increasing surveillance of critical locations;  
• Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions;  
• Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further 
refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and  
• Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans.  
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4. High Condition (Orange). A High Condition is declared when there is a high risk of 
terrorist attacks. 
In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal 
departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to 
the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:  
• Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces 
organizations;  
• Taking additional precautions at public events and possibly considering 
alternative venues or even cancellation;  
• Preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site 
or dispersing their workforce; and  
• Restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only.  
 
5. Severe Condition (Red). A Severe Condition reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks.  
Under most circumstances, the Protective Measures for a Severe Condition are not 
intended to be sustained for substantial periods of time. In addition to the Protective 
Measures in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies also 
should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific 
Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:  
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• Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs;  
• Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing 
specially trained teams or resources;  
• Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; and  
• Closing public and government facilities. 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005 (http://www.dhs.gov) 
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